795.00/7–2550: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India
priority
niact
115. Text msg for delivery Nehru fols. As indicated Deptel 106 Jul 22 highly important existence and content this msg and any ensuing correspondence be kept secret. We wish avoid further public exchange with Nehru. As press keenly interested suggest you deliver msg to Bajpai thus avoiding attracting attn by appt with PM.
“My dear Mr. Prime Min: I did not in my msg of July 18 specifically address myself to the points raised in the communication delivered to me by your Amb on July 17 as I wished to give you my thoughts on those points on a strictly personal and confidential basis.
“It may well be, as you say, that Moscow is seeking a way out of its present entanglement without loss of prestige. Our experience with the Kremlin leads us to believe, however, that it wld in such case make every effort to find an exit which wld also provide positive gain in terms of an increase of Sov influence throughout the world. One such gain wld be the seating of reps of the Peiping regime in the Security Council in circumstances which wld create the impression in many parts of the world that the US had made a deal with the USSR to buy off Communist aggression in Korea.
“It seems to me that the four sentences beginning ‘Since the Govt of India’ in your msg of July 19 put well and succinctly the Indian position with respect to the Peiping regime. I shall try to state as briefly our position.
“We have not recognized Peiping for reasons which you and I discussed while you were in the US last autumn—reasons which we believe are still valid. We have consistently opposed the seating of Peiping reps in UN organs, at the same time making it clear that we wld accept the decision of a constitutional majority in any organ. Our position has not changed and in our view has been reinforced by Peiping’s rejection of the findings of the UNCOK and the Security Council in the Korean situation and its open support of the North Korean aggressors.
“The considerations influencing our position are of a most serious character. I shld like to restate some of them because of the weight which we attach to them.
- 1.
- Peiping has shown little indication of a genuine desire to estab normal relations with other states.
- 2.
- It has singled out Amer citizens and interests as special objects of its hostility.
- 3.
- It has made no pretense of accepting and carrying out the internatl obligations of China.
- 4.
- There is still room for doubt that it exercises effective control throughout the mainland of China or is supported by the Chinese people.
- 5.
- It is lending support to Communist insurgents in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma and elsewhere, has recognized Ho Chi Minh [Page 467] and is actively interfering with efforts to transfer polit power in Indochina by peaceful processes.
- 6.
- It is cooperating with a degree of Sov penetration of China which can only lead to China’s dismemberment.
- 7.
- Its recent defiance of the United Nations in connection with the Korean situation is, of course, a new and grave factor.
“Your request that the US exert its authority and influence to bring about the seating of Peiping reps in the Security Council put us in a very difficult position. It was, as you point out, consistent with India’s past policy for you to make the request, but it wld have been wholly inconsistent with our past policy for us to accept your proposal.
“You expressed in your msg of July 17 the honest belief that there is a real chance of a peaceful settlement in Korea if Peiping reps enter and the USSR returns to the Security Council. You also said that if Peiping and Moscow thereafter proved unreasonable, world opinion wld hold them responsible for the consequences. I have given much thought to these two statements which I conceive to be very much at the heart of your position.
“There has been no intimation from Moscow that it wld comply with the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27 and stop the aggression in Korea even if reps of the Peiping regime were seated in the Security Council. In view of the Kremlin’s silence on this point and our gen experience with the USSR, I greatly doubt that the presence of Moscow and Peiping in the Security Council wld be conducive to a peaceful settlement in Korea. This is admittedly a matter of judgment, but it seems to us that the risks inherent in your proposal are so great that we cannot disregard our own appraisal of the situation. If Moscow and Peiping were to come into the Security Council and proved unreasonable, the UN effort to restore peace in Korea might be blocked. This wld be a very grave consequence indeed, and its effect on world opinion of the United Nations and the value of continued Sov participation therein would be difficult to predict.
“We hope that in the present critical phase of the development of the UN as an effective mechanism to prevent aggression those nations sharing the common objective of stopping aggression in Korea will not permit differences of opinion over such questions as Chinese representation to divert their attn and energies from the attainment of this objective.
“I know that you have been deeply concerned about Formosa as one facet of the Chinese problem. I hope that the President’s msg to Congress removed any doubts that you may have had about our intentions with respect to that island. We understand your deep interest in maintaining friendly relations with your neighbors, the people of China. We too are most anxious that the traditional friendship between the Amer and Chinese peoples shall continue and be fostered. We look forward to the time when the present barriers to the full expression of that friendship, which barriers have come into being through no desire on our part, may be lifted.
“I understand that yours is the only Govt outside the Soviet bloc which has effective dipl relations with the Peiping regime. Wld it be possible for you to apprise your Amb in Peiping of the President’s statement with respect to Formosa and continue to endeavor to persuade [Page 468] the Peiping authorities that their own interests require that they avoid intervention in the Korean situation or an attack upon Formosa.
“Although our recent communications unhappily highlighted our divergent views on the Peiping regime, they did serve to emphasize our unity of purpose to strengthen the United Nations in resisting aggression. We share your earnest desire that hostilities in Korea be terminated before they spread to other countries. I believe our agreement with respect to Korea is of greater importance than our disagreement over China.”