S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167: “Eastern Mediterranean and
Middle East”
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State
top secret
Washington, December 27,
1950.
Subject: Proposed US Political and Military Actions
Required to Assist the Countries of the Middle East in the Defense
of the Area Against Aggression
In the light of present world events, it is believed that more
positive US political and military action is required if the Middle
East* is to be successfully defended, and the US
and its Western Allies are to make war-time use of Middle Eastern
oil, bases and manpower.
Justification for Review of Policy
Among the basic elements justifying a review of US policy and actions
in the Middle East at this time are:
- (1)
- US actions have not adequately reflected the NSC findings that the defense
of the Middle East is “vital” to the defense of the
US.
- (2)
- The UK, which has primary responsibility for the defense
of the area, lacks both manpower and resources successfully
to defend the area and has no plans for defense of the Saudi
Arabian oil fields and the Dhahran Air Base.
- (3)
- Loss of the Middle East to the USSR would be a great
psychological loss to the free world generally, and
particularly to Western Europe and the members of the
British Commonwealth who attach special importance to the
sea, land and air routes of the area.
- (4)
- Access to Middle Eastern oil is essential to Europe and
would be essential to the US in a long war. Russia could
never consolidate a European conquest without Middle Eastern
oil.
- (5)
- Important naval, land and strategic air routes and bases
exist in the area. Dhahran and Wheelus Fields would be put
to immediate strike and post-strike use by the USAF, in the event of global
war.
- (6)
- If the West does not participate effectively in defense of
the Middle East, it is doubtful that the support of the
Middle East countries could be regained after a war. If the
US itself does not participate, American prestige in the
area would be lost and American firms might not be permitted
to resume their oil concessions and other interests
following “liberation”.
- (7)
- Turkey’s fighting power, potentially the greatest in free
Europe outside the United Kingdom, could not be effectively
realized if Soviet forces surround it from the East and
South.
Proposals:
The following proposals seek to maximize, at minimal cost to the US,
the will of the people of the area to cooperate with the West in
resistance to the USSR; to translate that will into a coordinated
[Page 5]
indigenous effort to
resist the Soviet advance; and, if the area is overrun, to harry and
sabotage the invader, to aid downed Allied airmen and to assist in
liberation.
The key proposal around which other steps will center is:
A US decision and unilateral public statement that the US has a vital
security interest in the defense of the Middle East as a whole, and
that the US, consistent with its obligations under the UN and with our other commitments, is
prepared to assist the countries of the Middle East in the defense
of the area against aggression.1
Within the framework of the overall declaration described above, it
is proposed:
- (1)
- To let it be known informally to the governments of each
country in the area that an overt Soviet aggression in the
area would lead inevitably to global war.
- (2)
- To continue to supply military equipment to Greece,
Turkey, and Iran. In the case of Turkey, substantially to
increase military supplies as conditions permit, and to
consider other forms of assistance, economic and otherwise,
as are required to permit Turkey to increase the size of the
regular army and to have stand-by equipment for maximum
mobilization of reserves. (A separate memorandum on the
subject of support for expanded Turkish military strength is
being prepared.)
- (3)
- In conjunction with the UK, to embark upon a policy of
strengthening the indigenous defense forces in the other
countries of the Middle East who will participate in the
defense of the area, on the basis of equal-to-equal
partnership. If necessary to achieve the cooperation of the
Arabs, we should urge the UK to offer to renounce its
existing treaty rights in Egypt, Jordan and Iraq, if and
when alternative and adequate security arrangements can be
made.
- (4)
- To deliver at an early date token amounts of US arms to
Middle Eastern states not now receiving them, who will
participate in the defense of the area. To advise these
states that when supply and global priorities permit, more
substantive quantities of arms would be delivered, for needs
not met from the UK or other sources.
- (5)
- As proof of US determination, to station at an early date
a battalion of US Marines at Dhahran Airfield in defense of
the air field and oil fields, as a means of meeting
Ibn Saud’s needs
for American assurances, and for the morale effect upon the
Near East generally.
- (6)
- To supply promptly small US and/or UK training missions
and individual service technicians to states asking for
them.
- (7)
- To arrange “show-the-flag” visits by USAF planes and Navy vessels
in friendly countries, in agreement with the Governments
concerned.
- (8)
- The US, UK and Commonwealth to agree, in conjunction with
inhabitants of the area (Turkey in particular) to plan and
to attempt to hold as close as possible to the “outer ring”
(the Turkish-Iranian mountain line which will protect the
maximum defensible area of the Middle East with its oil,
manpower, and strategic facilities). The defense of the
“outer ring” would thus become the target for which
provision
[Page 6]
would be
made in the Allied power build-up, once more pressing needs
elsewhere are met.
