887.00 TA/11–1051: Despatch
The Ambassador in Iraq ( Crocker ) to the Department of State
No. 466
Subject: Basic Policy on Technical Assistance for Iraq.
The Embassy has been engaged in discussions with the recently arrived TCA field party which is reviewing and evaluating technical assistance projects in Iraq. It appears opportune to set forth the Embassy’s views concerning the most appropriate policy relative to such projects, based, of course, upon experience to date with Point IV in Iraq.
The foremost consideration is that Iraq does not lend itself to being fitted to an over-all pattern of technical aid. Iraq has had the benefit of numerous surveys of her developmental needs (largely British performed) and has already launched on a program of economic development. A special government agency (the Development Board) [Page 555] has been established with high-level personnel and substantial revenues with the specific purposes of determining the nature of the developmental projects to be undertaken and assuring that such projects go forward. The Iraqis would not welcome the arrival of a foreign group which might attempt to present them with plans for the development of their country. It is essential to the acceptability of Point IV aid in Iraq that any central TCA group here avoid even the appearance of such a purpose. Moreover, it is definitely to our interest and that of Iraq to support completely the Development Board and not to detract in any way from its prestige and its functions.
In this connection it must be borne in mind that, while a General Point IV Agreement has been signed with Iraq, this by no means indicates that the course of the various projects as requested finally by the Government has been smooth. The Embassy has found it necessary to exercise much tact and forebearance in dealing with the various concerned Iraqi officials, many of whom have private interests in connection with specific technical aid projects which do not always coincide with the objectives of the Point IV program and which, furthermore, sometimes occasion internal conflicts among the Iraqis themselves.
Understanding the Iraqi character is important in actually implementing the technical aid program. To begin with, the Iraqis generally are suspicious of getting something for nothing and this suspicion is not limited to the top-level people; in fact, it is probably least true of the western-educated Iraqis. Nevertheless, there is political danger for Iraqis to appear to be too closely associated with occidental countries and so few Iraqis care to support Point IV with unbounded enthusiasm. Also the Iraqis are a proud people and their leaders are often super-sensitive of their own prerogatives, so that aid projects must be carefully presented. These characteristics make the position of a Point IV project negotiator a delicate one, which is further complicated by the ineptness and administrative inefficiency of the Iraqi authorities.
The Embassy’s experience shows that often individual Iraqi officials will grandiosely endorse a project and indicate that the endorsement constitutes practical adoption of the project by the Iraqi Government. However, final approval of a project generally requires slow and devious processes in which even Iraqi personalities who do not appear to have any direct relation to the project under consideration occasionally inject themselves. The Point IV project negotiator must also be leery of the pleasing and deceptively efficient phrases used by the western-educated Iraqis, since Iraqis usually like to be congenial. Use of the same technical language that we employ does not always mean that the Iraqi has our attitudes of mind nor our customary drive to accomplish objectives.
[Page 556]It is also essential to bear in mind that Iraq, unlike many other backward countries, has now and will have for the foreseeable future more funds (from her oil resources) than she needs for any reasonable developmental program. Thus she does not need financial aid for her economic development. She does need desperately foreign technical assistance. However, she can afford to pay for it. This fact has definite advantages since she can readily finance developmental projects; and thus maximize the benefit to be derived from technical advice; but it also makes the Iraqis feel more independent in accepting technical aid.
To summarize the effect of these considerations on the technical aid program, it is not believed that the most progress can be made in Iraq by attempting too extensive and ambitious Point IV projects too rapidly. Caution seems indicated so as not to lose the ground gained thus far. Furthermore, the projects must be geared to the Iraqi concept of where aid is needed and to Iraqi methods even though those methods are much slower, devious, and inefficient than ours. One of the objectives of our aid here should be precisely to improve gradually those methods.
To pass now to considering the nature of projects feasible in Iraq, it is the Embassy’s considered judgment that the Development Board constitutes the principal key to the future of Iraq’s development of her resources. This Board has allotted to it all the Iraqi oil revenues (which represent by far the largest source of national income) and is specifically charged with responsibility for measures for economic development.
A golden opportunity for influencing and guiding Iraq’s economic future exists in the provision for an American member of this Board. Unfortunately, Gen. Donald Adams who served for a short time as Point IV appointee to the Board, left Iraq in July and a replacement has not yet arrived. This has created a somewhat delicate problem since the Iraqis (and foreign diplomatic circles also) are most anxious to have an American member. In the Embassy’s view, this is by far the most important technical aid appointment to be made in Iraq. The American member will sit with the innermost council of the Iraqis in charting Iraq’s economic future and in implementing developmental plans by appropriate measures. No other American in Iraq can be in a position to learn so intimately the Iraqi problems and plans for development nor to contribute so largely by counsel to the solution of those problems and the formulation of sound plans.
The position of the American member of the Development Board is so influential and important that the Embassy believes it should be the focal point around which other Point IV activities in Iraq should center. While the American member should have no administrative functions with reference to the rest of the Point IV program in Iraq (essential because he can only maintain the confidence of the Iraqis by [Page 557] concentrating on his duties on the Board), he would be in a unique position to advise the Embassy’s Technical Cooperation Officer regarding various technical aid projects. It is believed that in this way a better integrated and practical program for Iraq may be evolved.
It is understood that the Department proposes to establish a central TCA group within the Embassy to coordinate the aid program for Iraq. This is a sound proposal; however, the existence of an American member on the Iraqi Development Board will necessitate some difference in the type of operation carried on by the central TCA group from operation of similar groups in other countries. Moreover, the nature of the situation in Iraq is such that no strong central supervision of technical assistance projects in Iraq appears feasible. The fact of a Development Board means that plans must initiate with that Board in order that Iraqi cooperation may be assured. Thus, the central TCA group cannot inject itself into the economic planning activities of the Iraq Government as may be practicable and desirable in some other countries. The American member of the Development Board will do this as a function of his position. Furthermore, the Iraqis would be quick to resent any apparent interference with the Point IV technicians whom they will consider as special advisors and members of the staffs of the Ministries to which assigned. Thus, the central TCA group should not attempt close supervision of the American technicians assigned to Iraq.
The Department will also appreciate that many Iraqis feel that not much aid has been forthcoming under Point IV. Gen. Adams came as American member of the Development Board, but has resigned and his vacancy has not been filled. Dr. Walter C. Price is now here as maternal and child health expert. The Iraqis have had a naive belief that many American technicians would have arrived before now and the Embassy’s explanations have not completely reassured them. It is therefore important that at least six or seven of the 21 technicians which the Iraqis have requested be sent to Iraq immediately. Until they arrive, the Embassy considers the time inopportune to discuss any further technical aid projects.
Of less importance than the furnishing of American technicians in the eyes of the Iraqis generally, is the program for training Iraqis abroad. Some progress is being made in this field which seems to be reasonably satisfying to the Iraqis. Of least importance from the Iraqi point-of-view are the various special training projects, such as leader grant projects.
For convenient reference, Enclosure 1 to this Despatch lists the Embassy’s major communications to the Department concerning the technical assistance program in Iraq which may be consulted to gain a fuller appreciation of the needs and problems peculiar to Iraq.
[Page 558]The views expressed in this Despatch have been thoroughly discussed with the Point IV field party now at this Embassy.1
- Enclosed in this despatch was a list of despatches of major import on the subject of technical assistance programs in Iraq.↩