Your attention is called to the final paragraph in the attached Estimate. The
Intelligence Advisory Committee, after great struggle, concluded that it
could not, on the basis of present intelligence, make a categorical
statement that the Kremlin is “likely” or “unlikely” deliberately to
precipitate war, although it does state that the USSR has the capability to
launch general war and may decide to precipitate general war. The estimate
develops this aspect and also evaluates the
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Possible Soviet courses of action if the Kremlin does
not have the intent to precipitate or incur serious risk of general war.
[Annex]
Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency
top secret
[Washington,] August 2, 1951.
NIE–25
National Intelligence Estimate3
Probable Soviet Courses of Action to Mid–1952
the problem
To estimate probable Soviet courses of action to mid–1952 with particular
reference to the probability of direct hostilities between the US and
the USSR.
estimate
I. Soviet Objectives
1. We believe that the ultimate Soviet objective is a Communist world
dominated by the USSR and that the Kremlin believes its vital interests
can be assured over the long run only by the elimination of all
governments it cannot control. This objective probably reflects a
Kremlin conviction that peaceful coexistence of the USSR and its empire
on the one hand, and the US and its allies on the other, is impossible
and that an armed conflict between them is eventually inevitable.
2. The principal immediate Soviet objectives evidently are:
-
a
- To divide the West;
-
b
- To prevent Western, West German, and Japanese
rearmament;
-
c
- To prevent implementation of the US overseas-bases
policy.
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3 We believe the USSR, in the pursuit of its
objectives, will during the period of this estimate:
-
a.
- Seek to maintain an advanced state of war-readiness and offset
any increase in the capabilities of the US and its
allies;
-
b.
- Seek to prevent the development of any threat to the vital
interests of the USSR or to Soviet control of the
Satellites;
-
c
- Seek to expand the territorial limits of the Soviet
orbit;
-
d
- Seek to undermine and secure control of governments not yet
under Soviet domination;
-
e
- Seek to force countries of the free world to adopt a policy of
neutrality in the East-West struggle and to deny their
resources, including strategic sites, to the US and its
allies.
II. Military Considerations Underlying
Soviet Action
4. We estimate that the armed forces of the USSR have the capability of
overrunning continental Europe and the Near and Middle East (except
India and Pakistan) within a relatively short period.
5. The USSR does not now have and would be unlikely to secure adequate
naval forces or sufficient shipping to permit it to mount a successful
invasion of the Western Hemisphere, even if it should seize the Eurasian
continent and the UK.
6. The Soviet Air Force is capable of providing adequate tactical support
of all ground campaigns which the USSR might launch against continental
Europe and the Near and Middle East (except India and Pakistan), and
simultaneously of attempting a strategic air offensive against the
United Kingdom and the North American continent.
7. It is impossible to estimate with any accuracy the Kremlin’s
conclusion with regard to the relative effectiveness of Soviet and US
atomic warfare capabilities or with regard to the relative importance of
atomic and conventional weapons in determining the issue of a future
general war. We believe it probable, however, that uncertainty
concerning relative atomic warfare capabilities and concerning the
effectiveness of atomic weapons in determining the issue of a general
war will be a major, though not necessarily a decisive, deterrent to the
Kremlin in making a decision to initiate or deliberately provoke a
general war with the US during the period of this estimate.
8. The USSR is capable of employing sabotage against a variety of targets
and of employing clandestine methods to attack the US and its allies
with atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. We believe, however, that
those capabilities would be exercised on an appreciable scale only in
conjunction with or immediately preceding general
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military operations and that they would
not be a decisive factor in any Soviet decision to initiate a general
war.
III. Possible Soviet Courses of Action
Without Intent To Precipitate or Incur Serious Risk of General
War
9. While in Soviet theory and practice war is an acceptable, and on
occasion necessary, instrument for attaining Communist objectives, the
Kremlin presumably prefers if possible to attain its objectives by
courses of action short of resort to general war. The Kremlin probably
estimates that opportunities exist for making limited progress toward
both its immediate and long-run objectives, at least during the period
of this estimate, without provoking general war, because of:
-
a.
- The deterrent effect of the estimated Communist capability to
overrun most of Eurasia at will;
-
b.
- The deterrent effect of Soviet capabilities for atomic
warfare;
-
c.
- The divergent interests of the Western Powers; and
-
d.
- The general reluctance of the Western Powers to become
involved in general war.
10. In discussing courses of action short of general war, it is necessary
for clarity to examine each separately. Soviet policy envisages various
courses of action—political warfare, limited Satellite or Soviet armed
aggression, and even general war. While, therefore, separation for
purposes of exposition is essential, the inseparable connection of all
possible courses of action must be kept in mind.
