711.5/7–3151

Memorandum by Mr. William H. Bray, Jr., of the Office of International Security Affairs1 to the Director of That Office (Cabot)

top secret

Subject: Summary of NSC 114—Status and Timing of Current U.S. Programs for National Security.2

The summary presented below is designed to give you a quick review of other programs included in the NSC 68/3 and NSC 68/4 series.

[Page 113]

A. Changes in the world situation since the completion of NSC 68.

1. NSC 68 presented a prospect which was more favorable for the United States than now appears to have been warranted. The danger to our security is greater now than it was in April 1950. At that time, 1954 was regarded as the time of maximum danger. It now appears that we are already in a period of acute danger, which will continue until the United States and its allies achieve an adequate position of strength.

2. The military power of Russia and its satellities is increasing and the Soviet rulers have demonstrated a willingness, although closely calculated, to take actions which involve grave risks of precipitating general war.

a.
Estimates of Soviet atomic capabilities given in NSC 68 have been revised upwards.
b.
Military strength of the Eastern European satellites since April 1950 has been large and alone probably offsets the increases which have been achieved in Western Europe. Similarly, the Chinese Communist regime has considerable military capabilities at its disposal and has made progress in consolidating its control in China.
c.
The U.S.S.R. has demonstrated its ability to develop large military capabilities where none existed a few years ago, as in North Korea.
d.
Soviet military production is of high quality—higher than had previously been estimated.
e.
The Kremlin is conducting a systematic campaign to prepare the Russian people psychologically for possible war with the United States. The Kremlin is fully capable of maintaining control over the Russian people and those in the satellites.

3. The Kremlin regards most seriously the prospect of Western rearmament and is especially sensitive about the rearmament of Germany and Japan. The presently indicated action on the part of Russia to frustrate these programs of rearmament is to wage peace campaigns designed to exploit in the West both the fear of war and the reluctance to make the needed sacrifices. If this course of action fails, the danger of Soviet preventative action will be acute.

4. Situations have developed in Korea, Iran and the Balkans in which general war could issue by accident or by miscalculation.

5. On the part of the free world important progress has been made to meet the Soviet threat; but this progress has been slow and unsatisfying in relation to the abnormal exigencies of the situation. The United States and its allies have moved less rapidly than envisaged in NSC 68/4 toward exploiting their vastly superior economic potential to improve their overall power position in relation to the Soviet system. The level of military production in the United States and Western Europe and the flow of military assistance to allied countries have lagged behind the programs contained in NSC 68/4.

[Page 114]

B. The military program.

1. The target date of June 30, 1952 was set for completing the equipment and modernization of the approved active forces as well as getting a start on the accumulation of a minimum level of war reserves. The current estimate indicates that United States Armed Forces will not achieve the state of readiness planned for mid–1952 because important items of equipment will not be delivered until 6 to 18 months later.

a.
Army—If no further major slippages in production schedules occur, if adequate funds and controls are provided, and if Korean operations cease in the very near future, the Army can support combat operations in Europe at the planned level early in Calendar Year 1953. If combat in Korea continues until the end of 1951, the Army will be unable to support combat in Europe at the planned level prior to late Calendar Year 1953.
b.
Navy—Active forces strength (other than air) planned for the end of June 1952 will be initially equipped or modernized sometime around the middle of Calendar Year 1953, i.e., one year later. Both the ship conversion program and the construction of new ships are regarded as long lead time items for which completion date runs as far ahead as the end of 1954.
c.
Air Force—Under the 95 wing program the various wings will be equipped with modern aircraft by dates running from December 1952 in the case of trainers and fighter interceptors to December 1953 in the case of medium bombers and medium reconnaissance planes.

2. For many of the long lead production items the attainment of the required volume of production by mid–1952 was never scheduled for production since this would be incompatible with the establishment of a broad mobilization base by the same date.

3. Output has fallen below production schedules for many important end items. The main factors accounting for slippage in recent months are:

a.
Design delays and changes; and engineering difficulties, as in the electronics field.
b.
Inability to obtain prompt delivery on certain specialized machine tools.
c.
Shortages of trained personnel in the procurement and production branches of the military departments.
d.
Shortages of skilled labor, as in the aircraft and electronics industries.

