Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 103 Series

Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

[Washington,] February 7, 1951.

Subject: NSC 103—“The Position of the U.S. with Respect to Greece”

You will note from the second paragraph of the covering memorandum from the Acting Executive Secretary² that “not all the members of the Senior NSC Staff have concurred in paragraph 3 of the enclosed Statement of Policy”. Mr. McGhee will, of course, send you a briefing memorandum on this paper but I thought it might be helpful to highlight briefly for you the differences of view, as we interpret them, which developed in the Senior Staff. This paper was drafted in the Department of State and processed through the NSC Staff Assistants. It reached the Senior Staff in agreed form. Mr. Finletter during the Senior Staff discussions raised questions particularly in regard to the third paragraph which covers the contingency of a Soviet or Satellite attack against Greece. His main argument seemed to be that we should at almost any cost avoid engaging in limited hostilities in connection with such contingency. Mr. Finletter raised the question whether we should decide that an attack on Greece would be a casus belli and argued against any such decision. In the last Senior Staff meeting, Mr. Finletter seemed willing to give some military assistance to Greece if it were attacked thus narrowing the apparent difference of opinion to one of degree. It is our view that the United States should give the maximum practicable assistance to Greece in the event of an attack, recognizing of course that the actual type and scope of military assistance can only be determined in the light of circumstances then existing.

The JCS representative consistently supported our view and the NSRB representative supported Mr. Finletter. The NSRB representative also supported the view that we should make unequivocally clear that any local aggression will be met by denunciation of Soviet Russia as the true aggressor, presumably with “appropriate action to follow”.

The issue around which the debate revolves is essentially the question whether we should to the best of our ability and in the most feasible manner meet with military resistance further acts of local aggression.³

1. Drafted by Max W. Bishop, NSC Staff Member assigned to the Ambassador at Large.
2. See footnote 1, p. 451.

3. On February 12, the Senior NSC Staff sent a memorandum to the National Security Council through NSC Executive Secretary James S. Lay recommending for its consideration that the draft statement of policy “be amended as follows in the interest of greater clarity:

   “Par. 1–c, line 2: Strike out ‘the first’ and substitute ‘one’.

   “Par. 2–e–(2), line 1: Strike out ‘Resisting effectively’ and substitute ‘Repelling’.

   “Par. 2–e–(3), line 2: After the word ‘direct’ add the words ‘or indirect’.

   “Par. 3–c: Amend the paragraph to read as follows (words to be added underscored):

   “c. Provide such military matériel and deploy such forces to the general area as can appropriately be made available without jeopardizing the security of the United States or areas of greater strategic importance to the United States, in the light of recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time.” A copy of this memorandum is in S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 103 Series. On February 13, Berry sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State reviewing and analyzing the salient features of NSC 103 and urging its approval. A copy of this memorandum is in S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 103 Series.