795.00/9–2750

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

top secret

Subject: Conversations between Indian representative in Peiping and Chinese Communist officials

Participants: Mr. Hubert Graves, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

Mr. Graves came down urgently this afternoon to show me “in strict confidence” three telegrams which had been received from New Delhi. He said he was not authorized to leave us copies and that it was desired to keep secret that Bevin and Nehru had been in personal communication on this matter.

The first two telegrams were copies of two messages apparently received today by Nehru from Pannikar in Peiping. The first of these reported a conversation he had just held with General Nieh Jungchen, Chief of Staff under Chu Teh. General Nieh spoke bitterly of the Manchurian bombing by U.S. aircraft and said that “China would not take such provocations lying down”.1 When Pannikar reminded [Page 794] him of the tremendous damage from bombing which involvement in war would bring to China, General Nieh stated that he did not believe the United States could spare combat troops to fight in China and that no war could be won by air bombardment alone. Pannikar then quoted a conversation he had held with the Polish Ambassador to Peiping2 who had just returned four days earlier from Warsaw. The Polish Ambassador stated quite frankly that China would not endure further provocation and sit idly by with folded hands in the face of it.

In his second message, Pannikar concludes that on the basis of these interviews and a reinterpretation on his part of a conversation had with Chou En-lai on September 21 when Chou En-lai said that “since the United Nations had no obligations to China, China had no obligations to the United Nations”, there is no doubt in his mind that China has now decided on a more aggressive policy and he is inclined to expect indirect intervention in North Korea. In closing, he urged Nehru to send a personal message to Chou En-lai though even this action “may be too late”.

The third telegram was a personal message to Bevin from Nehru responding to Bevin’s personal message asking Nehru’s support of the UK draft UN resolution on Korea. Nehru cites the care with which he has studied Mr. Bevin’s proposal. He reports that he has sent a personal appeal to Chou urging patience and moderation on the part of China. Nehru expresses the conviction, however, that any suggestion that UN forces cross the 38th parallel is likely to precipitate a situation in which “world catastrophe is more than probable”. Accordingly, he urges no action whatsoever of this character on the part of the UN. Nehru concludes with the recommendation that the UN merely announce that its objective is to secure a unified Korea coupled with an offer to the North Koreans to discuss with them ways and means whereby this may be accomplished.

Mr. Graves says that they do not take too seriously Pannikar’s fears, believing him volatile and an unreliable reporter. They do, however, have to take into account the effect of Pannikar on Nehru and the latter’s resultant attitude. Earlier, however, Mr. Graves had given me as his opinion the belief that the UK delegation would plan still to go forward with their resolution even though the Indians did not support it.

Mr. Graves told me in leaving that he understood Mr. Rusk had already been shown copies of these telegrams in New York by the UK GA delegation.

  1. On September 24, the Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China had sent to the U.N. Secretary-General a telegram complaining against U.S. bombing of Chinese territory (U.N. document S/1808). On September 26, the U.S. Government informed the Security Council that a bombing incident might inadvertently have taken place, expressed regret if such were the case, and offered to pay for damages shown by impartial, on-the-spot investigation to have been caused by U. S. planes (S/1813).
  2. Julian Burgin.