783.00/11–551
Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria–Iraq Affairs ( Gnade ) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs ( Kopper )
Subject: Weekly Summary
[Here follow the sections on Syria and Lebanon.]
Iraq
The Palace Master of ceremonies, an intimate of the Regent,1 reported to a US Embassy official that he was extremely worried about [Page 554] the consequences of the present tense situation brought about by extreme nationalist sentiment.2 He was apparently afraid of a mob uprising. He remarked: “We can depend on the tribes, but are not certain of the Army”. This is the first hint the Embassy has received that the Army was not completely reliable. He spoke as if the Regent were convinced that Nuri must go, but he saw no suitable leader in sight to replace Nuri.
In an unprecedented private interview with Mr. Crocker the Regent let it be known that he was much impressed with the opportunity offered in the form of association with the MEC;3 that he was unhappy about Egypt’s unilateral action with respect thereto; that he was not satisfied that Nuri Said’s present one-man government was representative enough to deal with a matter of such importance, and that he wanted to work out in his own mind the best way to prepare Iraq to deal with the MEC in view of Egypt’s rejection, the reluctance of any Arab state to take the first step, and the possible opposition of extremist elements. He felt that since Egypt had not consulted the other Arab states in her action they were free to follow their own best interests in this instance. He suggested that the United States should mediate in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute.4
- Crown Prince Abdul Ilah.↩
- The political atmosphere in Iraq was tense as leftist, nationalist, and anti-Western elements continued to mount pressure for abrogation of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and adoption of a policy of “neutrality” for the Middle East. The situation was described in despatches 394, October 24, and 432, November 3, from Baghdad: 787.00/10–2451 and /11–351, respectively.↩
- For documentation on the proposed Middle East Command, see pp. 1 ff.↩
- For documentation on this subject, see pp. 343 ff.↩