- (9)
- To establish (for political as well as military reasons) a
combined US–UK command structure in the Middle East which
would stimulate basic cooperation among the states of the
area not now possible through indigenous organizations or
groupings such as the Arab League. This structure would not
alter the fact that the UK and Commonwealth have primary
responsibility for the defense of the area. It would,
however, make much more attractive to the Arab States and
Israel the establishment of a direct relationship between
the US–UK command and the respective military authorities in
each country. The US–UK command structure would include the
naming of a British Commanding Officer, the naming of a US
Deputy Commander and, if possible, the naming of US country
advisers or commanders for the combined US–UK structures in
Greece, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia. The US Deputy
Commander should have a political adviser supplied by the
Department. If and when shipping and supply conditions
necessitate, the US–UK command structure should have a
supply counterpart along the lines of MESC in World War
II.
- (10)
- To streamline Washington procedures so that reasonable
requests for aid within the capability of the US to supply
are met promptly. To the wavering states in the Middle East,
delay in action is considered evidence of disinterest: the
maxim “he gives twice who gives quickly” is particularly
applicable to this area.
- (11)
- Through technical and economic assistance, both directly
and through the UN, to make
it clear to the peoples of the Middle East that they as
individuals will benefit from the victory of the West; many
poverty-crushed Middle Easterners feel that life under the
USSR could not be worse than the life they are now
leading.
- (12)
- By the early placing of orders for raw materials and
manufactures for war purposes (notably in Egypt and Israel),
to get such industry as exists in the Middle East behind the
Allied war effort and to expand such industry where
practicable.
[Annex 1]
Paper Drafted in the Department of
State2
top secret
[Washington, undated.]
Re-evaluation of US Plans for the Middle
East
1. us security interests in the middle
east
The following US Government policy was approved on November 24,
1947:3
“… The security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the
Middle East is vital to the security of the United State. …
In carrying out this policy the United States should be
prepared to make full use of
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its political, economic, and, if
necessary, military power in such manner as may be found
most effective. … One of the greatest dangers to world peace
may be the failure of the Soviet Union to understand the
extent to which the United States is prepared to go in order
to maintain the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and
the Middle East. It should, therefore, be the policy of this
Government to make evident in a firm but non-provocative
manner the extent of the determination of the United States
to assist in preserving in the interest of world peace the
security of the area.”
Although the Defense Department, or branches of the armed forces,
have at times indicated a preference for the designation
“critical” rather than “vital”, nevertheless the US and UK Joint
Chiefs of Staff as recently as October 26, 19504 agreed that
“the Middle East in war is of importance second only to Western
Europe”.
The security interests of the United States in the Middle
East† are primarily:
- (1)
- The oil resources of Arabia, Iraq and Iran.
- (2)
- Important naval and strategic and tactical air
bases.
- (3)
- Communications and transportation between the West and
the Far East.
- (4)
- The political and military importance of the Middle
East bridge between the continents of Europe, Asia and
Africa.
United States security interests in the Middle East, especially
when viewed in their interrelationship with the similar British
security interests, involve the region as a whole. For this
reason a country-by-country approach is inadequate as a basis
for the formulation of area plans and our policies and actions
toward any one country must be framed in the light of our
objectives with respect to the area as a whole.
2. october conclusions of us–uk joint
chiefs
In the October discussions of the US and UK Joint Chiefs, the
following conclusions were reached:
US and UK military representatives in the Middle East will be
directed to undertake a joint fact-finding review of present
capabilities and projected requirements for the defense of the
so-called “outer ring”. The “outer ring” is anchored on Turkey
in the west and runs southeastwards along the Zagros Mountains
of Iran, thus embracing most of the Middle East and giving some
protection to the oil fields in southern Iran and Arabia. This
plan goes far beyond the limited concept of defending the Suez
Canal area which the British proposed
[Page 8]
as the most feasible plan considering
probable British and US capabilities in the foreseeable future.
It is noteworthy that even the defense of the Suez area is,
according to the British, beyond the probable capability of the
UK and the Commonwealth and involves a deficit which only US
forces, particularly air forces, can meet.
