600.0012/12–451
The Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)
Dear Phil: I was glad to receive your letter of November 201 concerning the regulation of armaments picture in Paris. While it is true that we did not get our minds together during the stages of the drafting of the disarmament resolution, the product that resulted is probably a good one. With one very important exception, it took into consideration the most important views expressed by the Department. That one exception is that the Department felt that the resolution should be limited to creating the new machinery; turning over the tripartite program and presumably any other proposals to the Commission; and instructing the Commission to devote its efforts in the first instance to deliberations on the subject of disclosure and verification. The resolution as submitted in effect endorses the most important features of the tripartite program. One of our chief reasons for wanting to avoid the endorsement of the tripartite program was our belief that many states would then bring their own particular projects before the Committee and seek to secure the endorsement of these projects. The result would be a resolution which might completely distort the balance of the tripartite program. We have one example of such a proposal—the Indian resolution—and I fear that there will be more. However, if we can avoid this danger and secure a well-balanced resolution that will be all to the good.
Your letter raises a number of extremely interesting and important questions. With a little hesitation I am inclined to agree with your conclusion that we must go ahead with the program even if the Soviets strongly oppose the adoption of the resolution. We must go ahead at least to the point of submitting specific proposals for disclosure and verification and securing the inevitable unfavorable reaction from the Soviets. I have doubts as to whether we should go beyond that point since I fear that any false illusion of progress towards actual disarmament might interfere with the rearming of the West.
[Page 599]I am completely in agreement with your suggestion that we must be prepared to submit proposals on disclosure and verification as soon as the Commission is organized. We have already submitted to the Conventional Armaments Commission certain papers on the most important technical phases. They are contained in United Nations document S/1690, dated August 15, 1950.2 While these papers must be somewhat modified to conform to the requirements of (a) a continuing as opposed to a one-time census; (b) the disclosure and verification of atomic energy as well as other armaments and armed forces, nevertheless, their essentials still hold good. A State–Defense operating level working group has already started work on drafting this paper. Beyond this I am inclined to go somewhat slowly primarily for the reason that I cannot conceive of our getting agreement with the Soviets on disclosure and verification.
I agree with you and Frank that any proposal for reexamination of the atomic energy plan will encounter the strongest opposition and must be initiated directly by the President. I am having my staff go over the ground work with a view to discussing the matter with the Secretary upon his return and upon Frank’s return.
I agree with you that the Secretary’s speech in Committee 1 was magnificent and I think that the net effect of the tripartite approach has been entirely favorable.
Keep up the good work.
Sincerely yours,