641.74/12–1451: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1

secret

2923. 1. Embassy’s thoughtful analysis present UK attitude on Egypt and Sudan (Embtel 2661 December 7)2 most helpful and timely since Department reviewing our position on these questions.

2. We are concerned by tendency UK allow matters drift for time being, in hope that “something” may turn up which will make settlement possible. Since we are apprehensive consequences prolongation this line, we consider important that you discuss Anglo-Egyptian question with Eden soonest making clear our analysis situation and views following paragraphs. If possible, discussion should take place before Eden goes to Paris.

3. As we understand it, UK believes continuation present policy firmness and patience without further move from our side to end impasse may result in Egypt eventually being prepared negotiate settlement along desired lines. UK assumption is that if situation is permitted drift, in time either (A) Wafd Government (with or without Nahas), realizing folly of its ways, will take matters in hand and be prepared negotiate reasonably; or (B) public dissatisfaction and frustration will sweep Nahas and his party out of office and new government will come to power willing suppress disorder, back down on intransigeant Wafd stand and negotiate reasonable settlement.

4. Our analysis situation somewhat different. We consider Egyptian nationalism, which has grown steadily since 1919 is deeply-rooted movement which will neither subside nor alter its course by mere passage of time. Although present high pitch national fervor and emotion, of which UK primary target, may be partially induced artificially, we are convinced that in general it represents substantially accurate expression of popular feeling against UK. We also believe this feeling likely grow as time passes and as incidents and Egyptian deaths affect various parts of country. Danger present state of drift is that while public dissatisfaction and frustration may sweep Nahas and party out of office, Wafd may not be replaced by more reasonable politicians; on the contrary there is good chance it will be replaced by extremist elements which may lead Egypt down road to chaos and anarchy. If this should happen, and it becomes necessary for parts of Egypt to be reoccupied by UK to preserve law and order, we believe that will add such fuel to flames of Egyptian nationalism that West will have in Egypt no long range position and can maintain [Page 439] itself short-range only by force. What we could do in 1882 would not be acceptable to world opinion in 1952. In essence we hope British analysis is right; we doubt that it is and we fear consequences of UK maintaining its present policy too long.

5. UK and US share same basic objective in Egypt and although UK bears greater responsibility, US has stood close to UK regarding Egypt since our association with Four-Power defense proposals. We believe that to achieve our objective, namely maintenance strategic facilities in such manner they can be speedily and effectively used in wartime, we must have reasonable degree Egyptian cooperation. Regarding this we are impressed by conclusion reached by US and UK Embassies Cairo and concurred in by British Generals Fayid, that as of now lack Egyptian cooperation has resulted in Canal base being “no longer operative”. (Cairo’s 799 December 1 and Despatch 1279 December 2).3

6. Regarding Sudan we recognize UK more directly involved than US and that UK takes pride in its achievements there. However, we feel unpalatable fact must be faced, that defense issue and Sudan question are linked. Our two Ambassadors Cairo are convinced that we shall make no progress regarding Egyptian cooperation on defense issue if some face-saving move cannot be made regarding Sudan. We also believe that as each day goes by without moves by either side to settle situation, solution becomes increasingly more difficult.

7. Department particularly welcomes Eden’s statement to Egyptian Ambassador December 11 that UK willing resume talks either Cairo or London.4 We feel resumption talks (which was one of reasons we suggested UK respond to Salaheddin’s Sudan plebiscite proposal) would give Egyptian Government excuse hold tight reign on disturbances. Talks would only be of use if they get down to substance quickly. Department’s thinking this connection is along lines of “package deal” in which UK in conjunction US, France, and Turkey recognize title “King of Sudan” on condition (A) that Egyptians at same time agree to some form plebiscite or referendum to guarantee to Sudanese their right to eventual self-determination; and (B) that Egypt agree to substance Four Power defense proposals which might be recast without altering basic concept to make them more saleable Egyptian public.

8. Regarding above proposal we make following comments (A) Proposal seems wholly consistent with today’s press reports views Eden will expound to Salaheddin in Paris; (B) It is consistent with Cairo joint appreciation that solution defense issue requires some move regarding Sudan; (C) It safeguards UK and Sudanese interests and also gives Egypt face-saving concession; (D) Any agreement [Page 440] by Egypt on substance Four Power proposals must not only be in form which binds Egypt but must contain provisions for presence in Egypt of allied troops in sufficient strength to assure maintenance MEC rights there since under present conditions new agreement with Egypt without such provisions would inspire no more confidence than 36 treaty.5

Acheson
  1. Drafted by G. Lewis Jones and Stabler, cleared by BNA, EUR, SP, and S. Approved for transmission by Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews. Repeated to Paris, Cairo, Ankara, Baghdad, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, Damascus.
  2. Ante, p. 431.
  3. Neither printed.
  4. See footnote 4, infra.
  5. In telegram 893 from Cairo, niact, December 16, Caffery stated that he agreed with the ideas expressed in the source text, but that the important questions were timing and channels. “This is the time but I question Salaheddin a channel.” Caffery added that if the British accepted the package proposals outlined in paragraph 7, Farouk should be approached, and, if he approved, Serageddin should then be contacted in confidence for suggestions regarding the course to be followed. (641.74/12–1651) In telegram 908 from Cairo, December 19, Caffery reported that Stevenson was delighted with the views expressed in the source text and was “as convinced as I am that Dept’s suggestions signify only way out.” (641.74/12–1951)