A. Political Warfare
1. The Kremlin may consider the prospects of success by political
warfare* sufficiently favorable to make other courses of
action unnecessary. For example, with the immediate objective of
dividing the Western Powers, undermining US mobilization, obstructing
the NATO program and frustrating prospective German and Japanese
rearmament and with the ultimate objective of paralyzing opposition to
Communism, the Kremlin may fraudulently propose peaceful coexistence of
the two systems and may encourage the West to hope for a settlement of
outstanding issues by mutual agreement. In the vital area of Western
Europe the Kremlin will almost certainly continue to press its “peace”
campaign, to exploit the fear of war, to intimidate by display of force,
to raise hopes of German unification, and to use the Communist Parties
of France and Italy in an attempt to confound the political situation
and obstruct effective government. Wherever elsewhere in the world
non-Communist governments are weak, as in Iran, Indochina, and Burma,
the Kremlin will almost
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certainly seek to strengthen the Communist position and, if favorable
situations develop, will support Communist coups.
B. Employment of Chinese Communist Forces
12. The Kremlin might, during the period of this estimate, attempt to
achieve some of its objectives by inducing the Chinese Communists to
engage in additional military operations. Such operations would involve
risk of general war between the US and the USSR, but the Kremlin might
estimate that such operations could be so conducted that general war
would not be precipitated.
13. Indochina and Burma. In particular, the
Kremlin may estimate that a Chinese Communist invasion of Indochina or
Burma would not involve a serious risk of general war and that such an
invasion would facilitate a Communist advance throughout Southeast Asia
and the consequent denial of the resources of that area to the free
world. The Chinese Communists almost certainly have the capability for
conquering Burma. We consider an invasion of Burma possible, but we do
not believe it probable during the period of this estimate. The Chinese
Communists are now capable of overunning virtually all of northern
Indochina, and we consider an invasion of Indochina possible at any
time.
14. Taiwan. The Kremlin probably estimates that
the Chinese Communists alone do not have the capabilities for a
successful invasion of Taiwan so long as the US policy of employing US
fleet units for the defense of Taiwan remains unchanged. Under existing
circumstances, the Kremlin must realize that active Soviet participation
in an attack on Taiwan would substantially increase the risk of general
war without necessarily ensuring the success of the operation. We
therefore believe it unlikely that the USSR, in prevailing
circumstances, would either encourage or participate in a Chinese
Communist attack on Taiwan.
15. Hong Kong and Macao. Chinese Communist seizure
of Hong Kong and Macao probably would be militarily easy, but would
presently entail political and economic disadvantages for the
Communists. If present conditions continue, we believe it unlikely that
forceful seizure of these ports will take place during the period of
this estimate.
C. Employment of European Satellite Forces
16. The Kremlin might, during the period here considered, attempt to
achieve some of its objectives through local military operations by
European Satellite forces. However, the Kremlin probably estimates that,
because of the more direct impact on NATO interests, such operations
would involve greater risk of general war between the US and the USSR
than similar local operations by Chinese Communist forces.
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17. Yugoslavia. The Kremlin undoubtedly attaches
great importance to regaining control of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is
strategically important and is gradually developing close ties with the
NATO powers. Titoism continues to be a potential menace to Soviet
domination over the Satellites and over the world Communist movement.
Satellite capabilities for launching an attack on Yugoslavia are
steadily increasing. It is possible that the Kremlin regards the
Yugoslav issue as of such importance as to warrant acceptance of the
risks involved in a Satellite attack. However, in view of the increasing
Western support of Yugoslavia, it is more probable that the Kremlin
estimates that a Satellite attack would involve not only serious risk of
war between the US or UN and the
Satellites, but also the danger that such a conflict would develop into
a general war between the US and the USSR. On balance, we believe a
Satellite attack on Yugoslavia during the period of this estimate is
possible, but not probable.
18. Greece and Turkey. Satellite capabilities for
attack on Greece and particularly on Turkey are too limited for conquest
of those countries. Furthermore, the Kremlin almost certainly realizes
that an operation against either of these countries would probably
entail US or UN intervention with the
possibility of general war developing. We believe, therefore, that the
USSR is unlikely to launch a Satellite attack on either Greece or Turkey
during the period of this estimate.
19. Berlin, West Germany, and Austria. Satellite
capabilities for military action against Allied forces in Berlin, West
Germany, or Austria will probably remain so limited during the period
here considered and the risk of general war involved in such action
would be so great that the USSR is unlikely to launch a Satellite attack
during this period.
D. Employment of Soviet Forces
20. The Kremlin must realize that commitment of major Soviet forces in
any European Satellite or Chinese Communist operation would greatly
increase the risk of general war between the US and the USSR. Wherever
possible, therefore, the USSR would rely upon European Satellite or
Chinese Communist forces for carrying out military operations against
non-Communist areas. It undoubtedly would provide such forces with
technical and logistical aid and might participate in rear area
operations; if it considered the risk acceptable, it might even provide
“volunteer” Soviet forces in the forward areas. Open Soviet military
intervention, however, would be unlikely excepting in areas considered
of great importance to the USSR and where Satellite forces are either
unavailable or incapable of successful action.
21. Greece and Turkey. The Kremlin probably aims
to secure control of Greece and Turkey in order to eliminate bases that
could be
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used for attack on
the Soviet orbit and at the same time to secure bases from which the
position of the free world in the Near East might be threatened.
However, the available Satellite forces alone are probably not capable
of conquering Greece and certainly not capable of conquering Turkey.
