780.00/8–251
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones)
Subject: Israel’s Concern Re Peace With the Arabs and Other Matters.
| Participants: | Mr. Theodore Kollek, Embassy of Israel |
| Mr. G. Lewis Jones, NE |
Discussion:
Mr. Kollek called on me today at his request and said that the occasion for his visit was the fact that he plans to depart for Israel August 4 and return to Washington about August 25. His visit was in lieu of that of Ambassador Eban who has been detained by the Suez case in the Security Council. Eban might visit Israel in September. Kollek said that he was anxious to have a first-hand picture of developments in Israel following the election.
Elections:
Regarding the Israel election, Kollek said that he believes that Mapai and the General Zionists should coalesce for a single purpose: i.e., to agree on holding direct elections and to set a date for new elections. He spoke of the disabilities which the present system of proportional representation subjected Israel.
Water Problems:
Kollek said that he had had lunch yesterday in New York with General Riley (whose impartiality he praises), who had spoken in very gloomy terms of the situation in the Demilitarized Zone. Riley saw as the only solution a Regional Water Scheme in which Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Jordan would participate; Riley saw no possibility of this happening in the foreseeable future, and according to Kollek, Mr. McGhee agreed with him.
Kollek said that he could not imagine anyone in Israel rejecting the idea of a Regional Water Scheme: he wanted to know whether I, too, was doubtful regarding the practicability of such a scheme.
I replied that such a scheme was the only one that made any sense, but that I doubted that it would have any hope of success while Israel continues to adhere to its “orthodox” approach. I said that the Arabs can see no evidence of Israeli goodwill; consequently they will hold back from such a scheme. Kollek seemed to accept this.
Continuing along the line of the “unorthodox” approach, I told Kollek that I was most interested to hear that he had mentioned the el Hamma Salient last evening to Mr. Jack Waldo as being something which Israel might be willing to yield to Syria. I said that this (and the right of Syrian fishermen to fish in the Sea of Galilee, which he [Page 814] had also mentioned) were very small things but to me their significance was the fact that Kollek had mentioned them at all; they were the first indications that I had had that Israel might be prepared to give up anything to Syria.
Kollek said that he was not talking as an Israeli official but it was his personal belief, which he thought others in the government would support, that a deal could be made with regard to el Hamma as part of an agreement involving the entire Demilitarized Zone. Kollek indicated that he thought Israel had “missed a bet” in refusing to sit down with the Syrians recently. He favored the Israel-Syrian MAC, “which is really a political instrument,” being staffed with Foreign Office officials from both sides. On this basis he believes something might be worked out under the aegis of the MAC.
I expressed the view that it would be too much to expect the Syrians to buy a “final peace settlement” at this time even though agreement were reached regarding areas of jurisdiction in the Demilitarized Zone. The most that could be hoped for is that the parties might agree upon lines of a part of a temporary modus vivendi with the full knowledge that these lines would eventually become the frontiers under a final peace settlement.
Diplomats vs. Soldiers
Kollek then turned to the question of the internal struggle in Israel between the Foreign Office and the General Staff. He said Riley had mentioned this to him, and he had to admit that there was some foundation for the view that in Israel as well as elsewhere in the world soldiers and diplomats were not infrequently at odds. However, he thought these differences were much exaggerated and that time would show that the diplomats will come out on top. I said that as I understood the situation much depends upon the personal views of Ben Gurion who is the “giant” on the scene in Israel. Kollek agreed, but said that Ben Gurion is a Democrat and that he knew of many instances in which he might have circumvented a decision by the Cabinet which had gone against him. However, he had refused to follow any course except the democratic decision of the Cabinet.
The Arab State of Mind
Kollek asked me directly “Can you talk to the Arabs? Do they make sense? What are they thinking about? We, of course, cannot talk to them, and our information is very poor regarding the state of mind of the Arabs”.
I told him that I would reply with the utmost candor and then proceeded to paint a picture of Israel as seen from the Arab side of the line. I ended up with the generalization that fundamental to Arab thinking is the belief that Israel possesses neither good faith nor goodwill towards its neighbors and said that when we were asked [Page 815] to cite specific instances supporting Israel’s contention that they possess both, I was bound to say that, aside from the uniting of Arab families more than two years ago, I could think of no instance which would carry weight with the Arabs. I spoke of the dilatory and petty fogging tactics of Israel in connection with compliance with the May 18 resolution and remarked that the overly-legalistic approach of Israel to this resolution was conclusive evidence to the Arabs that Israel intended to do what it wanted to do. I said it would be helpful in dealing with the Arabs to have a case in which Israel eschewed equivocation in its compliance. The Arabs felt they were intelligent enough to know the sense of a Security Council resolution—to understand it. By the time the Israel lawyers got through with a resolution it was something else.
It may have been Kollek’s natural courtesy or that he was dissembling, but he gave me the impression of not only being grateful for my unvarnished sketch of Israel as seen by the Arabs, but to a degree concurred with regard to the poor mariner in which Israel has complied with the May 18, 1951 resolution.
Ingathering of Exiles
At the close of the interview I asked Kollek to tell me frankly whether Israel planned to start the ingathering of 70,000 Jews from Iran along the lines of the ingathering from Iraq. I said that so far as I knew, the level of anti-semitism in Iran was not abnormally high and I thought the friends of Israel, including the United States, would not favor a deliberately generated exodus there.
Kollek replied that there was a school of thought in Israel which believes that when a nationalistic government of the Mossadegh type comes into power sooner or later they turn against their minorities and this has caused consideration to be given to the Iranian Jews. He did not believe, however, that efforts would be made to bring them to Israel unless the situation generally deteriorates. There could be no doubt that the need of the Roumanian Jews to come to Israel is far greater than the need of the Iranian Jews.
I opined that the Iraqi operation had been bad for Iraq. I said that I hoped the Iraqi Government would not disenfranchise the Jews who had elected to remain Iraqi citizens. Kollek argued that short range, Iraq may have lost some skills, but he thought that long range it is “better for a country to be homogeneous” as would be the case if all of the Jews left Iraq. I asserted that homogeneity of population is not always a good thing and pointed with pride to the fact that the United States is in no sense homogeneous. Kollek’s only answer was “The United States is different.”