Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563

The Counselor (Bohlen) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)¹

top secret

[Washington,] July 28, 1951.

Dear Paul: While Newby Walmsley² was out here yesterday he showed me a copy of the current redraft of the NSC 68 series.³ As he indicated in his memorandum to you, I find my habitual dilemma in regard to these series. In order to be clear, I wish to state, as I did originally last April,⁴ that it is no quarrel with the basic recommendations concerning the necessity of a rapid buildup of military strength, especially in the U.S. and in Western Europe, that bothers me. I am obviously in hearty accord with these conclusions. What does disturb me, however, is the part dealing with the analysis of the Soviet Union, its policies and intentions, which I see perpetuated in NSC 114. I feel very strongly that unless we arrive at a correct estimate of the phenomena of the Soviet Union, how it operates, etc., we will never be able to act most effectively. After all it is the estimate and analysis of the Soviet Union and how it operates that conditions our thinking and ends by dictating our action.

I am confining my comments only to Part I of the paper⁵ since I am not in any position to comment on the parts dealing with our current programs, their status, adequacy, execution, etc.

My chief objection to Part I is the presentation of the Soviet Union as a mechanical chess player engaged in the execution of a design fully prepared in advance with the ultimate goal of world domination.⁶ The phrase “world domination” is a misleading truth and tends to become related to the phenomena of Hitler in minds of people here in Washington who have had no longterm dealings with the Soviet Union. On this point we must be able to make a distinction between a serious and continuing risk of war growing out of the present situation in the world and a firmly held belief that war will probably start by Soviet deliberate calculation at such and such a date. The result in either case may be the same, i.e., war; but the methods of dealing with it are quite different depending upon which thesis is accepted. Furthermore, as you know, I have never felt from the beginning—and I believe, although I commit no one, that this view is shared by most of the people in the Russian work, including George⁷ —that Korea represented a new phase in Soviet general policy indicating a willingness to accept the grave risk of precipitating global war which was not present before Korea.⁸ Most evidence at our disposal seems to indicate that the Russians made a gross miscalculation in Korea and did not anticipate any such risk. If this is correct, then their action in instigating the Korean attack is not logically susceptible of the conclusion reached in paragraph one of Part I. It does not follow, however, that once having embarked on a false presumption that there will not be a series of reactions to the situation thus developed. As to the question of risk of global war, surely the Berlin blockade contained almost an equal risk of precipitating a global conflict, if only for the reason that the troops of the principal major powers were directly on the spot.

I do not know the authority for the statement in paragraph two, that since April 1950 the USSR has been engaged in a deliberate campaign to prepare for possible war with the U.S. This has been standard Soviet procedure directed against their chief potential enemy ever since the foundation of the Soviet state. As far as the United States is concerned, this campaign began well before 1950.

It is possible that being in Paris⁹ I have not had access to the information to justify the flat statement in paragraph three in regard to Soviet military strength at present as compared to a year ago. Also, is it true vis-à-vis the United States and the West, in view of the rearmament already achieved? I do not question the statement on the satellites nor the reference to the quality of Soviet military production, but I think the last statement that in April 1950 the prospects were more favorable to the U.S. than now is one that should have further elaboration and proof.

Re paragraph six, there is no question but that the Soviet Union would like to break up Western rearmament, but I would put U.S. rearmament and overseas bases ahead of German and Japanese rearmament. While agreeing fully with the dangerous effect of any Soviet peace offensive, I do not consider softness on the Soviet side as reflected in the cease-fire discussions in Korea, Malik’s statement etc.,¹⁰ to be primarily motivated by a desire to lull the free world to sleep. This is one of the possible consequences which we must guard against at all times, but so far the Soviets have not shown themselves capable, for reasons which I will not go into here, of pursuing consistently any such aim. It is more likely to my view that the Russians desire some alleviation of acute tension in specific spots, i.e., Korea, because they see in it the genuine danger of global hostilities. Since I agree with the danger expressed in paragraph six, the only purpose of the comment is to show that taking possibly a false assumption of Soviet intention in this field may lead to a very radical conclusion which is found in paragraph seven. This paragraph states flatly that if this alleged aim of the Kremlin, i.e., to disrupt Western rearmament, cannot be done by the soft method, then there is a strong probability that the Soviets will resort to preventive war. Everything is a possibility, but I do not think that the logic of Soviet action leads to that type of conclusion. I think it is a dangerous thought as it might tend to condition us to an unwise response to a Soviet “peace offensive” in order to avert the alleged danger of Soviet preventive action.