Therefore, such operations could be accomplished only with the active
participation of Soviet forces. The Kremlin probably estimates that the
US and UN almost certainly would come to
the support of Greece and Turkey and that in those circumstances a
general war between the US and the USSR would probably result. An attack
on Greece or Turkey is therefore unlikely during the period of this
estimate.
22. Iran. Of the areas where only Soviet forces
are available for immediate employment, Iran is unstable and important.
Soviet control of Iran would eliminate a potential base for hostile
action against the USSR, would deprive the West of a vast oil supply,
and would facilitate the subversion or conquest of the Near and Middle
East. However, the Kremlin probably estimates that the political and
economic instability and the widespread anti-British feeling offer good
prospects of increasing Communist influence and eventually of
establishing Communist control without direct Soviet intervention. Under
these circumstances we believe it unlikely that the Kremlin would
consider it necessary to incur the risk of war with the Western Powers
involved in Soviet military intervention. But if the British should use
military force in their dispute with Iran, the Kremlin might then invoke
the 1921 treaty and occupy at least northern Iran, estimating that it
could do so with relatively little risk of general war.
E. Employment of Soviet Forces Against US Forces
23. The Kremlin almost certainly estimates that overt and recognized
commitment of Soviet forces against US forces in any area would involve
not only a local war with the US, in which the US might well use atomic
weapons, but also the strong probability of general war with the US,
including a US strategic atomic attack on the USSR. Unless, therefore,
the Kremlin had decided to accept general war with the US, we believe a
Soviet attack on West Germany, Berlin, Austria, or Japan would be most
unlikely during the period of this estimate.
24. If the Korean conflict continues or is renewed after a cease fire,
the Kremlin will probably continue to aid the Communists in ways which
the Kremlin estimates would not involve serious danger of a break
between the USSR and US/UN. If, however,
the Communist forces in Korea were threatened with decisive defeat, the
Kremlin would probably intensify its aid. This aid might well include
the introduction of “volunteer” forces. It might even include the
employment of Soviet forces to such an extent that a de facto local war between the US/UN and the USSR would exist. At every stage the
[Page 126]
Kremlin will probably endeavor
to keep open the possibility of ending the Korean conflict by political
negotiation if the global interests of the USSR would be served by
disengagement in Korea.
IV. Possibility of General War
25. Consideration of the degree of probability of Soviet military action
in specific areas must be related to over-all Soviet strategy and
policy. If the Kremlin should decide to precipitate or to accept general
war, it might launch an attack in any area at any time and in any form
as a prelude to such general war. Soviet forces are in an advanced state
of war-readiness and could initiate general war at any time with little
or no warning. The danger of general war exists now and will continue to
exist so long as the USSR is in a position to take action which
threatens, wholly or in part, the vital interests of the Western
Powers.
26. We believe that the most important immediate objectives of the
Kremlin are to divide the West and to halt Western, West German, and
Japanese rearmament. If the Kremlin should fail to make sufficient
progress toward that end by methods short of general war and if in
addition it should become convinced that its superiority in conventional
forces were about to be offset (whether through NATO and West German or
Japanese rearmament or through Western advances in unconventional
armaments), we believe the Kremlin would consider the advisability of
precipitating general war. We believe it unlikely that the Kremlin would
adopt this course of action so long as Western rearmament appeared to it
only as a transitory impediment to further Soviet and Satellite
expansion. On the other hand, if the Kremlin were to conclude that this
rearmament threatened the vital interests of the USSR, we believe: (a)
if it estimated that the USSR had sufficient means to wage war
successfully and that the delay would tip the scales of power
irretrievably against the USSR, the Kremlin would precipitate general
war; but (b) if it estimated it did not have sufficient means to wage
war successfully, the Kremlin would modify its policy and attempt to
relax international tension until such time as the Western Powers
relaxed their vigilance or other factors favorable to the USSR
supervened. It is possible, however, that the USSR might precipitate war
even under adverse circumstances if it considered the threat to its
vital interests sufficiently real and immediate.
27. We do not believe that during the period of this estimate the Kremlin
is likely to conclude that US, NATO, West German, and Japanese
rearmament constitutes an immediate threat to the vital interests of the
USSR. It is possible, however, that the Kremlin may at any time conclude
that the Western rearmament program constitutes an eventual but already
unacceptable threat to its vital interests,
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or that the Kremlin may at any time misinterpret
Western defensive measures as indicating an imminent attack on the
USSR.
28. There is, moreover, a serious possibility of general war developing
within the period of this estimate from an action or series of actions
not intended to produce that result. The Kremlin might, for example,
miscalculate the degree of risk involved in a particular action or
underestimate the cumulative effect of several actions. Or, it might
regard a particular action as so necessary or so advantageous as to
warrant assuming even a serious risk of general war.
29. We recognize the desirability and the importance of concluding this
estimate with a simple and direct statement of the likelihood or
unlikelihood that the Kremlin will deliberately precipitate or provoke
general war between the US and the USSR during the period here covered.
Existing intelligence does not enable us to make such a precise
forecast. The USSR has the capability to launch general war and may
decide to precipitate general war. Moreover, the international situation
is so tense that at any time some issue might develop to a point beyond
control.†
