780.5/1–551: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Barbour) to the Department of State
1292. Embassy believes that desire Israel to be included in development western plans Near Eastern Defense (Depintel January 3, [Page 15] 1 a. m.)1 should not be considered in isolation from general context regional Near Eastern security requirements.
It would appear prudent at this stage to consider danger that with our major attention focused Far East and Europe, Soviets may be planning to disturb relatively quiet and neglected Near Eastern garden this year. Form which such Soviet moves may take range from stepping up internal subversive programs and creating mass unrest through activity local Communist groups to armed revolts supported by Kurdish and Azerbaijan “volunteers” from Soviet Union. Further, should Soviets be determined on precipitating World War III this year, it is possible that major Soviet military moves elsewhere might be accompanied by outright invasion certain Near Eastern areas by Soviet military forces primarily with view to denying to West strategic and petroleum assets of this region. Not to be overlooked is question whether Soviets would undertake large-scale war of sustained duration without including in plans maneuvers calculated to assure for themselves access to Near Eastern oil. Soviet invasion Near East would, of course, be characterized by them as defensive step to prevent Anglo-American aggressors from using Near East as place d’armes against Soviet motherland. Whether contingency that we may face in Near East during coming year falls in first or second category, it is clear that present obviously weak and defenseless condition Near Eastern countries constitutes open invitation to Soviets to indulge in direct or indirect aggression that area.
As pointed out in Moscow’s despatch 294, December 111 Soviets have in past months followed position ostensible friendliness towards most Near Eastern countries. Softening-up process particularly noticeable in Iran but trade agreement concluded with Afghanistan early 1950 may fall in same category. Sociability displayed by Vyshinski at recent UNGA session towards Arab delegations was part of pattern. Such lulling of suspicions may well be prelude to surprise expansionist moves in area. Embassy believes time has come to establish working relationship between NATO and non-Communist Near Eastern countries as recommended Embtel 651, September 8. Israeli bid for US military support affords us some leverage bring about at least degree rapprochement between Israel and Arab states which would make possible taking positive steps towards Near Eastern regional collective security arrangements.
Merely to associate Israel with present Greek-Turkish defense pattern would be futile gesture in view unprotected character Arab hinterland surrounding Israel. Furthermore, to give Israel priority in this matter over Arab states would obviously exacerbate Arab emotional antipathy towards US and West generally and play directly [Page 16] into Soviet hands. What is required in Embassy’s view is larger regional security organization embracing in addition to Israel and Arab states, Greece, Turkey, Iran and perhaps Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Embassy appreciates heavy burden now resting on US in terms Far Eastern and European commitments and problems but believes that our positions in both these areas would be seriously jeopardized if we permitted ourselves to be outflanked through Soviet incursion into vital Near East middle region.
Department pass London, Paris. Sent Department 1292, repeated information London 239, Paris 306.