Noting that there is “growing evidence pointing toward the
requirement for at least a portion of the Middle East oil
throughout the war”, the US and UK Chiefs concluded that further
study should be given to this question. Present US planning is
based on the assumption that Middle East oil would not be
essential for the Allied war effort for the first two war years
of a global war. Should the study ordered by the US and UK
Chiefs reveal that some Middle Eastern oil is indispensible
throughout the war, US plans for defense of the area would have
to be altered significantly. In this connection Soviet and
European oil resources are so limited that the USSR could not
consolidate a victory in Europe without Middle Eastern oil.
3. disparity between us planning and us
interests
The US Joint Chiefs informed the UK Joint Chiefs in October 1950
that the US “will be unable to commit forces to [the Middle
East]5 during, at least, the first two years of war.”
In view of the limited British capability in the area and the
limited defensive capabilities in being on the part of the
countries of the area, this statement clearly implies that the
United States contemplates the abandonment, without even a token
defense effort, of most if not all of the Middle East in time of
global war.
The JCS decision rests, of
course, on the unpleasant fact that United States capabilities
are inadequate to protect our vital interests everywhere at the
same time: the Middle East has been written off reluctantly in
favor of theaters of higher priority. Since last October,
however, major changes have occurred in the world situation: the
rate of US buildup has been increased; organizational progress
has been achieved in Western Europe and the chances of the
Middle East remaining tranquilly on the side of the West without
some practical evidence of Western interest have greatly
declined.
No one will challenge the fact that plans to abandon the Middle
East fail to provide for our security interests there: we
believe that a re-evaluation of our Middle East plans is called
for in the light of the US program for increased military
stature and preparedness.
The present unfavorable trends in the world arise according to
NSC 68/26 “from
the inadequacy of current programs and plans rather than from
any error in our objectives and aims”. In the development of
adequate programs and plans a balance must be maintained between
global and regional plans and between areas of differing
priorities. “Commitments in one area must not be permitted to
[Page 9]
jeopardize
capabilities to act in other areas. Anxiety for the general
position must not prevent adequate actions in particular
situations.” (November 10 draft of Annex 8 to NSC 68/1)7
Abandonment of the Middle East without defense in time of war
cannot be justified on the ground that the USSR and its
satellites have the capability through an all-out effort to
occupy the entire Middle East. By such reasoning the United
States would not be justified in defending the
Japan-Ryukyus-Philippine chain of bases in the Western Pacific,
part or all of which the USSR and Communist China could either
neutralize or occupy through an all-out effort in time of war.
Instead, our plans should be based on our estimate of the
probable effort which the Soviets are likely to exert in the
area and on our judgment as to the extent to which our interests
in the area justify the commitments which may be necessary to
deter or defeat the estimated Soviet effort. NSC 68/1 states that the Defense
Department, in determining military requirements, has proceeded
on the bases that “the US should have a military strength
sufficient to meet her two fundamental obligations: (a) Protection against disaster; (b) Support of our foreign policy”. In
weighing what military action may be required for survival
itself, account must be taken of the disastrous effect which the
abandonment of the Middle East without an effort at defense
would have upon the political position of the United States in
its relations with the peoples of the Middle East in the
post-war period. The likelihood cannot be ignored that, even in
advance of war, the inevitable knowledge of the Middle East
peoples that the US plans to abandon them can, under an
intensified Soviet war of nerves, cause political deterioration
and defection throughout most of the Middle East with worldwide
political repercussions.
It is our belief that a small fraction of the total US military
production and manpower can, if properly applied, produce
results far out of proportion to the magnitude of the effort
expended.
4. disparity between us and uk
planning
In the Middle East the US and UK have similar security interests.
All the more striking, therefore, is the absence of any
similarity between US and UK plans for the protection of their
interests in the Middle East. UK plans, in spite of heavy
commitments in other areas, call for the commitment of British
forces to defend part of the Middle East. US plans envisage no
commitment of American forces to the Middle East for at least
the first two years of war. This disparity between US and UK
plans had some justification under the World War II concept of
British primary responsibility for the defense of
[Page 10]
the area. Yet, while UK
plans envisage (and US plans endorse) British defense of the
Suez area and protection of the Iranian oil fields in which
British interests are paramount, neither US nor UK plans call
for—nor would we probably consider desirable without US local
command—British defense of Dhahran Air Field and the oil fields
of Arabia in which American interests are paramount.
5. important factors in re-evaluation of
plans
In addition to the factors noted above there are other important
reasons why our Middle East plans should be reappraised. To
follow the time-honored assumption that the US can rely upon the
UK to defend the Middle East is to indulge in wishful thinking:
British capabilities are too small to be a sound basis for the
defense of the US interests in the area. The military weakness
of the UK is well known throughout the area; this adversely
affects the political position of the UK in negotiating with
local governments regarding key defense facilities in the area.