I am of course quite unable to comment on the upward revision of Soviet atomic capabilities. (There is clearly a misprint in “10” and “mid-1952” is meant rather than “mid-1950”.) It seems to me that in the “68” papers on this subject there is a genuine confusion in thought. If the atomic equation is regarded as controlling, then logically the Russians would go to very great lengths to avoid anything that could lead to a serious risk of genuine war before this equation, both offensive and defensive, was sufficiently balanced in their favor; in which case, how can Korea be regarded as a willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to court general war and how can the very pessimistic statement in paragraph 12 of Part I be supported?

I fully realize that many of these comments may be based on ignorance on my part of certain basic intelligence and other material, but since I do know that in the past our policy abroad on many questions has been dictated by the considerations outlined in the “68” series, including the stepped up dates, I would like very much to have some of these questions I have raised answered more fully before the estimate in Part I becomes accepted as official U.S. Government doctrine. It is for this reason that I asked Newby to ask you if it would be possible to see you before you leave for Europe. He apparently misunderstood me as I did not in any sense mean that you should bother to come out here, but merely to tell you that I will be out on Tuesday night¹¹ at the Joyce’s¹² and probably be there most of Wednesday.

Could you leave word with Miss Wojnar when we could get together for a talk on this subject. You could of course bring with you the people from S/P who have been working on this paper.

Charles E. Bohlen

1. At the time of his appointment as Counselor in March, Charles E. Bohlen, then Minister of Embassy in France, was designated Department of State Representative on the Senior Staff of the National Security Council. However, assignments in Europe prevented him from returning to Washington until July. During the interim period, Paul H. Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, coordinated State Department participation in NSC staff operations.
2. Walter N. Walmsley, Jr., Alternate Department of State Representative on the Senior Staff of the National Security Council; State Member, NSC Staff Assistants.
3. The paper under reference is presumably NSC 114, “Status and Timing of Current U.S. Programs for National Security,” a report to the National Security Council by Executive Secretary Lay, July 27, 1951, not printed. For text of NSC 114/1, August 8, see p. 127.
4. Bohlen’s memorandum of April 5, 1950, a copy of which is attached to the source text, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. i, p. 221.

5. Part I of NSC 114, “Changes in the World Situation Since the Completion of NSC 68,” is virtually identical with Part I of NSC 114/1 (p. 129), with the exception of paragraphs 6 and 9. Paragraph 6 of NSC 114 reads as follows:

   • “6. As anticipated in NSC 68, the Kremlin regards most seriously the prospect of Western rearmament. It is especially sensitive to German and Japanese rearmament and the establishment of American bases overseas. Its principal immediate purpose is to frustrate these programs. Its presently indicated course of action to that end is a specious peace campaign designed to exploit both fear of a new general war and reluctance to make the sacrifices necessary to redress the balance of power. There is a serious danger, which may become acute if a cease-fire in Korea is agreed to, that by such wiles the USSR may yet lull the free world into a false sense of security, with adverse effect upon both its military posture and its political cohesion. If, however, the United States demonstrates determination and progress in meeting its commitments to build the strength of the free world to the level at which it can deter or defeat Soviet aggression, and if Soviet conciliation is seen to present no real assurances of peace and security, it is likely that the alignment of the West can be maintained and its strength further developed.”

   Paragraph 9 of NSC 114 rends as follows:

   • “9. The level of military production in the United States and Western Europe and the flow of military assistance to allied countries has lagged behind the programs contained in NSC 68/4. In general, the output of military equipment has been a more serious limitation on the building of military strength than the availability of manpower for the armed forces. While this limitation is partly the result of technical production and organizational factors, it is also traceable to factors of will, political strength, and psychology which are less favorable than was expected.” (S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 114 Series)

6. The following marginal notation by Nitze appears at this point: “We don’t believe this or say it.” The phrase “world domination” does not appear in NSC 114, Part I.
7. George F. Kennan, member of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey; Director of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947–1949; Counselor, 1949–1951.
8. The following marginal notation by Nitze appears at this point: “We don’t say that about the original intervention but do about the Chinese.”
9. Bohlen was Minister in the United States Embassy in France, June 1949–March 1951.
10. Reference is to the statement by Jacob A. Malik, Soviet Representative at the United Nations, June 23, 1951, suggesting armistice negotiations in Korea. Documentation on this subject is presented in volume vii.
11. July 31.
12. Presumably Robert P. Joyce, member of the Policy Planning Staff.