Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Atomic Energy Files, Lot 57 D 688¹

Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of International Security Affairs (Bechhoefer)²

top secret

[Washington,] December 4, 1951.

Reexamination of Atomic Energy Plan.

Mr. Hickerson’s letter to Mr. Jessup³ dealt with Mr. Jessup’s suggestion that it might be desirable to reexamine the atomic energy plan and agreed with Mr. Jessup that any action in this direction must be initiated directly by the President. Mr. Hickerson’s letter further stated: “I am having my staff go over the groundwork with a view to discussing the matter with the Secretary upon his return and upon Frank’s return”.

I discussed the matter with Mr. Chase and found that our views were very similar although to a certain extent based upon different lines of reasoning. We both felt that it would be highly inadvisable to suggest at this time modifications of the atomic energy plan. Mr. Chase stressed the strong objections raised when the matter had been previously broached. He stated that it is highly unlikely that a man like President Conant of Harvard⁴ or Dr. Oppenheimer⁵ would consent to take the time to discuss the revisions. They felt that the basic problem had gone beyond the control of atomic energy and involved the entire relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact Dr. Conant suggested that he would make the study only if his terms of reference included the entire foreign policy of the United States.

My line of reasoning, which reached the same conclusion, was based upon my participation during the past summer in the Atomic Energy Sub-Committee of the International Law Committee of the American Bar Association. It is my belief that if any suggestion were made for abandoning the present atomic energy plan, public reaction would be along one of the two following lines:

a) Why should the United States have any plan? Why should we not merely go ahead and manufacture the bomb?

b) The atomic energy plan is socialistic in that it does not allow private capital to operate in the field of fissionable materials. Therefore, we should have no plan and leave the matter to be worked out by laissez-faire competition.

While these two lines of reasoning are diametrically opposed they reach the same result:—abandonment of the atomic energy plan without substituting anything for it.

Mr. Chase and I both felt that the matter might be changed if by any chance the Soviet Union agreed to an effective system of disclosure and verification. Such a concession, which we do not anticipate, would reflect a basic change in Soviet policies that it would be necessary for the United States to readjust its entire foreign policy including the matter of atomic energy.

Bernhard G. Bechhoefer

1. Consolidated collection of documentation in the Department of State on atomic energy policy for the years 1944–1962, including files of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs.
2. Directed to Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson and David H. Popper, Acting Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.
3. Supra.
4. Dr. James B. Conant, President of Harvard University; Member of the General Advisory Committee of the United States Atomic Energy Commission since 1946.
5. Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, Chairman of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey; Chairman of the General Advisory Committee of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission since 1946.