Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/7–2250

Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff

top secret

[ Washington , July 22, 1950.]¹

Problem:

To decide upon U.S. policy regarding the advance beyond the 38th parallel of U.S. forces now engaged in Korea as a part of the U.N. forces.

Analysis:

1. As U.N. forces drive back North Korean forces and approach the 38th parallel, the decisions and actions taken by the United States and other U.N. members which are supporting the Security Council Resolutions, and those taken by the Kremlin, will determine whether hostilities can be confined to Korea or will spread so that the danger of a third world war is greatly increased.

2. In its Resolution of June 25, 1950, the United Nations Security Council noted “with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea”, determined “that this action constitutes a breach of the peace,” called for “the immediate cessation of hostilities”, called upon “all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.”

3. In its Resolution of June 27, 1950, the Security Council noted “from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace arid security”; noted “the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security”; and recommended “that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area”.

4. In a third Resolution of July 7, the Security Council requested the United States to designate a Commander for all the forces of the members of the United Nations in the Korean operation, and authorized that these forces fly the U.N. flag. In response to this Resolution, General MacArthur has been designated as Commander of these forces. The Republic of Korea also has placed its forces under General MacArthur’s command.

5. In his message to the Congress on July 19, President Truman stated that he thought it important that the nature of our military action in Korea be understood; that it should be made perfectly clear that the action was undertaken as a matter of basic moral principle; that the United States was going to the aid of a nation established and supported by the United Nations and unjustifiably attacked by an aggressor force.

6. The primary purpose of the present military action in Korea is to bring about the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel. This action is being carried out under the provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which deals with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.

7. The General Assembly Resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948 and October 21, 1949 are a part of the U.N. effort which is strongly supported by the United States, to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. This effort is based upon provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter, dealing with pacific settlement of disputes.

8. There are, therefore, two major parts of the Korean problem: (a) the long-term effort to bring about unity and independence, and (b) the present enforcement action to repel North Korean aggression. This paper is addressed to the latter phase of the problem.

9. The following contingencies are envisaged as the U.N. enforcement action develops, provided North Korean forces are not reinforced by USSR or Communist Chinese troops; (a) voluntary withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel before U.N. forces have begun a counter-offensive; (b) a withdrawal in good order of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel at a time when they are being driven northward to a point approaching the 38th parallel; (c) a major defeat and disintegration of North Korean forces during the period when they are being driven back toward the 38th parallel; (d) continued resistance by North Korean forces after U.N. forces have, reached the 38th parallel. Another contingency is the occupation of North Korea to the 38th parallel by Soviet or Communist Chinese forces before the U.N. forces reach the 38th parallel, or active support of the North Korean forces south of the 38th parallel by Chinese, Communist or Soviet forces.

10. A need for important decisions will arise with a reversal of the military situation in Korea and the approach of U.N. forces toward the 38th parallel. It is probable that at the time when it becomes apparent that the North Korean aggression cannot succeed and that eventually North Korean forces will be driven back north of the 38th parallel the Kremlin will take a decision (if it has not already done so) regarding a course of action in the new situation.

11. There is ample evidence of the strategic importance to Russia of the Korean peninsula. It is extremely unlikely that the Kremlin would accept the establishment in North Korea of a regime which it could not dominate and control.

When it becomes apparent that the North Korean aggression will be defeated, there might be some agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the North Korean regime which would mean in substance that U.N, military action north of the 38th parallel would result in conflict with the U.S.S.R. or Communist China.

While fighting is in progress south of the 38th parallel, the Kremlin might bring about the occupation of North Korea either with its own or with Chinese communist forces.

The Kremlin might initiate some move toward a negotiated settlement while hostilities still are in progress south of the 38th parallel. It is possible that the basis would be the withdrawal in good order of North Korean forces and the continued division of the country along the 38th parallel. The situation at the time of such a possible proposal might make its acceptance desirable; but we should guard against terms that would leave the aggressor in an advantageous position, that would invite a repetition of aggression, and that would undermine the authority and strength of the United Nations.

