795.00/12–250: Telegram
The Chargé in Norway (Snow) to the Secretary of State
niact
[Received December 2—9:51 p. m.]
562. Saw Foreign Minister Lange 6 p. m. today re Depcirtel 221, December 1. He informed me Norwegian Government viewed current Korean situation engendered by Chinese aggression so seriously that no decisions being taken in relation thereto without Cabinet approval and consultation leaders other parties. As small nation of people with extensive territory on edge of Russian domain and situated so as to be of strategic interest to Russia, Norway had to proceed deliberately weighing each move in terms all possible results it might have. Norwegian UN delegation had reported to FonOff this afternoon generally along lines Depcirtel 221. FonMin had then waited to hear our version before presenting matter to Cabinet. He would seek to obtain Government decision by Sunday night or early Monday,1 meanwhile could only give his preliminary views which are following.
As for transferring Korean issue from SC to GA he would generally favor the tactic but would offer a few suggestions as to timing and procedure. First he believed the item should be formally stricken from SC agenda. Then he would be inclined to await even a slight further degree of stabilization in the military situation in Korea. It was of [Page 1316] prime importance that the 52 nation majority maintained complete solidarity throughout and he thought that some of the more vacillating members would have a better stomach for the endeavor if the military picture were a little less fluid and depressing.
Moreover, he thought the Chinese would also be more amenable to reason under those conditions. Then he suggested that the prospective meeting of Attlee and perhaps Pleven with President Truman in Washington would have an effect on the situation but one which was pretty hard to judge in advance. It might be well to wait at least until these conversations had begun before raising the question in the GA. He was in short in favor of avoiding the appearance of unnecessarily forcing the issue at this particular moment.
As for intransigent attitude of Chinese Communist group in New York, his UN delegation had informed him that Indian delegate Rau had finally succeeded in getting into conversation with Chinese group leader and was to have another talk very soon. Also, that Secretary-General Lie had established contact. He saw some slight hope in this and felt it supported his impression that the better course might be not to force the pace in the GA. He felt apologetic about offering this sort of advice to the US whose casualty lists were growing and who was carrying so heavy a share of the total burden. He presumed that domestic pressures were strong upon the Administration for prompt action.
Foreign Minister’s speech in Storting this morning being reported separate message.2