711.5/8–251
Memorandum by Mr. William H. Bray, Jr., of the Office of International Security Affairs to the Director of That Office (Cabot)
top secret
[Washington,] August 2, 1951.
Subject: Revision of the Basic Report in NSC 114—Status and Timing of Current U.S. Programs for National Security.
The July 31 edition of the NSC Staff report on this subject makes the following important changes in the previous report which I summarized for you in my memorandum of July 31:
- 1.
- In an attachment accompanying the July 31 Staff report the JCS concur in the view that “it now appears that the United States and its allies are already in a period of acute danger, which will continue until they achieve a position of strength adequate to support the objectives defined in NSC 68”. The JCS also concur in the view that “it is vital to our national security that the objectives of the NSC 68/4 programs be achieved at the earliest practicable date”. (underlining mine)
- 2.
- A fuller explanation is given for the failure of military production in the United States to meet the military readiness targets indicated in NSC 68/4. Among other things, it is pointed out that the approved force levels were set on December 14, 1950 and the detailed materiel programs were finally approved on April 19, 1951. In addition, other limitations on the availability of military equipment are (a) the practical problems of reducing production lead times, (b) delay in administrative actions, which could have made tools and facilities available at an earlier date, (c) organizational problems in production facilities and (d) the decision to expand the production base and concurrently to secure delivery of end items.
- 3.
- A much firmer statement is given in this draft about the capability of the United States economy to carry a load of the magnitude represented by the NSC 68 programs. The report states: “There can be no doubt of the capability of the economy to support a level of military production somewhat higher than that projected in the NSC 68 programs together with civilian consumption levels comparable with those prevailing in the period 1947–1949.”
- 4.
- The conclusions of the report have been modified to recognize
explicitly that the target dates for certain items within many
programs cannot be met on schedule and, therefore, revisions within
these programs should be undertaken with a view to determining those
items essential to national readiness, which should be accelerated.
[Page 118]
- a.
- The gravity of the world situation demands that as much of all programs essential to the national readiness as is practicable be accomplished by or before the approved target dates for the NSC 68/4 programs.
- b.
- The Staff recommends that, as a basis for the preparation of budget estimates, responsible departments and agencies should be directed to accelerate their presently approved programs in order to advance currently projected completion dates as far as feasible toward the target dates established in NSC 68/4 and in particular, to review for each major item the problem of achieving accelerated production while securing an adequate mobilization base. (underlining mine)