Most local governments, if they had to choose, would prefer to
rely on American rather than British aid; alternatively they
would much prefer joint US–UK support.
There are two important post-war consequences to be considered in
connection with our present plans. First, if our total oil
requirements for a global war of several years duration were to
be obtained solely from Western Hemisphere sources, the
over-production of the oil wells would damage the fields so as
to delay significantly, if not preclude resumption of normal
production in the post-war period. Second, if the British alone
put up a token resistance in defense of the Middle East and the
protection of the oil fields of Iran while the US withdraws
after demolition of the oil fields in Saudi Arabia without
firing a shot, the local political reactions might be so adverse
to the US as to severely handicap American re-entry into the
area and to give the UK a strong commercial and political
advantage in their postwar relations with the local governments.
The peoples we plan to abandon in war are the same peoples we
must continue to work with upon liberation and in the post-war
period, when access to local resources and facilities would have
to be re-negotiated in an adverse atmosphere.
The protracted debate between the State and Defense Departments
and among the three branches of the armed service over the issue
of whether the Middle East is “vital” or merely “critical” for
purposes of US strategic planning has an interesting sidelight.
The position of the Defense Department is motivated in part by
two tactical considerations. In the first place, Defense hopes
that by adopting a lower priority for the area than the British
do, the result will be that the UK will exert itself to do more
for the defense of the Middle East than would otherwise be the
case. In the second place, the priority
[Page 11]
assigned to the Middle East substantially
affects the inter-service competition between the branches of
the armed services for their quotas of the military
appropriations. Thus, if the Middle East is deemed “vital” and
ground forces are committed to its defense, the Navy would
require very considerable equipment and facilities to supply and
defend the sea and air lanes on which such ground forces would
be dependent. Such an increase in the Navy’s share of
appropriations would be at the expense of the other service
branches.
Whatever role these tactical considerations may play in relations
between the US and UK or among the US armed services, it is
obvious that they must not be mistaken for the principles which
should govern US strategic planning.
6. direction of re-evaluation
We believe that a re-evaluation of US plans in relation to the
Middle East is urgently required in connection with the
accelerated military build-up in which the United States is now
engaged.
The direction of such a re-evaluation should be, in our judgment,
away from the concept of primary British responsibility and
toward the concept of combined US–UK responsibility and active
US–UK cooperation in the development and implementation of
plans.
[Annex 2]
Paper Prepared in the Department of
State8
top secret
[Washington, undated.]
The Potential Military Manpower in the Arab
States and Israel
i. available manpower in the near eastern
area
The Arab states (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi
Arabia, Syria and Yemen) contain about 40,000,000 people.
Approximately 9,000,000 are males between the ages of 15 and 49
of whom 4,430,000 would be physically fit for military service
under Western standards. Israel’s population is about 1,056,000.
342,000 of these are males between 15 and 49 of whom 255,000 are
physically fit for military service.9
ii. the conditions and attitudes of the
near eastern people
Literacy and living standards are low among the larger part of
the Arab population. Certain areas such as Yemen are quite
backward.
[Page 12]
The morale of
the people differs in the several Arab states. However, it
cannot be considered high at the moment, although its
potentialities are good. The Arab populations have, in general,
a common language, religion, heritage, culture, and similar
problems. For the most part the Arabs, particularly the
governmental leaders, have a basic antipathy towards communism,
although communism could make inroads among the poorer classes.
However, while the Arab is fundamentally more inclined toward
the West, his feelings are colored by his oppositions to
imperialism and his dislike of the policy of the West
(particularly the United States) on Palestine.10
Israel has a higher standard of living and literacy than the Arab
states. The morale of the people is high. The economy of the
country is precarious, however. The people are for the most part
of European extraction and differ greatly from the peoples of
the surrounding Arab states in temperament, outlook, energy and
approach to their problems. Their approach is essentially
western, although it has not as yet been possible to detect any
deep friendly attitude toward the West.
iii. the military potentialities of near
eastern manpower
a. The Arab has had little chance during
the past 30 years to demonstrate whether or not he can be molded
into an effective fighting man. Prior to the end of the first
World War, people of Arab stock had demonstrated from time to
time over the centuries a capacity to perform military service
in a competent and efficient manner under most arduous
conditions. Since 1919 there has been little real effort made to
build up strong, well-trained and well-equipped military units
in the Arab states except for the development of the Arab Legion
and the Transjordan Frontier Force in Jordan by the United
Kingdom. However, during World War II almost a million people
were used for activities in support of the military. This
constituted an important source of support manpower.
