Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 103 Series

Staff Study by the National Security Council¹

top secret

[Washington, February 6, 1951.]

The Position of the United States With Respect to Greece

the problem

1. To determine the position of the United States with respect to Greece.

analysis

2. The threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece derives from the USSR, acting mainly through its various agencies: The Greek Communist Party, the Soviet satellite nations on Greece’s northern border, and the international communist movement. The security of the Near East, and as a result the security interests of the United States, would be endangered if the USSR, directly or through any of its agents, obtained control of Greece. Control of Greece would provide access to the Mediterranean Sea as well as a strategic position with respect to the eastern Mediterranean, the Near East, the Suez, Turkey and the Turkish Straits. Western access to the oil of the area would be threatened, as well as U.S. communications and transportation facilities, and U.S. air and naval bases in the area. The control of continental Greece and the Greek Islands would present to the USSR important military and political advantages. Without foreign assistance, Greece is incapable of meeting the threat to its political independence and territorial integrity. It has, therefore, been the policy of the United States to lend political, economic, and military assistance and advice to Greece.

3. United States political support to Greece has been both internal and international. Internally, the United States has advocated the implementation of wholesome political and social concepts as a deterrent to communist subversion and has encouraged the observance of democratic, constitutional political practices as well as the protection of civil liberties to the extent compatible with the security of the State. Efforts of the United States to promote enactment and implementation of legislation designed to distribute equitably the incidence of taxation, to improve the efficiency of Greek fiscal and administrative procedures, and to free the Greek economy from monopolistic and stultifying practices have been only partially successful.

4. In the international sphere, United States political support to Greece has been extended mainly through the United Nations, which has been seized of the Greek Case since 1946. The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans is being retained in Greece in order to deter aggression and to authenticate to world opinion the true nature of an aggression should it occur. The United States has endeavored through its information media and diplomatic missions to disseminate the facts of the Greek situation and in so doing to overcome the continuous vicious communist propaganda against Greece. The United States has not hesitated to take direct diplomatic action on behalf of Greece on appropriate occasion. In September 1950, as a manifestation of continuing interest in the independence and integrity of Greece, the United States initiated and strongly supported action which enabled Greece as well as Turkey to become associated with the appropriate phases of the planning work of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization concerned with the defense of the Mediterranean area.

5. The object of United States economic aid to Greece is to assist Greece to restore its economy to a viable position and to assist Greece to develop and maintain a standard of living which will enable the Greek people to offer greater resistance to the blandishments of communist ideology. Although this objective is probably attainable, the economic recovery of Greece from the effects of World War II has nevertheless been seriously retarded because of subsequent guerrilla hostilities, political instability, inflation, and changes in world trade patterns. Moreover, so long as present conditions of international tension continue, Greece will be required to make military expenditures which are in excess of those which could be supported by the Greek economy. In FY 1950 Marshall Plan funds were required to finance 63.5% of the civilian imports into Greece. On the whole there have been Substantial gains in reconstruction, production, and public administration, although because of the increase in population, per capita production is still less than prewar. Nevertheless, the United States has not succeeded in evoking the degree of self-help in Greece which is essential for the ultimate solution of Greece’s critical economic problems. For this reason, acceptance of maximum responsibility for the rehabilitation and development of Greece by Greek leaders themselves continues to be a basic objective of U.S. policy in Greece. It is now evident Greece will not have achieved economic viability by 1952 and that American aid to Greece cannot be stopped in 1952 without jeopardizing the gains that have been made. Current estimates tend to indicate that Greece might be self-supporting by 1954, providing reduced trade barriers and higher standards of living in other Marshall Plan countries significantly expand the market for Greek products and providing Greek political leaders act courageously and unselfishly. Extension of American economic aid to Greece beyond 1952 does not imply a substantially larger total aid to Greece than has heretofore been considered necessary to make the Greek economy viable. It would involve spreading the contemplated aid over a longer period of time in order to assure that United States assistance will be merely a support for Greek effort rather than a substitute for it. In order to induce the Greek Government to prepare itself for the ultimate termination of American economic aid, American representatives in Greece have continued to encourage the creation of a stable and efficient government based on the freely elected representatives of the Greek people, and have urged that this government should be more responsive to the needs of the poor, that it should pursue a sound fiscal policy, establish an equitable tax system, improve public administration, revitalize local government, encourage individual initiative, foster more competition in industry and trade, press aggressively for larger earnings from exports, tourism and shipping, husband national resources more carefully, frame and execute a realistic plan of economic development, and cultivate cordial relations with those of its neighbors who are not under the Soviet thumb.

