Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

884A.00R/4–551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

confidential

[Washington,] April 5, 1951.

Subject: Grant-aid to Israel

Participants:	The Secretary
	Mr. Abraham Feinberg
	NE—Mr. Waldo

Mr. Feinberg called in accord with a suggestion from the President that he see me so that I could explain to him some of the problems faced by the Department in connection with the Congressional bills of April 2 to authorize grant-in-aid of $150 million for Israel.

I told Mr. Feinberg that the principal problem facing us in the Near East was one of security. Our first line of defense in that area was the states of Greece, Turkey, and Iran; behind these countries the Arab states and Israel provided the only defense in depth. The Arab states, however, were not very secure. At the present time they could not defend themselves against the Soviet Union. A year ago these states had expressed the conviction that Israel was preparing for aggressive action against them. Israel had held similar views with respect to the Arab states. As a result of the uneasiness in the NE the US, the UK, and France had issued a declaration, May 25, 1950, which assured all of the states of the Near East that these three countries would be prepared to supply them with arms adequate for internal security and for necessary self-defense on receiving assurances from the individual states that these arms would not be used against one another. The declaration also indicated that we wished to strengthen these countries and permit them to play their part in the defense of the area. As a further implementation of the policy set forth in the declaration, the Department had been studying means whereby individual states of the Near East could be strengthened in order that they might be in a position to defend themselves against aggression from the Soviet Union. At present none of the states in the Near East, with the possible exception of Israel was in such a position.

The bill which had been introduced into Congress authorizing $150 million for Israel came at a very inopportune time; Congress was in a difficult mood, and the Department’s aid programs would probably encounter considerable resistance. It was probable, moreover, that if 150 million dollars were made available for Israel it would be taken out of the Department’s program already contemplated for the area, which included the Near Eastern states and Iran. There was no question but that, if Iran and the Arab states were to fall to the Soviet Union, Israel’s position in the Near East would be untenable.

Mr. Feinberg said that the President had talked to him and that he relied on the President’s and my views in this matter. He assured me, therefore, that no pressure would be brought to bear in connection with the bills in the House and Senate. He was leaving for Israel in a few days to bring back Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion; and would explain our position to the Prime Minister. Mr. Feinberg appeared certain the Prime Minister would understand the US position. I told Mr. Feinberg that none of the arguments I had made to him would be likely to carry much weight with the Ambassador of Israel, who would feel that he had arguments equally as valid as mine. On the other hand, we could hardly expect Israel’s thinking regarding grant aid to be similar to ours or that Israel would propose a program of assistance for the area as a whole in asking for a grant from the United States.²

1. Memorandum drafted by Mr. Waldo.

2. On April 5, during a discussion with President Truman of several foreign policy issues, the Secretary raised the subject of aid to Israel. Mr. Acheson’s account of that part of the conversation follows:

   “I reported to the President our analysis of the problems created by the Taft-Douglas bill. He has these very much in mind and will talk with me about the matter again early next week.

   “In the meantime, we should proceed with our thinking on various courses which might be pursued, but no one in the Department should express views of any sort outside the Department without further direction from me.” (Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 238)

   Arrangement of documentation in this lot file indicates that the Secretary’s talk with the President occurred after his conversation with Mr. Feinberg.