974.531/7–3051: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State
priority
164. Re Suez: Gross and Ross lunched with Fawzi (Egypt) and Counselor Egyptian Mission to UN today on Fawzi’s invitation. Gross outlined Dept’s views as set forth in Deptel 60, July 30 (timeliness of which was very helpful) and Deptels referred to therein. Noting that views expressed were similar to those expressed by Dept to Counselor Egyptian Embassy and Amb Caffery to Egyptian FonMin, Gross emphasized para 2 of Deptel 60, namely our view that restrictions should be suspended in toto or “alleviated to the point of invisibility”. He gave equal emphasis to para 4 Deptel 41[42] July 19 (Dept’s No. 87 to Cairo).1
Fawzi said he thought he understood our position and he wanted to make sure that we understood the position of his govt. “Big stick” of an SC res or any other big stick would not accomplish purpose desired. We could not ask another govt to “commit suicide” nor would it do so if we were to make such an extreme demand. No Egyptian PriMin or FonMin would be able to face the Egyptian Parliament or the press or “go for a walk in the street” if he yielded to big stick tactics. Such tactics were reminiscent of Hitler and would be unbecoming to us. If effort made to apply such tactics, Egyptian people would be convinced that American “steam rollers” were once again being used. No one was more cooperative than the Egyptian FonMin and no one was more courageous than he in willingness to face Egyptian people with solution to problem such as Suez which might be far from perfect from Egyptian viewpoint. A coalition govt in Egypt necessarily composed [Page 808] of minorities would never face problem in same spirit of cooperation and courage.
We said we thought we appreciated dilemma in which Egyptian Govt found itself. On the one hand were domestic difficulties to which Fawzi referred; on the other hand Egyptian Govt appeared to be on what might be described as a “bad wicket” so far as UN members were concerned, particularly members of the SC. Appreciating their dilemma and motivated by friendliest feelings we wanted to help Egypt out of their present difficult situation if possible. Members of SC were of peace stability, and therefore to process of strengthening the area.
Reverting to earlier remarks, Fawzi repeated the effect Egyptian conviction that restrictions on tankers passing through Suez and destined for Haifa could not be lifted without very substantially strengthening Israel economically, politically and militarily; that, apart from other considerations, for Egypt to lift restrictions unilaterally would upset thereby balance of power in Near East; and that Egypt could not take this action without “compensation”.
Following Gross’ departure, Ross endeavored to get Fawzi to be more explicit. It seems fairly clear, in the first place, that Fawzi was using the term “compensation” not so much in the sense of payment for something as in the sense of restoring equilibrium. Fawzi indicated that since Israel would be strengthened economically, politically and militarily by lifting the restriction on the passage of tankers, “compensation” should be sought in the same three fields. He refused to be drawn out further than this, adding that Egypt wanted to be “as wise as water”, to quote an ancient Far Eastern proverb. By this he seemed to mean that we should find some point, however small, on which we could agree as a starting point in our endeavor to unravel the problem before us.
In the course of the discussion Gross indicated without overemphasizing that we did not feel Egyptians had much of a case on the matter of state of war or belligerent status. Fawzi was not at all inclined to argue these points; in fact, he rather brushed them aside in the interest of discussing the matter as a practical political problem.