6. The original objective of the military assistance program for Greece, initiated in 1947, was to provide the Greek armed forces with supplies, equipment and technical advice required to eliminate the communist guerrilla menace and to restore internal security. This objective was achieved in September 1949. After that date the objective of military assistance to Greece was to provide support to a Greek military establishment which would be capable of maintaining internal security and affording Greece, through certain limited accessories, a modicum of prestige and confidence, and which, in the event of a global war, would be capable of causing some delay to Soviet and/or satellite forces and of assisting in the over-all war effort. After the attack on Korea the scheduled reduction of the Greek armed forces was halted. The Greek armed forces, strengthened by American advice and equipment, are physically tough, well trained and have the will to resist. Minimum essential equipment to resist an armored attack is being provided to Greece as a matter of priority. With the exception of the Greek Air Force, all major items of equipment required by the Greek armed forces are expected to be provided through the FY 1951 and supplementary FY 1951 military assistance program for Greece. Assuming the present approved level of the Greek forces, future military assistance will be devoted principally to the maintenance and training of the Greek armed forces and the replacement of equipment as it becomes obsolete.

7. The inherent weakness of the economic and social structure of Greece, the position of Greece on the European and Asian defense perimeters, and the political significance which Greece has acquired as a symbol of the ability of the United States effectively to assist nations threatened with communist domination, all tend to indicate that Greece will continue to be a target of Soviet ambition. Within Greece the outlawed Communist Party is concentrating on repairing the damage suffered by its organization as a result of its complicity in the unsuccessful guerrilla war. It is estimated that the Greek Communist Party and its sympathizers represent probably less than 15% of the Greek people. Nevertheless, with its ruthless conspiratorial methods, its rigid discipline, and the direction which it receives from the powers of international communism, the Greek Communist Party constitutes a dangerous force ready to exploit unsatisfactory internal conditions in Greece and to assist a communist aggressor from without. The Greek guerrilla leaders have not abandoned their aims and have at their disposal for combat purposes at least 20,000 guerrillas presently dispersed in Eastern Europe.

8. Greece is an area in which the Kremlin might consider that an aggression on the Korean pattern (an attack involving only satellite troops) would be successful. Since June 30, 1950, Cominform propaganda agencies have repeatedly charged that the “Athens–Belgrade Axis”, under American and British direction, is preparing for aggressive action against Albania and Bulgaria and is menacing the peace of the Balkans. This Cominform propaganda line, coupled with the steady increase in the military potential of the Balkan satellite states, particularly Bulgaria, and the probability that the USSR is willing to risk a general war, has contributed to a disturbing situation.

9. On the one hand, the alleged threat to Bulgaria and Albania resulting from the “Athens–Belgrade Axis” may serve as a pretext for the USSR to send combat troops into Bulgaria at the request of the Bulgarian Government. The presence of Soviet troops in Bulgaria would serve to stabilize conditions within the country and would constitute an immediate threat to Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey.

10. On the other hand, it is possible that the USSR might instigate a Bulgarian (or joint Bulgarian-Albanian) attack against Greece coupled with or in support of a renewal of guerrilla activity. Bulgarian forces are estimated to be the best trained, best equipped and most reliable among the satellite forces in Eastern Europe. The Soviets have for some months been stockpiling war materials in the Balkans, particularly Bulgaria, in excess of the normal needs of the indigenous forces. The Bulgarian forces are known to possess considerable armored equipment, including between 450 and 700 T–34 tanks, and are believed to be capable of invading and overrunning Greece east of the Struma River in a few days time. In a sustained war Bulgarian forces are probably capable of extending their conquest to include all Greek territory east of the mountain line which runs through Edessa to Mount Olympus. It is believed, however, that the Bulgarian forces are not capable of destroying the Greek Army.

