974.531/7–3151: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State
priority
167. Re Suez. Gross and Ross lunched with Jebb (on his invitation) and Lacoste, Laskey present. Fawzi in separate conversations with Jebb and Lacoste yesterday apparently took almost precisely same [Page 809] line as he took with us yesterday. Interesting variation as reported by Jebb was that Fawzi, in referring to possibility of lifting certificates required of shipmasters in transit through canal implied that shipmasters would not, of course, thereby be bound not to unload cargoes at Haifa. Jebb said this possibility had been mentioned to British Amb Cairo perhaps two years ago; British objection then as now on combination of legal and practical grounds. In mentioning this possibility to us yesterday Fawzi, saying that possibility had been brought to attention of AmEmb Cairo (he did not say when), indicated Egyptian Govt would naturally expect shipmasters would feel morally bound not to unload cargoes at Haifa.
As we had anticipated Jebb was inclined to take very skeptical and condemnatory line vis-à-vis Egyptian protestations desire to cooperate. Lacoste, on other hand, while professing skepticism was strongly inclined to take go slow line and manifested desire French Govt to play string out to end with Egyptians.
Referring to Fawzi’s suggestions re alternative oil installations, Lacoste recalled that there had been alternative pipeline facilities running to Tripoli coast of Lebanon. He speculated, in context Iraqi interest Suez problem, whether Tripoli possibility should not more thoroughly be examined. We asked that he get more info on this aspect of matter which he promised to do.
We questioned in foregoing context whether in long-range interest of Atlantic community possibility of alternative oil installations (relative to Iranian and Haifa facilities) should not be explored. Both Jebb and Lacoste were noncommittal but Jebb, and Lacoste more so, seemed interested. Gross made clear that fundamentals our position remain unchanged, namely, that we felt maintenance of restrictions was wrong and that restrictions should be lifted at soonest possible time. Lacoste, and Jebb as well, of course agreed. Jebb was inclined to argue for tabling of res tomorrow; on other hand, Jebb, apparently impressed by weakness of voting situation in Council, was amenable to almost anything that would maintain some degree of momentum.
With regard to res we left no doubt we were inclined to co-sponsor and thought there should be no difficulty in working out agreement on text; only problem we foresaw was matter of timing. Lacoste, as yet without definitive instructions on text of res, felt it should not be tabled tomorrow. Jebb, remarking he probably should not say so, nevertheless said he would agree to “anything” in way of res we considered desirable, essential thing being, which might be accomplished in one short para, that we call upon Egypt to lift restrictions. Jebb expressed, without apparent conviction, however, that tabling of res would have effect on Egyptian Govt decision to lift restrictions. Lacoste was very strongly impressed, however, that Egyptians would not comply, at this time at least, with strong res. Jebb very readily agreed [Page 810] with idea that res, once agreed upon text, might be shown to Egyptians (and of course to Israelis) within next day or two primarily for purpose of indicating to Egyptians probable end result of SC action unless Egyptian Govt meanwhile came through with more assurances than had been forthcoming up to now.
Both Jebb and Lacoste readily agreed that tomorrow’s (Wednesday’s) mtg of SC should be essentially routine, opportunity being given to Fawzi and Eban to restate their cases. Jebb may receive instructions to make statement; if he makes statement tomorrow it will be in broad, general terms. We explained that us being in Presidency we would probably follow precedents and give other members of Council opportunity to make statements before we spoke. Lacoste indicated initial statement France might make would be in general terms.
Jebb was somewhat intrigued with idea of Riley appearing before Council but readily yielded to Lacoste’s objections, Lacoste adding he understood Riley did not want to appear on this case.
Lacoste rather strongly and Jebb very readily agreed that after essentially routine mtg tomorrow and some days delay, next step might well be appointment of Muniz as rapporteur. See ourtel No 168, July 31,1 on present thinking of Muniz this subject.
Lacoste displayed some interest, and Jebb mildly so, in US, UK, French discussions with Fawzi. We pointed out disadvantages as we saw them: (a) Appearance of our being “suppliants”, and (b) Fawzi being on short tether without negotiating flexibility. We therefore dropped idea “tripartite” discussions, at least at this point. Jebb and Lacoste agreed most effective approach ensuing days would probably be through Caffery to Egyptian FonMin.
- Infra.↩