S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 114 Series
Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze) to the Secretary of State
Mr. Secretary:
Subject: The Issues in NSC 114.1
1. The underlying issue.
The objectives of the program can be summarized as being
- a.
- to deter war;
- b.
- to be ready, and in time, should war come; and
- c.
- to be in a position to continue the program on a sound basis for as long a period of time as may be necessary.
The issues underlying NSC 114 arise from different evaluations as to the relative importance of these three objectives. Those who worry most about the political and practical difficulties in a rapid execution of the program tend to place maximum emphasis on “c”. These are Secretary Marshall, Lovett, McNeil,2 the procurement officers in the services and the Munitions Board. The State Department and the JCS have put primary emphasis on “a” and “b”. ODM and the Council of Economic Advisers both stress the fact that the general economy can stand a far greater effort than we are currently putting on it, and tend to be extremely critical of the Defense Establishment for talking as though the program were urgent and acting as though they were convinced of the wisdom of spreading it out. ODM feels that it is probably over-controlling the civilian economy for the small volume of war production which is actually coming off the line.
2. The particular issues which need clarification:
- a.
- The risk of aggression against areas or principles which are vital to our security and the consequent risk of war.
- State, the CIA, and the JCS all agree that the risk of further aggressive action on the part of the USSR or its satellites is not only real but probable and that the current military strength of the free world is grossly inadequate to put us in a position to deal satisfactorily with any such aggression. The risk of general war arising from such aggression is therefore great.
- b.
- The period of greatest risk.
- State and CIA feel that we are now in the period of substantial danger. We believe this period will continue until our rearmament and that of Europe has progressed to the point contemplated by the targets in NSC 68/4. We believe that the disparity of our atomic capabilities versus those of the USSR contributes to restraining the USSR from taking actions which in their estimation would bring on [Page 111] a general war. It appears to us essential to achieve preparedness prior to the substantial reduction of our atomic superiority. The period of greatest danger would certainly be on us if we permit a situation to arise where we have lost our preponderance in the atomic field and have not yet achieved an adequate state of preparedness.
- c.
- The effect of our actions upon possible action by the USSR. There is a widespread point of view in the Pentagon that if the USSR has determined to go to war it will; if it has not, it won’t irrespective of what we do. We in State have felt that there is an important interplay between our actions and those of the Soviets. We believe that strength is the basic deterrent. We also feel that a program for building strength, prior to the time the strength has been achieved, tends to increase the likelihood of USSR counteraction. We would like to see the period of build-up and therefore of greatest sensitivity shortened as much as possible. There are, however, factors in the psychological field which would indicate that during this period we should beat the drums only as much as is necessary to get the job done.
- An ability to sustain the program over as long a period of time as is necessary is also an obvious requirement. Otherwise we would have to force the issue at the time of our maximum build-up or reconcile ourselves to a continuing long-run erosion of our position.
- d.
- The specific conflicts between a more urgent program and one which
we can sustain over a period of time.
- (1)
- Secretary Marshall and many others who lived through the bleak days of minuscule military budgets during the 20’s and 30’s are very dubious whether the U.S. people and the Congress will support military budgets at a level even of $20 billion a year over an extended period.
- (2)
- They therefore tend to view the present program of $108 billion as a one shot authorization which may well be followed only by normal pay, maintenance, and replacement budgets.
- (3)
- Therefore they believe that, if an adequate industrial mobilization base is to be built and maintained, it must be done within the $108 billion program. If one were to construct all the tanks which can be financed out of the funds allocated to tanks in the $108 billion program, by July 1, 1952, all the tank production lines would have to shut down. It is easier to expand an already expanding program, in their judgment, than to expand a declining or stopped program. Therefore, we get better protection by spreading out the production by one-shift operations, etc. over a longer period of time.
- (4)
- A spread out program will permit further progress on new design and development work permitting improved weapons, thus guarding against stockpiles of obsolete weapons.
- (5)
- We in S/P on the other hand feel that
- (i)
- in an atomic age weapons in being have an increased value over production lines which are vulnerable to attack;
- (ii)
- that a spread out program will necessarily delay the time of completing, and even delay making much progress with, European and other foreign rearmament plans;
- (iii)
- that the U.S. people will respond better to a job done with an efficiency and drive that corresponds to their realization of the dangers inherent in the world situation, than to doubts and suspicions as to whether the Administration has been pulling their leg as to the seriousness of the situation;
- (iv)
- that additional programs over the $108 billion will be needed after the completion of that program and that funds can be obtained therefor;
- (v)
- that new design and development work can proceed concurrently with an aggressive production program;
- (vi)
- that a more urgent program will have a material bearing on the risk of war and on our readiness should it nevertheless come.
- e.
- Status of NSC 114.
- We believe that this paper is in about as good shape as could have been expected in the time available. We concur in the conclusions. Neither the paper nor the discussion which preceded its drafting laid the important issues out on the table.
- The impression was given in the discussion that the problem was merely one of unavoidable delays in designing, scheduling, getting machine tools, materials, etc. It was only in private discussions that any one adverted to what I believe to be the underlying differences as to policy.
- The paper covers up to some extent the seriousness of the lags not only in the production program, but in the civil defense program, the MDAP program, and the public information program.
- One of the dangers involved in NSC 114 is that the Bureau of the Budget will not take seriously the language in the conclusion, recommending that present production schedules be accelerated where possible, and will do its budget work on the basis of projecting existing schedules. In that event, the availability of funds which is not now a bottleneck may become one.