11. Bulgarian occupation limited only to Greek Thrace and Greek Macedonia would constitute a substantial success for the Cominform. Bulgarian irredentist aspirations would be satisfied, Salonika and the line of communications into Yugoslavia would be in the hands of the Cominform, and Greece would be deprived of its richest agricultural area. This would lead to the establishment of an “autonomous” Macedonian state in accordance with the aims of the Kremlin. Yugoslavia would be virtually surrounded, even though the Greek Army itself had not been eliminated nor had the existence of Greece as an independent state been extinguished.

12. Albania might attempt to remain neutral in the event of a Bulgarian attack against Greece because of its inability to contribute a substantial military force and because Albanian participation might invite some form of hostile effort from Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, activity by Albanian forces might divert a number of badly needed Greek troops, and it is reasonable to suppose Albania would be prepared at least to support large-scale guerrilla activity against Greece in the event of an attack against Greece by Bulgaria.

13. Participation in a satellite attack against Greece would probably be limited to Bulgarian forces, possibly augmented by Albanian troops and Greek guerrilla forces. The promptest augmentation of Greek defensive strength might involve the utilization of British land, sea and air forces in the Near East, and American air and naval units in the Mediterranean area, as well as the military resources of Turkey and Yugoslavia. … The U.S. would assist in the most feasible manner. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with which Greece and Turkey are associated in the appropriate phases of the planning in connection with the defense of the Mediterranean area, provides a possible arrangement for future collective planning for the event of an attack against Greece.

14. The international conduct of the USSR in connection with Korea clearly demonstrates a willingness to risk a general war. The USSR must be aware of the deep interest and heavy moral commitment of the United States in Greece. An attack against Greece involving satellite and/or Soviet forces would indicate that a general war is probably imminent. In the event of a general Soviet attack against the West, Greece would probably be indefensible and the requirements of Greece would be subordinated to the global strategic plans of the United States.

15. From the liberation of Greece in 1944 until the end of FY 1951 total American aid to Greece will have reached almost $2 billion. Although the material cost has been high, resolute United States policy in Greece has encouraged the resistance to communism in other parts of the world and has avoided the consequences of communist domination of Greece. The Greek people remain essentially anticommunist and are prepared to fight again to maintain their freedom.

alternative courses of action

16. In view of the vulnerability of Greece to communist subversion or aggression, the far-reaching consequences of communist domination of Greece, and the extent to which United States prestige has been committed to the maintenance of a free and independent Greece, continued United States assistance to Greece in the political, economic, and military fields is imperative. Within these fields certain basic alternative courses of action present themselves.

17. …

18. Economic. The Greek economy cannot survive at this time without continued United States assistance. It will not be self-supporting by the end of the Marshall Plan in 1952. Consequently, the principal alternatives confronting the United States lie in the determination of whether further economic assistance should be limited to a program of essential items designed to prevent disease and unrest or whether the United States should persist in the objective of developing a viable Greek economy. Although the obstacles to the creation of a self-supporting Greek economy are formidable, this objective is probably attainable. It holds not only the greatest promise for creating a healthy social structure in Greece, but also the best hope of ultimately divesting the United States of its obligations with regard to the Greek economy. Recent analysis suggests that future economic assistance to Greece must be provided in smaller annual increments in keeping with the limited capacity of Greece to provide sufficient internal investment capital, public or private, to permit a substantial increase in its productive capacity. This assistance must be extended for a number of years, possibly until 1954.

19. Military Assistance. Greece cannot afford to equip or maintain a military establishment of the size which the security requirements of the present international situation demand. The basic alternatives confronting the United States are whether the present Greek military establishment should be maintained primarily to insure internal security, or whether the United States should provide additional assistance which would, in addition, permit the Greek armed forces to resist effectively in the event of an attack by Soviet satellite forces. Particularly in view of the growing military capabilities of Bulgaria, progressive relative inferiority on the part of the Greek armed forces would seem to invite attack. Such an attack would cause serious embarrassment to the United States and might result in the communist domination of Greece. For these reasons, and in recognition of the increased potential of Greece to contribute to the general military strength of the non-communist world resulting from the already substantial United States investment, the United States will provide additional military training and equipment to Greece.

