Secretary’s Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)
Subject: Intelligence Reports on Outbreak of World War III
Participants: Mr. Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador
The
Secretary
Mr. Reinhardt, EE1
Mr. Johnson, NA
Ambassador Bonnet called at his request and stated that he had been instructed by the Foreign Minister to inquire of the Secretary concerning our evaluation of certain intelligence reports received by the French Government. He stated that the first report, which had been received by the French representative in Tokyo from U.S. military sources there, was to the effect that the Vice President of the Chinese Communist government had recently transmitted a message to the chief of the Chinese Communist secret service and to the Commander of the Chinese Volunteer Forces in Korea to the effect that an outbreak of general hostilities could be expected shortly after the signing of the Japanese peace treaty on September 4.
The second report, also received by the French representative in Tokyo from U.S. military sources there, was to the effect that in a recent conference between Mao Tse-tung2 and Chou En-lai3 it was stated that the successful outcome of the present armistice negotiations in Korea could not be expected and that general hostilities would break out immediately following the signing of the Japanese peace treaty on September 4.
[Page 119]The third report, the Ambassador stated, was received by the French Government from Cominform sources in France, to the effect that World War III would start during September of this year and preparations therefore should be made.
The Secretary replied that he had no personal knowledge of the first two reports and as far as the third report was concerned our information, while indicating the Communists were probably in a position to undertake general hostilities at any time, reported no unusual signs or indications pointing toward their intent to do so in September.
The Ambassador stated he assumed that as the first two reports had not come to the Secretary’s attention they might well be of low evaluation.
The Secretary stated that he would look into the matter immediately and if the reports were such as to warrant immediate attention he would get in touch with the Ambassador later this afternoon, but that if he did not do so the Ambassador could assume that such was not the case and that he would discuss the matter further with the Ambassador on Monday.4