Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417

Substance of Discussions of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, December 12, 1951¹

[Extract]

top secret

[Washington,] December 12, 1951.

Present

General Bradley		Mr. Matthews
General Collins		Mr. Nitze
General Vandenberg		Mr. Bohlen
Admiral Duncan		Mr. Johnson
General Bolte		Mr. Bonbright
General Lee		Mr. Berry
Admiral Fife		Mr. Ferguson
Admiral Wooldridge		Mr. Parsons
General Cabell		Mr. Tufts
Admiral Lalor		Mr. Gleason
Colonel Carnes
	General Ruffner

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Egypt

Mr. Berry: I have just returned from a visit to Egypt where I found a terrible situation. The British are detested. The hatred against them is general and intense. It is shared by everyone in the country. The result is that the position we desire in Egypt, the area we want for bases, and the influence of Egypt in the Arab world in support of our interests are denied to us. A solution is urgently needed to this exceedingly complex problem. The problem is not simply a problem of British position and influence in Egypt. It has many other deep-seated reasons as well. These include the fact that the population of Egypt has increased by one quarter in ten years. This increase has not been accompanied by any measurable increase in the amount of land under cultivation or in yields. It also includes the unequal distribution of wealth. One half of the cultivable land is owned by one-half of one percent of the land owners. In the cities there is an even more unequal distribution of wealth. It also includes the problem of education. Most of the population is illiterate and its ignorance is unimaginable.

I might give you one example to illustrate the importance of this last factor. During my stay in Egypt there was a riot at Ismailia. The riot started because a British patrol started to pick up a man who was lying in the street. The patrol thought that he was dead. However, he was not dead and when the patrol members picked him up he ran off. An Egyptian policeman saw this and jumped to the conclusion that evil spirits were abroad. He ran through the streets shooting off his revolver and crying out that evil spirits were abroad. He alarmed the 60 policemen in his headquarters and touched off a full-scale riot. It was four hours before the British and Egyptian authorities could restore order.

Another factor is that the Wafd party is the most corrupt party that has ever been in power in recent Egyptian history. A close associate of the Prime Minister arranged to have some valuable land declared as wasteland and then proceeded to arrange for the irrigation of this land at government expense. In this way he gained great wealth. That is just one example of the corruption which spreads throughout the government. No one has any confidence in the honesty of the government. It is also inept. It has not fulfilled any of the promises it made to the Egyptian people. It is also a disunited party except on the one question of the abrogation of the treaty with the U.K. As a matter of fact the Wafd party is happy to have the British troops as a focus of the Egyptian discontent. The party has now developed a campaign which really challenges the U.K. position in Egypt. Eighty-five percent of the labor force working for the British in the Canal Zone has left. When I visited a high British official in the Zone for lunch we ate canned food which he opened at his desk. His servant had gone out to obtain fresh food and had been beaten up and warned that unless he ceased to serve the official he would be tied hand and foot and thrown into the Canal. This kind of terrorism is increasing.

The British are trying to meet the labor problem by flying in labor from outside. However, this does not help—in fact, it introduces an element of confusion. The bases can no longer be regarded as operational bases. This puts us in a precarious position in the Middle East.

The British Ambassador is very depressed. He sees the future as a rapid downward spiral which will probably be set off by incidents in the Canal Zone. There are increasing accounts of violence against British soldiers and they are not a pretty kind. They are sand-bagged in the streets and then cut up. There were eleven such murders during my visit. The British soldiers are highly resentful of British inactivity. The officers believe that they will not be able to control the soldiers very long unless they take active measures to counter these acts of violence. However, if the British strike back the Egyptians will retaliate by cleaning the British out of Cairo and Alexandria. The British will occupy Cairo and Alexandria and that will lead to the eventual loss of Egypt by the British.

I am not quite as depressed as the British Ambassador. There are a number of elements with whom and with which we can work. (1) Our Ambassador is greatly respected. He speaks with a ring of authority. There is no doubt that he is the outstanding foreigner in Egypt. (2) The British Ambassador sees eye to eye with our Ambassador. We can get, and have gotten a joint view of the problem. I regard that as a matter of great importance. (3) Despite the U.S. position on Palestine, the U.S. still has great prestige in Egypt. This prestige can be exploited to our advantage. (4) The King clearly understands the position. He realizes that his position as king depends on our own—in fact, even his life depends on a solution of this problem. (5) There are certain Egyptian groups which are also on our side. For example, the Pashas clearly recognize that their position and wealth will be lost if Western influence is removed from Egypt. Some time this group will have to come out into the open if the terror is to be brought under control.

I think we may have to revamp our concept of the MEC in order to give more flattery to Egyptian vanity. I think we will also have to do something about recognizing the King of Egypt as the King of the Sudan. That should not be difficult as even the British law court recognizes his right to this title.

In conclusion, I would only say that Egypt is rapidly going down the drain and that it will soon be lost unless the trend is soon reversed. If this happens we will have to revise our policy toward the whole Arab world. One of the difficulties in finding a solution is that the present government is the only organized political group.

General Bradley: What do you have in mind as regards the revamping of the MEC? We offered them already a very large position.

Mr. Berry: I must admit that we have not thought this one through. The Egyptians desire that the Arab states should all be charter members. It may be necessary to find some role for King Farouk. It may be necessary and possible for the British to withdraw some of their forces. In this connection I might point out that the Egyptians are ready to accept air force personnel on the ground that they are technicians. It is the ground forces which they are unwilling to permit to stay in Egypt. We have no definite and concrete proposal to make but we think something along these lines will have to be explored.

Mr. Ferguson: Did you feel that the Egyptians had understood our MEC proposals? When I was there a short time before your visit I had the feeling that the Egyptians had never read the proposals and had no understanding of them.

Mr. Berry: That is correct. They never saw the proposals. The Foreign Minister was the only cabinet member who had read them prior to their rejection by the cabinet.

Mr. Matthews: Is there any awareness in Egypt of the Communist threat?

Mr. Berry: That is something we can work on of course. Egypt is far from Russia and does not fear Russia; however, there are many Egyptians who fear the coming to power of extremist groups within Egypt. Such groups would be a challenge to the power and position of the wealthy Egyptians. They greatly fear the Moslem brotherhood and its policy of political assassination.

Mr. Bohlen: Did you get any impression about the development of the Communist party strength in Egypt?

Mr. Berry: No specific information. The Soviet Embassy has been conducting itself very circumspectly. The local Communist party is exploiting the discontent with local conditions but it had not been trying to spread the gospel of Marxism.

Mr. Bohlen: Is the Communist party trying the develop a fanatic nationalism which it could then exploit?

Mr. Berry: Yes, it is.

General Bradley: This has been a most interesting report.

1. A note on the source text reads: “State draft. Not cleared with any of the participants.” There is no indication from the source text of the identity of the drafting officer. The section on Egypt comprises pages 10–13 of the source text. The first two sections dealt with the questions of Korea and the prisoners of war and the results of the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Rome. For a brief summary of the discussions on Korea and the prisoners-of-war issue by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, December 12, see vol. vii, p. 1307.