Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/12–850

Memorandum by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, of a Meeting Held on December 1950

top secret

[ Washington ,] December 3, 1950.

On his return from the White House last night where he had met with the President, General Marshall and General Bradley, the Secretary said that it had been agreed to proceed with paragraphs 1 and 2 of the paper entitled “Recommended Steps in the United Nations”.¹ These paragraphs concern the submission to the General Assembly by the six powers of a new agenda item entitled “Intervention of the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China in Korea”. The paragraphs also provide for the concurrent submission of an explanatory memorandum in such form as to leave open the nature of the resolution which might be adopted by the General Assembly.

The President and General Marshall felt that the proposal in paragraph 3 of the paper for the submission to the General Assembly of the resolution vetoed by the Security Council was only a time-waster. They felt that it might be a good stall for time but did not believe it would meet the current situation.

It was felt generally desirable to proceed with paragraphs 4 a and b of this paper but that any steps should be after the telecon with General Collins on Sunday morning, December 3.² It was also felt that action on these points should await Mr. Attlee’s arrival.

The Secretary said that paragraph 4c was considered too slow and it was believed we did not have time for this action.

It was made clear that the provisions of paragraph 3 should be our public position for the immediate time being.

The President and General Marshall said that they felt that if any negotiations with the Russians took place, the United States should be in the talks.

There was a discussion as to the price which might be asked by the Chinese Communists as payment for a settlement of the situation. The Secretary said that he thought the least that they would ask was that we go south of the 38th parallel. General Marshall thought that it was most unlikely that the Chinese Communists would ask for this little, and the Secretary agreed. The Secretary said the next thing they might ask is that we get out of Korea. The next demand might be a seat in the General Assembly. The next, might be abandonment of Formosa. And the last, might be placing the Japanese peace treaty negotiations on a CFM basis with China represented. This would foreshadow an effort to get us out of Japan.

General Marshall mentioned that we were in a great dilemma of determining how we could save our troops and protect our national honor at the same time. He thought it would be difficult for us to abandon in good conscience the South Koreans. All agreed that we must think a long time before we come to any such conclusion.

The Secretary discussed briefly his conversation with the President and General Marshall on the domestic situation. He said that, regardless of whether it was really necessary from the standpoint of gaining authority, he felt that it was in the public interest to have the President declare a national emergency in existence. The Secretary felt that this would be highly desirable if the public was to be aware of the seriousness of the situation. He also mentioned that the President should consider use of his powers for freezing prices, wages, etc. He also urged that the President establish high and far-reaching production controls. He indicated the President said he agreed with what the Secretary had said on these points.

The Secretary discussed with General Marshall and the President the urgency of getting our armed forces built up as quickly as possible, and also the need for getting the military establishment to place its orders for equipment, materiel, etc., as rapidly as could be arranged. They felt that additional funds in the form of appropriations would probably not actually be needed at present and believed that the funds presently available were ample to cover the accelerated program for the time being.³ Mr. Acheson urged that orders be placed as rapidly as possible. When the accelerated production gets under way, the question of additional funds can be considered.

It was agreed at this meeting that the Secretary and such others from the Department as he designated should meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Sunday morning, December 3 at 9:30 and that following that the Secretary and General Marshall, and I believe General Bradley, would go over to see the President. The Secretary designated Messrs. Jessup, Rusk, Matthews and Nitze to attend the meeting from the Department and asked that I call Mr. Harriman and inform him of the meeting, which I did.

L. D. B[attle]

[Annex]

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

Supplement to Mr. Battle’s Memorandum of December 3 Recording the Secretary’s Conversation With the President, General Marshall and General Bradley

The following items appear in my notes and are therefore included in this supplementary memorandum.

At the outset of the conversation, General Marshall said the situation looked very bad indeed. General Bradley also took an extremely pessimistic view of the military situation and thought that not more than 48 to 72 hours would elapse before it reached a crash state.

General Bradley thought that the troops of the Tenth Corps could be evacuated in five days at least but wondered about the manner of the evacuation unless the cease-fire were secured. He thought the 7th Division might be saved and that the 3rd Division was nearer the ports and could get out. He thought we might lose Wonsan but might hold Hungnam. He said we could not take our troops out and leave the ROK Capital and other divisions behind.

General Marshall said that even a Dunkirk type of evacuation might be prejudiced if the Chinese brought in their air.

The President raised the question of General MacArthur’s view about the need of operations across the frontier.

The Secretary repeated what he had previously said to General Marshall, namely, that the decisions should be based solely on whether it would help or hurt our troops. We need a very good military judgment as to whether knocking out the Chinese airfields would bring in the Russians. This decision should not be made by MacArthur but by General Marshall on the advice of General Collins, who should stay in Tokyo. We should not take this action for the purpose of holding Korea or merely for the purpose of retaliating against the Chinese but only for the purpose of permitting the evacuation of our troops, if necessary.

The Secretary stressed the importance of having at least the appearance of consultation with Attlee before definitive action was taken.

General Marshall indicated that we might have only 48 hours in which to reach a decision and we could not wait for the first meeting scheduled for Tuesday afternoon.⁴ General Marshall suggested it would be better to have Mr. Attlee suggest a settlement rather than having us bear the burden of making the suggestion.

Philip C. Jessup

1. The text of the paper is incorporated in telegram Gadel 153, p. 1307.
2. General Collins arrived in Tokyo on December 4, whence he proceeded to Korea after a brief meeting with General MacArthur; see Collins, War in Peacetime, pp. 229–233.
3. On December 1, President Truman bad requested from Congress an additional appropriation of $16.8 billion for the Department of Defense and a supplemental appropriation of $1,050,000,000 for the Atomic Energy Commission; see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, p. 728.
4. December 5.