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Editorial Note

On August 7, 1950, Assistant Secretary of State Rusk was interviewed by Mr. John W. Huizenga of the Division of Historical Policy Research on the events of June 24–25. In a memorandum of conversation, Mr. Huizenga recorded Mr. Rusk’s observations on the timing of the decision to take the Korean situation to the United Nations Security Council as follows:

“Mr. Rusk stated that the decision to go to the Security Council was taken on the strength of the single telegram from Seoul, No. 925. Efforts were made during the night to obtain a clearer picture of what was actually happening in Korea but no further information was in fact obtained.

“When the Secretary first telephoned the President shortly after 11 p. m., he obtained the approval of the President for presentation of a resolution in the Security Council if the Secretary decided that that course was indicated. By 2 a. m. no further information about the course of events in Korea had been obtained. It was considered, however, of utmost importance that the decision to present the case to the Security Council should appear in the morning papers simultaneously with the news of the North Korean attack. Therefore the Secretary made the final decision to go to the Security Council shortly in advance of the press deadline.” (Korean Conflict; 795.00/6–2450)