Nevertheless, there has been a lack of competent military
leadership throughout the Arab world. Training facilities have
been almost non-existent. Governments have been beset by
internal bickerings and lack of experience. On the other hand,
it would be possible to mold an effective fighting unit in each
of the Arab states or among the states as a whole provided: (1)
The peoples of Arab states believe they are striving for
something basic and real to their families, homes and countries;
(2) the government and peoples of the Arab states feel that they
are being treated as partners and not as pawns; (3) competent
leadership and training is provided and (4) equipment and
matériel are supplied as they become available. It is generally
agreed that the absence of training, leadership, matériel and
cooperation was the cause of the Arab debacle in Palestine.
Jordan
[Page 13]
clearly indicates
that military units can be built up. It would take time, but
NE believes that within a
two-year period much could be accomplished.
b. Israel stands in contrast to the Arab
states. There is a higher proportion of trained manpower of
military age in Israel, much of which was trained by the UK or
in Central European armies. Though far less in number than in
the Arab states, the manpower of Israel could be more quickly
developed for military purposes. A political problem of first
magnitude would exist in the deployment of Israeli forces in
other parts of the Near East. Israel would need matériel and
probably some training assistance. Just as in the Arab states,
the people must understand that from their participation in an
allied effort they would be fighting for things which are
essential to their survival. There is little evidence that there
is any general realization of this in Israel as yet.
iv. the use of military manpower
The best methods of using military manpower would be (1) to
stimulate the effective buildup of armies in the friendly
countries and (2) to develop units for support purposes, labor
battalions and the like. The training of foreign units to serve
with our troops might be the next best alternative. It would not
be desirable to establish a Foreign Legion under American
leadership. The development of a Foreign Legion in the Arab
world would probably be difficult because of (a) the bad connotation of the concept of a Foreign
Legion (i.e., French Foreign Legion in Arabic North Africa) and
(b) the lack of something national in
its composition. Under present circumstances Arabs would make
good mercenaries. The admission of volunteers to our Armed
Forces is not as satisfactory as the building up of armies in
individual countries or the area as a whole. The difficulties of
adjustment are too great. Finally, it is possible that the
potentialities of the Arab world and Israel might well be
realized by the development of collective forces under the
UN Uniting for Peace
Resolution.
v. political considerations involved in the
use of near eastern manpower
The United States’ prestige in the Arab states of the Near East,
while probably not as low as it was in 1947 and 1948 is
nevertheless not as high as it was in 1945. In Libya and Israel
our prestige is still fairly high.
The NSC has stated that the area
is of critical importance to the security of the United States.
The strategic location of the Near East, the importance of the
vast oil reserves and the value of the bases in Tripoli, the
Cairo-Suez area, Dhahran and Iraq are recognized.
[Page 14]
The Near Eastern nations are at a point of decision as to whether
to cast their lot irrevocably with the West, to remain neutral
or to drift into the Soviet orbit.
At the present time any decision to make more use of Near Eastern
manpower must take into account the fact that for the time being
there would have to be separate programs for Israel on the one
hand and the Arab states on the other.
The development of the use of manpower in the Arab states might
well have a beneficial effect in other parts of the Moslem
world, i.e., Pakistan, Iran, etc.
If the United States and the Western nations could clearly
demonstrate now to the Near Eastern nations our interest in
their survival, it is believed that we could align them with the
West against the communist threat and that the manpower
resources could become of increasing value over the next several
years. If, however, there is no real interest demonstrated in
the fate of the Near Eastern peoples, the area with its manpower
potential may be lost to the West for many years to come.
vi. conclusions
A. There exists in the Near East military and quasi-military
manpower potential which would be of great value to the United
States.
B. This manpower potential, to be effective, will require
leadership, training and equipment.
C. Before use can be made of the manpower the Near Eastern states
will want to be sure that:
- (1)
- the Western nations are really interested in their
survival;
- (2)
- the Western nations will treat the Near Eastern states
as partners and not as lackeys;
- (3)
- help in the form of training and equipment, etc., will
be made available over a period of time, and
- (4)
- in the post-hostilities period, should war come, the
wishes and views of the states will be taken into full
account.
D. If the West does not demonstrate an interest in the fate of
the Near East, the manpower potential of the area and the
position of the West (oil wells, bases, cultural institutions,
etc.) may be irretrievably lost for many years to come.
