683.84A/4–651
Memorandum by the Acting Officer in Charge of Palestine-Israel-Jordan Affairs (Waldo) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Kopper)1
Subject: Summary of Events Relating to the Huleh Lake Controversy.
Background
Huleh Lake lies in the northeastern corner of Israel, hard against part of the border with Syria; it empties into the Jordan at its southern [Page 621] end. Its northern shore is bordered by extensive malarial marshes and a program to drain these has been in mind since before World War I. The Israel Government, in its desire to gain more agricultural land and improve the public health of the area, began in recent months to initiate a project which would straighten the Jordan River bed, lower the water level of Huleh Lake, and thereby drain the marshes.
However, drainage activities must perforce take place within the demilitarized zone below the southern shore of the lake, and political complications between Israel and Syria have become paramount therefore during the last two months. The Israelis claimed rights of construction, alteration and expropriation, stating that compensation would be granted to those Arab landowners whose property was involved. When requested by the MAC chairman to cease work until completion of discussions, the Israeli delegate refused to comply and stated that (1) “entire matter had been discussed with State Department, who gave the green light to proceed, (2) therefore they were not worried about what the Syrian Government thought since the US controls the UK”2
February 14:
The Syrian delegation to the MAC complained that the Israeli project was (1) giving the Israelis a military advantage by removing a natural obstacle, (2) preventing many Arabs of the demilitarized zone from resumption of normal civilian life. The Israel delegation did not object to submission of the complaint, and General Riley submitted a memorandum in reply on
March 7:
At this meeting the memorandum was read and in substance opined:
- 1)
- Drainage of Lake Huleh would not give Israel any military advantage not equally applicable to Syria, and therefore was not a violation of Article II of the Armistice Agreement.
- 2)
- The work was of civilian nature in territory under Israel control, where no Syrian objections could be offered.
- 3)
- Flooding of Arab lands at the south shore because of dam construction was an obstacle to normal civilian life, and a violation of Article V of the Armistice Agreement.
- 4)
- NEither party had sovereign rights within the demilitarized area, no Mandate or Ottoman concessions could apply. Therefore, construction work and expropriation without full consent of landowners were non-exercisable and detrimental to the gradual restoration of normal civilian life in the area, and constituted a violation of Article V.
General Riley found that all land operations should cease until a mutual agreement was reached by Israel and Syria. The Israel delegation charged General Riley could only deal with Article II, the Syrians [Page 622] replied that he must consider all sides of the problem and that he had not gone beyond his prerogatives. It was agreed to postpone a vote until
March 8:
The Israel delegation did not appear, but sent word that its Government must give the question further and careful consideration. The Syrians protested the delay, asked that the TSO intervene to stop the construction work immediately, and the Chairman of the MAC so requested the Israel delegation on March 10.
March 15:
Jerusalem Tel 169 March 153 reported that Israel delegate Ramati flatly refused a request by UN headquarters to stop Huleh operations immediately. He said problem was outside scope of MAC.
An Israeli patrol crossed to the east bank of the Jordan, and Arabs on the Syrian side opened fire. MAC Chairman Bossavy stopped the gunfire and the Syrian delegate assured him there would not be military intervention except under provocation or orders from higher authorities. Israelis refused to remove the tractor and Bossavy immobilized it.
March 17:
Deptel 386 of March 174 gave the Department’s views, which in substance followed General Riley’s recommendations, and expressed the hope that Israel would attend the March 19 MAC meeting and avoid provocative acts.
Damascus Tel 470 of March 175 gave the Syrian Government’s views, which also paralleled General Riley’s; the Syrians contended they had not interfered with force, although Huleh Arab landowners had resisted Israeli operations.
March 18:
The Syrian Minister of Defense stated to Colonel de Ridder that if Israel continued operations, the Syrian army was prepared to take punitive action.
March 19:
Israeli delegate Ramati proposed at the MAC meeting that the question be removed from the MAC and placed in Chairman Bossavy’s hand. Bossavy agreed and added the provision that all work should also stop immediately; Syria concurred, but Israel withdrew.
Apparently at some point during this period the operations had ceased, for the Israeli delegate warned that after March 23 work [Page 623] would recommence regardless of whether Bossavy had come to a decision or not.
March 21:
The MAC Chairman reported Huleh Arab landowners were unwilling to accept compensation.
Col. Bossavy was notified by the Palestine Land Development Co. that work would be resumed on March 23.
March 26:
A meeting between Makleff and Shishakli was fruitless. Makleff claimed the MAC Chairman had no power to order work cessation, that he could only so order for a limited period of time and solely to discuss compensation. Syria maintained the operations should be unconditionally stopped to find an overall solution.
March 27:
Israeli tractors resumed work. Israeli army opened fire with mortars and machine guns; the Syrian army did not take action, but the Syrian delegate lodged a strong complaint against the Israeli army for firing small arms and mortars from the demilitarized zone.
The Acting Chief of Staff TSO requested the Israeli defense forces Chief of Staff to: (1) withdraw a paramilitary force that had emplaced mortars in the demilitarized zone, (2) withdraw a military patrol and additional military personnel. Israeli forces were repeatedly firing bursts from automatic weapons.
March 28:
Reports continued of Israeli mortar and automatic fire in demilitarized zone and close to Syrian border. UN observers stated that the Syrian army had apparently not fired a single shot throughout the dispute, although Col. Shishakli had warned that he could not for long restrain his men in the face of repeated provocation. All Arab fire was by Huleh landowners in the demilitarized zone, or by the same Arabs who had retreated over the Syrian border.
The Syrian Air Force and two infantry brigades were alerted for action.
March 30:
The U.S. position was explained to Israel Embassy officials by the Department. Mr. Keren was told that apparently the Israelis had taken action contrary to the armistice agreement, and that continuance of incidents by Israel could have a most deleterious effect upon the Department’s attitude.
To the Syrian Minister the Department expressed appreciation for Syria’s moderate attitude, and the hope that Syria would continue to exercise restraint and not take any untoward action.
[Page 624]April 1:
Jerusalem Tel 179 of April 16 reported that UN observers had been fired upon by Israelis and sugar put in their gas tanks over recent days. Col. de Bidder of the MAC stated an amicable arrangement of the drainage question could have been made, if the Israelis had not been so insolent and aggressive. He placed much of the blame on the attitude of Israeli delegate Eamati.
April 2:
The tension relaxed somewhat at this point after being at explosive heights for the past few weeks. The Israel Chief of Staff assured Col. Metz of the TSO that: (1) No Israel troops or mortars would be allowed in the demilitarized zone, (2) UN observers would have freedom of movement, (3) The Israeli delegation would attend MAC meetings.
April 3:
The Secretary General of the Syrian Foreign Ministry stated to a Legation officer (Damascus Tel 505 April 3)7 that the Syrian Government’s attitude would continue to be one of restraint and moderation, but he failed to comprehend why the MAC was unable to enforce its decisions.
He added that Syria hoped to find a settlement through the MAC, but that meanwhile the Arab landowners had no course of appeal and the Israelis were forcibly making changes unilaterally. The whole question of UN authority seemed at stake; he hoped the MAC would be able to enforce its rulings so that Security Council action would not be necessary.