795.00/7–2250: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India
priority
niact
106. Eyes only for Henderson. Dept how considering possible further msg from Sec to Nehru along lines fol text. Highly important that existence and content any such msg and any ensuing correspondence be kept secret. Dept requests your soonest advice such msg, particularly with regard to (1) content (2) whether we shld send another msg now or allow Nehru time to cool off and think things over and (3) whether it desirable to raise fresh series of exchanges on matters on which we disagree. Text follows:
“My dear Mr. Prime Minister: As my message of July 181 was to be released to the press, I did not for obvious reasons specifically [Page 448] address myself therein to the points raised in the communication delivered to me by your Ambassador on July 17. I should now like, on a strictly personal and confidential basis, to give you my thoughts on those points.
“It may well be that Moscow is seeking a way out of its present entanglement without loss of prestige. Our experience with the Kremlin leads us to believe, however, that it will make every effort to find an exit which will also provide positive gain in terms of an increase of Soviet influence throughout the world. One such gain would be the seating of representatives of the Peiping regime in the Security Council in circumstances which would create the impression in many parts of the world that the US had made a deal with the USSR to buy off Communist aggression in Korea.
“It seems to me that the four sentences beginning ‘Since the Govt of India’ in your message of July 192 put well and succinctly the Indian position with respect to the Peiping regime. I shall try to state as briefly our position.
“We have not recognized Peiping for reasons which you and I discussed while you were in the US last autumn3—reasons which we believe are still valid. We have consistently opposed the seating of Peiping representatives in UN organs, at the same time making it clear that we would accept the decision of a constitutional majority in any organ. Our position has not changed and in our view has been reinforced by Peiping’s rejection of the findings of the UNCOK and the SC in the Korean situation and its open support of the North Korean aggressor.
“Your request that the US exert its authority and influence to bring about the seating of Peiping representatives in the SC put us in a very difficult position. It was, as you point out, consistent with India’s past policy for you to make the request, but it would have been wholly inconsistent with our past policy for us to accept your proposal. We had hoped that in the present critical phase of the development of the UN as an effective mechanism to prevent aggression it would be possible for those nations sharing the common objective of stopping aggression in Korea to avoid becoming involved in difficulties over other questions such as Chinese representation in the UN. I am confident that this will still be possible between India and the US.
“You expressed in your message of July 17 the honest belief that there is a real chance of a peaceful settlement in Korea if Peiping representatives enter and the USSR returns to the SC. You also said that if Peiping and Moscow thereafter proved unreasonable, world opinion would hold them responsible for the consequences. I have given much thought to these two statements which I conceive to be very much at the heart of your position.
“I greatly doubt on the basis of our experience with the USSR that the presence of Moscow and Peiping in the SC would be conducive to a peaceful settlement in Korea. In any event, there has been no intimation from Moscow that they would comply with SC resolutions and stop the aggression in Korea. This is admittedly a matter of [Page 449] judgment, but if they were to come into the SC and your estimate of the effect of their presence proved wrong, a real disaster might result. One consequence might be a development which our two governments have been striving to prevent—namely, the permanent splitting away from the UN of the USSR and its satellites. If Moscow and Peiping were unreasonable and world opinion were to mobilize against them as you foresee, the issue might be so sharply drawn between the free world and the Soviet bloc that no reconciliation within the UN system would be possible. It seems to us that the risks inherent in your proposal are even greater than those we face in the current situation.
“I know that you have been deeply concerned about Formosa as one facet of the Chinese problem. I hope that the President’s message to Congress4 removed any doubts that you may have had about our intentions with respect to that island.
(To Henderson: Here you could orally summarize this section message to Congress and furnish text excerpt, if you desire)
“I understand that yours is the only non-Communist government which has effective diplomatic relations with the Peiping regime. I hope you will find it possible to apprise your Ambassador in Peiping of our position with respect to Formosa and make every effort to persuade Peiping that its own interests require that it avoid intervention in the Korean situation or an attack upon Formosa.
“Although our recent communications unhappily highlighted our divergent views on the Peiping regime, they did reveal a gratifying unity of purpose to strengthen the UN in resisting aggression. I believe our agreement with respect to Korea is of greater importance than our disagreement over China.”