795.00/7–2450
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)
Subject: Policy Planning Staff Paper1 on Problem of U.S. Policy Regarding Advance Beyond the 38th Parallel by U.S. Forces Now Engaged in Korea as part of the UN Forces
I have read and studied carefully the Policy Planning Staff paper on the above subject, and I regret to state that I must enter an [Page 459] emphatic dissent from its philosophy and conclusions. As I understand it, the paper proposes in effect that we make known at once to General MacArthur and the US Delegation to the UN the fact that US objectives in Korea are limited to repelling the aggression of the North Koreans and bringing about the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the attacking forces to the 38th parallel, after which a final solution of the Korean problem would be a matter for UN consideration. In other words we would go back to the status quo ante bellum and then ask the UN to start all over again doing what has been its attempt at three General Assemblies since 1947. The aggressor would apparently be consulted on equal or nearly equal terms and the real aggressor, the Soviet Union, would presumably go unpunished in any way whatsoever. The aggressor would be informed that all he had to fear from aggression was being compelled to start over again. There are given below my comments on specific parts of the paper in question and my further reasons for opposing the adoption of recommendations of this paper. There is also given my conception of what is the proper attitude for the United States to take.
The whole tone of the present paper implies that the North Korean regime has a legal status and that the area north of the 38th parallel is, in fact, a separate nation. This has no foundation in fact or morality. The North Korean regime is a creature of the Soviet Union set up in defiance of the will of the majority of the Korean people, and in deliberate violation of three Resolutions passed in the General Assembly.
The paper makes a false division between what it terms (a) the long term effort to bring about unity and independence in Korea and (b) the present enforcement action to repel North Korean aggression. It assumes the latter phase of the problem can be solved without regard for the former. This is a fundamental error. If a correct solution of the immediate problem is not reached, a correct long term solution will be impossible.
There is in the paper no recognition of the fact that in supporting the action of the North Korean regime the Soviet Union is acting in direct defiance of Paragraph 5 of Article 2 of the UN Charter which requires that:
“All members shall give the UN every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the UN is taking preventive or enforcement action.”
While the paper rightly stresses the importance of the attitude of our UN Allies toward what is done in Korea, it gives only cursory attention to the attitude of the 20 million people of South Korea who have been wantonly attacked, and the more than 2 million Koreans who [Page 460] fled from Soviet oppression in the North and sought refuge in the South. There can be no sound solution which does not take fully into account the hopes of these millions. Any action which implied that the aggressors would suffer but mildly if at all and that the artificial division of Korea was to be perpetuated would cause the people and army of South Korea to lose what little morale they have left and would run the grave danger of turning them actively against American forces now in Korea. And let us not comfort ourselves with the belief that we could adopt the recommendations and philosophy of this present paper and not have the Korean Government and people find it out. They would. And I should hate to have on my conscience the responsibility for what would follow. The Korean people and Government are already insisting that the 38th parallel division must go and that the present opportunity to unify the country must be seized. American diplomats in Korea have expressed agreement. If this is not done the people of Korea will lose all faith in the courage, intelligence and morality of the United States. And I for one, would not blame them.
The nub of the problem confronting the United States is correctly: stated in the paper—namely whether the disadvantages of a failure to attain complete independence and unity for Korea outweigh the risk of a major conflict with the USSR or Communist China that such a settlement might involve. But the answer given or at least implied is, in my opinion, the wrong one.
While rightly pointing out the strategic importance of Korea to the USSR, one of the main reasons for this importance, that possession of Korea makes easier the ultimate conquest of Japan—the real prize in Asia as is neither Korea nor even China—is ignored. And while accepting the fact that the USSR would not permit a regime hostile to it to exist in North Korea, there is no apparent realization of the fact that Japan is of critical importance to the United States and that we cannot afford to allow a regime hostile to American interests in Japan to dominate Korea.
The paper assumes we can buy more time by a policy of appeasement—for that is what this paper recommends—a timid, half-hearted policy designed not to provoke the Soviets to war. We should recognize that there is grave danger of conflict with the USSR and the Chinese Communists whatever we do from now on—but I fail to see what advantage we gain by a compromise with clear moral principles and a shirking of our duty to make clear once and for all that aggression [Page 461] does not pay—that he who violates the decent opinions of mankind must take the consequences and that he who takes the sword will perish by the sword.
That this may mean war on a global scale is true—the American people should be told and told why and what it will mean to them. When all legal and moral right is on our side why should we hesitate?
We should determine now that we will accept in Korea no solution which does not:—
- 1.
- Eliminate the North Korean Army, either by force or disarmament under UN auspices.
- 2.
- Provide for the full implementation in North Korea of the UN Resolutions of November 14, 1947, and December 12, 1948, including the holding of elections under the auspices of the UN Commission on Korea. These elections to be held after the return to their homes in North Korea of the more than 2 million refugees who had fled from Communist oppression.
- 3.
- Provide for a UN police force to maintain order until such time as a unified Korea can provide security forces of its own.
- 4.
- Provide for the admission of the unified Korea to the UN with its consequent assumption of the obligations of the Charter to refrain from the threat or use of force in its international relations against the Soviet Union as well as all other members of the UN.
- 5.
- Provide that the members of the UN, upon the advice of a UN Commission in Korea, will give such political and economic aid to the Korean Government as may be necessary to get it fairly started on the road toward becoming a stable, peaceful member of the United Nations.
Having determined on the above course, we should make known our policy to all the world after having discussed it with our friends in the U.N. It is one of which no man need be ashamed. Its announcement would inspire the people of South Korea to greater efforts in their own behalf. It is in accord and the only solution which is truly in accord with the UN Resolution of June 27th which requires the restoration of “international peace and security in the area”. Any member of the United Nations which did not support us would do so in the knowledge that its action was dictated by fear and not by doubt of the rightness of what we were doing. The free world cannot any longer live under constant fear. The issue is clear—we should now decide to stand up to what our President has called “raw aggression”, or we should admit that Soviet Communism has won and be prepared to take the consequences.