12. Since the United States is participating in a U.N. action, the attitude of its U.N. allies are important.

If North Korean forces withdraw or are driven back to the 38th parallel, it is doubtful that there would be majority support in the United Nations for continued military action by the U.N. forces for the purpose of imposing a settlement that would result in a unified and independent Korea.

There probably would be reluctance and opposition to multilateral use of force as a part of the United Nations effort, initiated under the provisions for pacific settlement, to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. This is particularly true as concerns many of the countries of Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia.

13. The future of the Korean people is an important consideration. The United States has supported the U.N. effort to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. The United States is concerned about the safety and well-being of the Republic of Korea and the Korean people.

Having been the victim of armed attack from North Korea, the Republic of Korea naturally will want a settlement that gives a maximum guarantee against the danger of similar future attacks. Consequently, if the North Korean forces are driven back to the 38th parallel, the Republic of Korea may well urge the continued pursuit of those forces until they are destroyed.

14. Likewise, public and Congressional opinion in the United States might be dissatisfied with any conclusion falling short of what it would consider a “final” settlement of the problem. Hence, a sentiment might arise favoring a continuation of military action north of the 38th parallel. The development of such a sentiment might create serious problems for the execution of United States policy.

15. The disadvantages of a failure to attain the complete independence and unity of Korea after the North Korean forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel must be weighed against the risk of a major conflict with the U.S.S.R. or Communist China that such a settlement might well involve. Furthermore, if the North Korean forces are decisively defeated and if North Korea suffers heavy material damage from air attack, those forces are not likely to attack again soon. By that time the United States and other U.N. members should be in a much stronger position to take effective action. It seems likely, also, that a satisfactory permanent solution of the Korean problem can be hoped for only when and if a substantial accommodation is reached between the U.S.S.R. and the non-communist world.

Conclusions:

16. If U.N. forces were to continue military ground action north of the 38th parallel except to the extent essential for tactical requirements as fighting approaches that line, the danger of conflict with Chinese communist or Soviet forces would be greatly increased.

17. From the point of view of U.S. military commitments and strength, we should make every effort to restrict military ground action to the area south of the 38th parallel, to bring about a cessation of hostilities on acceptable terms as rapidly as possible, and to work for a situation that will minimize the requirements for U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea.

18. U.N. military action north of the 38th parallel, except to the extent essential for tactical requirements as fighting approaches that line, would require a new Security Council resolution. Such new resolution might be difficult to obtain. U.S. action without U.N. support should be avoided unless absolutely required by considerations of national security.

19. The risks of bringing on a major conflict with the U.S.S.R. or Communist China, if U.N. military action north of the 38th parallel is employed in an effort to reach a “final” settlement in Korea, appear to outweigh the political advantages that might be gained from such further military action.

20. In the unlikely event that there is a complete disintegration of North Korean forces together with a failure of the Kremlin and Communist China to take any action whatever to exert influence in North Korea, U.N. forces, acting in pursuance of an additional Security Council resolution, might move into North Korea in order to assist in the establishment of a united and independent Korea.

21. Efforts to secure the unity and independence of Korea should be vigorously pressed if the North Koreans show a disposition to sue for armistice terms, or by means of the pacific settlement procedures of the United Nations after the North Korean forces have been driven back or withdraw to the 38th parallel and hostilities have ceased.

Recommendations:

22. It should be kept constantly before world opinion that U.S. forces in Korea are acting as a part of U.N. forces in response to Security Council resolutions; that they are acting in support of the moral principle of repelling aggression; that their immediate purpose is to bring about the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel; and that other measures in regard to Korea which might be necessary or desirable, once the aggression has been brought to an end, would be a subject for U.N. consideration.

23. The Department of State should keep developments in Korea under close and constant study, in order that decisions regarding our action can be taken rapidly whenever they are required by new situations.

24. Copies of this paper should be sent to the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations and to General MacArthur for information and guidance.

1. The source text bore the notation that it was drafted on July 22, by George H. Butler of the Policy Planning Staff; an attached chit by Philip H. Watts of the Policy Planning Staff, dated July 23, 9:45 a. m., indicated that this was the latest draft of “the 38th parallel paper”.