Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

611.41/8–450

Agreed Memorandum, Summary of United States–United Kingdom Discussions on the Present World Situation, July 20–24, 1950, Washington, D.C.¹

Washington, July 20–24, 1950

[Extracts]
top secret

1. Following is a summary of discussions held in Washington between July 20 and July 24, between General Omar N. Bradley and Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, representing the United States, and Sir Oliver Franks and Lord Tedder representing the United Kingdom. Mr. Charles W. Yost,² Colonel L. K. Ladue,³ Mr. M. E. Dening⁴ Major General Redman⁵ and Captain R. D. Coleridge, R.N.⁶ were also present.

Terms of Reference

2. The conversations were purely exploratory and involved no commitments by governments. It was understood that there would be no definitive or detailed discussion of areas in which third parties have a primary interest.

Far East

3. The U.K. representatives emphasized the importance which their government attached to avoiding any further major involvement of Western forces on the Asiatic mainland.⁷ They therefore expressed the hope that any new conflicts which might break out in the Far East might be localized and not be allowed to develop into general wary either with the Soviet Union or with Communist China. The U.S. representatives agreed as to the desirability of this objective but pointed out certain possible cases of aggression, as noted below, which it might be difficult or even impossible to localize.

Chinese Communists

4. The U.K. representatives particularly stressed the advantages of localizing any possible conflict between the U.S. or the U.K. on the one hand and the Chinese communists on the other; first, for the reason set forth in the preceding paragraph and, second, in order that a possible gradual drift of the Chinese communist regime away from Moscow might not be interrupted.

5. It was agreed that further study should be given by the U.S. and the U.K. to the question whether an overt large-scale involvement of the Chinese communists in Korea or a large-scale Chinese communist attack on any other state or territory should, as being indicative of a Soviet intention to force the issue, be considered as raising the immediate question of general war.

Korea

6. The U.S. representatives stressed the political and military importance of the contribution of ground forces to the campaign in Korea by as large a number of nations as possible. They pointed out, on the military side, that the campaign would presumably last for some months and that it was important that, when the counteroffensive was undertaken, it be carried out with very strong forces in order that the North Korean army could be destroyed to the maximum extent possible before our forces reach the 38th parallel. The U.K. representatives declared that they had not hitherto considered that any forces which they might be able to contribute could reach the theatre of operations in time to be used. In light, however, of the statement by the U.S. representatives that the campaign would be long and that very considerable land forces would be needed, they would represent to London the points made by the U.S. representatives.

7. The U.S. representatives expressed the view that careful study should be given to the question of the eventual solution of the Korean problem, particularly what will happen when UN forces reach the 38th parallel and what forces will remain in Korea after the end of hostilities. They indicated that this would be a question for consideration by the UN.

8. It appeared to be the view of both U.S. and U.K. representatives, as an exception to the general proposition stated above, that, if Soviet forces should interfere overtly on a large scale in Korea, this action would raise the immediate question of general war. The U.S. representative made it clear that they had no intention of fighting a major war in Korea. Should war occur, it was their intention to fight in accordance with our agreed over-all strategy.

9. It was agreed that further study should be given to the question of whether or not overt intervention of the Chinese communists in Korea should also raise the immediate question of general war. The U.K. representatives were inclined to consider such an intervention by the Chinese communists unlikely since the Chinese would not act solely at Soviet direction unless they gained some material advantage to themselves. The U.S. representatives, however, believing that Peiping is at the present time under very strong Kremlin influence and that the Kremlin might wish to involve the Chinese communists in hostilities with the West, considered such a possible involvement less unlikely.

Formosa

10. The British representatives expressed a strong hope that any hostilities arising from a Chinese communist attack on Formosa would be localized. The U.S. representatives replied that it is their desire and intention that any such hostilities be localized. In view of the character of the President’s statement of 27 June, there was reason to believe that there would be no invasion of the mainland in connection with a Communist attack on Formosa. The U.K. representatives stated they were in full agreement with this intention to localize any such hostilities.

Hong Kong

11. The British representatives stated that their forces in Hong Kong are adequate to resist internal disturbances or a small-scale attack from without, but they are not adequate to hold off a full-scale attack by the Chinese communists. Should such an attack occur, it would presumably lead to an appeal to the UN, but nevertheless the U.K. representatives would hope that the hostilities might be localized.

Macao

12. It was considered that action could not be taken to assist the Portuguese in case Macao were attacked. The U.K. representatives stated that they had already intimated to the Portuguese that the U.K. would not be able to assist in these circumstances.

Philippines

13. The U.S. representatives pointed out the fact that the U.S. occupied naval and air bases in the islands. Elsewhere in the discussions it was brought out that the Philippines constitute the southern end of the U.S. Japan-Okinawa-Philippine stopline.

Indochina

14. It was understood that the U.S. and U.K. would assist the French to the extent of their abilities in case of a Chinese communist attack, but the probability would be great that neither could provide forces for this purpose. There was no further discussion of the Indochina problem in the absence of the French, though further tripartite discussions were considered to be necessary.

Burma

15. It was understood that neither the U.S. nor the U.K. could provide forces to Burma in case of attack and that it is unlikely, though not impossible, that India or Pakistan would do so. In regard to action to be taken it was understood that the U.K. would take the initiative.

Malaya

16. The U.K. representatives said that they did not expect to be able to reduce their forces in Malaya during the next twelve months but hoped to do so after that time. It was generally agreed that an early and favorable resolution of the Korean situation would have a salutary effect on the Malayan problem.

Siam

17. It was generally agreed that Siam would bend with the wind.

Japan

18. Interest was expressed by both parties in proceeding with joint preliminary political discussions of the Japanese peace treaty at a relatively early date.

Afghanistan

19. It was agreed that Afghanistan could not be effectively assisted; in case of invasion by the Soviets.

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Actions To Be Recommended

1. A comprehensive study of the effects of overt large-scale Chinese, communist intervention in Korea or attack upon any other state or territory, particularly with a view to determining whether or not such intervention or attack could be localized or would lead to general war.

2. An examination, within the UN framework, of the eventual disposition of the Korean problem, including the maintenance of UN forces in South Korea, possible reoccupation of North Korea by the Soviets, and the problem of ultimate unification of the country.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. Four meetings were held on July 20, 21, 22, and 24. This memorandum was prepared and agreed upon at the conclusion of the talks, following a comparison of the informal summary notes kept by each side. Herein are printed the parts of this memorandum dealing with the Far East; complete coverage of the talks is scheduled for publication in volume iii.
2. Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs.
3. Deputy Secretary, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
4. Assistant Under-Secretary of State, United Kingdom.
5. Director of Military Operations, U.K. War Office.
6. Secretary, British Joint Services Mission.
7. Paragraph 29 of this memorandum, not herein printed, indicated the view of the U.K. Representatives that a threat to Berlin should be placed at the top of the list of danger points.