20. In the event of an attack against Greece. By instigating an attack against Greece by satellite forces the USSR would, without involving Soviet troops, place an immediate additional burden on the military resources of the United States. One alternative would be to limit United States action to political measures calculated to stop the aggression and localize the action. Inasmuch as there is little in the conduct of the USSR to indicate that the USSR would accept a political settlement which is not capable of prompt military enforcement, such measures would probably be futile. Moreover, failure of the United States to provide support to prevent Greece from falling into the Soviet orbit would produce political and military consequences of critical importance to the security interests of the United States. The USSR would acquire the strategic advantages to be derived from the possession of Greece. Under these circumstances the USSR might expect that the United States would not respond to subsequent direct Soviet action against Turkey and/or Iran and that those governments and the governments of Western Europe would in time be forced to seek accommodations with the USSR. In light of the vital interest of the United States in Greece and the deep commitment of United States prestige in Greece, the more valid alternative open to the United States in the event of an attack by Soviet and/or satellite forces would be to provide materiel and deploy United States forces to the extent necessary and available without jeopardizing the security of the United States or of areas of the world of greater strategic importance to the United States, and to urge all other nations to take similar action.

conclusions

21. It continues to be in the security interest of the United States that Greece not fall under communist domination.

22. The actions taken by the United States with respect to Greece, together with related factors, have been successful in preventing Greece from falling under communist domination.

23. In view of the far-reaching consequences of a communist domination of Greece, the investment of the United States in assistance to Greece has been justified although the cost has been high.

24. Greece continues to be a target of Soviet ambition although the threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece has altered in form.

25. Greece is one of the areas in which the USSR might consider that an attack involving only satellite troops would be successful.

26. The present threat to the security of Greece derives immediately from the growing military potential of Greece’s Cominform neighbors (particularly Bulgaria), from the presence of approximately 20,000 hostile Greek guerrillas in Eastern Europe, and from the activities of the Greek Communist Party as an agent of Soviet imperialism.

27. The preservation of the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece depends upon continued political, economic, and military assistance from the United States.

28. The United States should continue publicly to manifest deep interest in the independence and integrity of Greece in order to deter the USSR and/or its satellites from initiating aggressive action against Greece and, in any case, to prevent them from acting on the assumption that the United States would not provide determined support to Greece in the event of an aggression.

29. The United States should assist in every appropriate manner to strengthen Greek society against communist subversion, including the encouragement of democratic political procedures, the acceptance of wholesome social objectives, and the elimination of unimportant differences among Greek political leaders.

30. The United States should continue to provide economic assistance and advice with the objective of making Greece economically viable at the earliest possible moment. This will require continued American dollar assistance, possibly until 1954.

31. Acceptance of maximum responsibility for the rehabilitation and development of Greece by Greek leaders themselves must continue to be a basic objective of U.S. policy in Greece.

32. The United States should lend appropriate support to the Greek military establishment to assist it in:

a. Maintaining internal security.

b. Discouraging and, if necessary, resisting effectively an attack by satellite forces augmented by guerrilla forces.

c. Causing maximum practicable delay to an attack involving direct Soviet participation.

d. …

33. Within the limits of existing priorities and availabilities of matériel, the United States should provide Greece with such military equipment and supplies as will make possible the accomplishment of the objectives outlined in paragraph 32 above.

34. The United States should develop plans to assist Greece in the event of an attack by satellite forces. In this connection the United States should:

a. …

b. Urge at the appropriate time, military planning by the NATO to cover such a contingency and in the meantime encourage Greece and Turkey to explore the possibilities for mutual military cooperation.

c. Consider at an appropriate time, the possibility and desirability of military cooperation between Greece and Yugoslavia.

35. In the event of an attack against Greece by satellite forces, the United States should:

a. Make every effort to stop the aggression, localize the action and restore the status quo by political measures, through the UN, jointly with the UK, and unilaterally.

b. Accelerate and increase military assistance to Greece to the extent appropriate and feasible.

c. If necessary, and to the extent consistent with other security requirements, mobilize available military support to Greece through United Nations action, through implementation of North Atlantic Treaty plans, through joint United States–United Kingdom arrangements, and through unilateral United States support, as appropriate.

d. In participating in any military support action for Greece as envisaged in c above, deploy, to the extent necessary, such forces as can be made available without jeopardizing the security of the United States. …

e. Place itself in the best possible position to meet the increased threat of global war.

36. In the event of direct Soviet participation in an attack against Greece the United States should take the measures set forth in paragraph 35 above. Such action, however, should be taken in the full knowledge that a general war may nevertheless be unavoidable.

1. See footnote 1, supra.