4. The military strength on June 30, 1951 was 3,252,000. The military services met their personnel objectives for June 30, 1951 and expect to meet the target for June 30, 1952. The approved Fiscal Year 1952 military strength is 3,627,981, which will require a gross input of 1,545,000 men during the year. The anticipated manpower pool will be adequate to handle the call-up of men for duty. The military strengths can be accommodated with facilities now on hand and which will be provided in the Publics Works Bill now before Congress.

[Page 115]

C. The mobilization program.

The controls now instituted for the mobilization of resources and the stabilization of the economy are based upon substantially higher security programs than those now in the stage of mobilization. For the internal management of the mobilization program it is important that Fiscal Year 1952 production schedules be made fully realistic immediately and that firm schedules for 1953 be available as soon as possible.

1.
The materials control system of World War II is now virtually restored. Copper and certain alloying metals are becoming scarce; and cutbacks in materials have brought in the Detroit area the first serious case of large scale unemployment directly traceable to the mobilization program.
2.
Industrial expansion of very large proportions is under way. Present plans call for 100 percent increase in primary aluminum capacity, a 13 percent increase in steel capacity and a 14 percent increase in petroleum supply. The resources required for this expansion, however, are also needed in increasing amounts for both defense production and for civilian durable goods.

D. Foreign military and economic assistance.

The summary included in NSC 114 is identical with the one given in ISAC D–20.3

E. The civil defense program.

Preparations for civil defense are not advancing as rapidly as necessary. The present program is a state-federal program in which the federal administration develops plans and programs for the guidance and assistance of the states. Principal difficulties encountered are the lack of appropriations and the attitudes of indifference toward civil defense.

F. Stockpile.4

1.
It was always recognized that the attainment of all the stockpile objectives was not feasible for many commodities.
2.
Since December 1950 the target set for mid-1951 and mid-1952 have been revised downwards for many commodities for which current military and civilian requirements are in excess of supply.

G. The information program.5

1.
One of the most important elements in the augmentation of the “campaign of truth” program was the establishment of a series [Page 116] of radio stations to penetrate the iron curtain countries and areas of the sub-Asian continent.
2.
Congress has refused to appropriate sufficient funds. The report recommends that adequate funds be sought so that the radio stations can be placed in operation in approximately 24 months from the date of appropriations.

H. Foreign intelligence and related activities.

The report states that action is being taken to improve and intensify these activities but that difficulties are being encountered owing largely to the shortages of trained personnel and the lack of adequate facilities. The report notes that substantial progress has been made in the development of cooperation and coordination among the several intelligence agencies.

I. The internal security program.

The present basic internal security program is almost identical with that recommended by the interdepartmental committee on internal security and the interdepartmental intelligence conference. Needed measures to promote internal security, including industrial and port security, are well under way.

J. Conclusions.

The NSC Staff finds that the NSC 68/4 programs will not be accomplished at the present pace and scale of effort. The Staff recommends that, as a basis for the preparation of budget estimates, and pending further recommendations in the report due on October 1, 1951, the responsible agencies should be directed to accelerate their presently approved programs, particularly in the production field, in order to advance currently projected completion dates as far as feasible toward the target dates established in NSC 68/4.

  1. Bray was Chief, Program and Operations Staff. For documentation on the operations of the Office of International Security Affairs and the International Security Affairs Committee, see pp. 266 ff.
  2. NSC 114 is not printed; for text of NSC 114/1, August 8, see p. 127.
  3. ISAC D–20, “Analysis and Appreciation of Foreign Military and Economic Assistance Programs,” a report by the International Security Affairs Committee, July 26, 1951, is not printed. ISAC D–20b, same title, July 30, the version of the report approved by the Committee, is printed as Annex No. 2 of NSC 114/1, August 8, p. 360.
  4. For information on the U.S. stockpiling program, see p. 208.
  5. For documentation on the United States foreign information program, see pp. 902 ff.