Office of the Historian

794A.00/9–2750

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of States for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

[Extract] top secret
[Washington,] September 27, 1950.

Subject: Chinese Communist Intentions: Formosa, Korea

Reference: CA memorandum of August 17, 1950, “Present Situation in Respect to Formosa: Probable Nature of Hypothetical Communist Attack”1

Summary

The shift of the monsoon to the northwest [northeast]2 in the last decade of September, added to current events in Korea, makes a Chinese Communist assault on Formosa less likely than heretofore. This situation may persist until spring. This conclusion is supported by the evidence contained in a Hong Kong telegram of September 223 quoting a Chinese Communist official to the effect that the invasion of Formosa has been postponed. It is unclear whether this postponement was with or against the advice of Moscow. In any event domestic tasks facing the Communists are keeping them very busy at home. There is nevertheless a background of reports indicating that important elements of Lin Piao’s 4th Field Army have moved into Manchuria, with 3rd Field Army troops taking their place in Kwangtung. These reports are paralleled by another Nationalist item reporting the arrival of Soviet units in the North China-Manchuria area in early August. That those Chinese troops will participate in the Korean fighting is the most interesting possible explanation of their movement. Peiping has belatedly admitted that certain Korean personnel have returned to Korea “to defend it and take part in building up their country”.4 If the Soviets were to permit the situation in Korea to develop to its logical conclusion, the extent of their political defeat would be clear for all Asiatics to see. If they feel that they cannot rely upon a veto to prevent any projected move of UN forces into North Korea, they may plan an intervention of either Chinese Communists, Chinese and Soviet forces, or Soviet forces in North Korea to restore the status quo ante Soviet withdrawal. If Peiping in some of its threatening statements may be [Page 796] trying to bluff us, it is nevertheless not yet safe to assume that the USSR has played all of its cards respecting Korea. In any event Chinese military activity continues strong, and if there seem clear indications that they have temporarily postponed their invasion attempt against Formosa, there is nevertheless no sure guarantee that the Chinese Communist effort will not be thrust forth in another direction, toward the north or south, or at least toward the occupation of Quemoy and Matsu. The Soviet “peace camp”, if still unready for World War III, is presumably nevertheless straining all sinews in preparation.

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  1. Not printed.↩
  2. The monsoon ordinarily blows from the southwest from April to October and from the northeast for the period October to April.↩
  3. See telegram 642 from Hong Kong received at 7:57 p. m. on September 23, p. 765.↩
  4. See footnote 4 to the memorandum of conversations by Bancroft dated September 23, p. 762.↩