795.00/12–250: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 2—8:15 p. m.]
1132. We concur course suggested Depcirtel 221, December 1 re Chinese intervention Korea. While this new Assembly agenda item directly involves central government of Peoples Republic of China, which Chinese have apparently been making effort to avoid, and by so doing obviously tends to sharpen issue directly between Chinese regime and UN, any other designation of responsibility for Chinese action in Korea is obviously unrealistic, and, at present state of affairs, to give further lip-service to Chinese pretensions that action “voluntary”, or in someway involves less than full responsibility of Chinese regime, would appear likely to encourage Communist extension of this spurious device, possibly in other theaters.
In connection with Soviet attitude and intentions Korean situation, Department will have noted that in contrast earlier strident support [Page 1314] North Koreans et cetera, Soviet press recently has been relatively subdued in pronouncements particularly insofar as so-called North Korean communiqués are concerned. Latter have notably lagged behind Chinese successes and have eschewed emphasis thereon. Also, it is reported that agitators and lecturers addressing groups Moscow are comparatively colorless on Korea. We would hesitate draw important conclusions from this evidence but it obviously suggests measure of Soviet uncertainty as to future course Korea. If such uncertainty reflects any essential apprehension at UN reaction continued Chinese intervention, firm line as suggested by Department might succeed dissuade Communists from all-out effort. In any event anything but firm line will inevitably, we believe, encourage them to continuance Hitler-like tactics to which imperialist dictatorships prone. Further, as unprepared as free world nations may feel themselves this time, Chinese Communists no doubt also in less favorable position now than they might be expected to be after further period consolidation their regime et cetera.
Re Department’s infotel December [1] 7 a. m.1 Assume withdrawal to stabilized line is military necessity in any case. However, as regards maintenance indefinitely of “defensive” line, we note that defensive action has disheartening and adverse effect on UN members and their unity. Accordingly, we think such stabilization if it is to be continued long must be accompanied by increased effort in pursuit of positive objective of building up Western Europe to which French attitude on German rearmament has so far been principal obstacle.
Concern expressed among GA delegates that military-diplomatic situation may deteriorate further and belief that adroit diplomatic action essential to conclude Korean affair is also widely held among my friendly colleagues here, whose thinking similarly based on defenseless position Europe in face uncommitted Soviet forces. A number of colleagues have been advocating various moves obtain cease fire along present or even less favorable line, including UN taking initiative in proposing negotiations for armistice, neutral zone et cetera and urging at some length that fiction CPR non-involvement be continued. However, in our view military-diplomatic position UN at moment is such that initiative this type or failure cite CPR responsibility would inevitably not only fall into pitfall of appeasement, but, as sign weakness, backfire in stimulating Communists to further efforts. As set forth above, we feel calm determined firmness in face this Chinese Communist, but at least Soviet blessed, campaign offers best possibility restoring balance militarily and diplomatically to point where it will [Page 1315] be in combined Chinese-Soviet interest treat with us on suitable terms. We note this connection, recent Nenni2 reference to armistice, which with previously cited attitude Soviet press et cetera, suggest that Communist thought does not rule out negotiated solution, although in present situation where things are going their way Chinese delegates refusal talk not unnatural.
We appreciate European apprehensions and, of course, united support UN as heretofore is of paramount importance. On otherhand, possibility détente now somewhat smacking of Munich is unattractive, even if—as we inclined doubt but feel unqualified to judge with assurance—same advantage of buying time for European build-up can be shown to exist now as was advanced in 1938.
Department pass London, Paris, Frankfort; repeated information London 208, Paris 241, Frankfort 150.