Office of the Historian

330/7–2350: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

top secret
niact
New Delhi, July 23, 1950—11 p. m.
[Received July 23—6:36 p. m.]

180. Deptel 106, July 22.

1.
It is somewhat difficult decide whether or not we should engage in further correspondence on this subject. Among factors this end are:
(a)
Nehru and Bajpai who in effect is FonMin appear to be considerably irritated at our reply. Bajpai particularly seems to have taken reply as personal affront and has made number of sarcastically critical remarks to other chiefs of mission. For instance, immediately following receipt our reply British Chargé asked him if Indian press might not start campaign against US. Bajpai’s answer was “They won’t like the American reply any better than I”. To another diplomat he said “The US has made its decision and the worse for US”. To another he said US had completely failed understand spirit in which approach was made. Bajpai’s anger due in part personal pique. Although idea of sending messages was it seems first suggested by Krishna Menon HC to UK most effective foe of US among Nehru’s trusted inner circle, Bajpai assumed role master strategist. He personally drafted messages after presenting arguments to me re importance seating of Peiping in SC, after working on British, etc. With his supersensitive mind he apparently has interpreted second paragraph our reply in which we state our policies re maintenance peace and of strengthening UN as veiled insinuations that our policies this respect were in contrast those of India. He apparently failed note that this paragraph had been inspired by mention these points in Nehru’s original message to us. This misconception Bajpai’s part responsible for third paragraph Nehru’s second published note.1 Neither Nehru nor Bajpai has made move discuss exchange with me subsequent receipt our reply. I have considered it wise not to approach them on subject for present. Bajpai has taken occasion twice to tell me over telephone [Page 455] that GOI considers correspondence on this subject as “terminated” and both times I have indicated my belief US Government has similar views.
(b)
Indian press in general has denounced what it considers as thwarting by US of Nehru’s efforts for peace. Nehru by this move has won back favor of those sections Indian press which most enthusiastically support India’s policy of “non-alignment with either power bloc.” Nehru and Bajpai are undoubtedly encouraging to some extent criticism in Indian press our response to Nehru’s approach.
(c)
There is no indication our reply has irritated such Indian political leaders as Patel2 and Rajagopalachari who seem to understand our position.
(d)
Nehru and Bajpai are further annoyed by leak in Washington of Nehru’s second message.3 Bajpai telephoned me about NY Times article expressing surprise Nehru and self and complaining same time re NY Times unfortunate editorial on Kashmir.
2.
I am inclined believe that in spite Bajpai’s intimations GOI would prefer correspondence closed we should send immediately another note along lines suggested. Following my reasons:
(a)
By outlining with such frankness our reasons for turning down Nehru approach to us we would indicate that we consider his cooperation important and desire take him into our confidence.
(b)
Delivery of note would furnish Nehru and Bajpai self-satisfying opportunity give vent to their resentment arising from injured pride. It would also give me chance to point out their misinterpretation spirit of our formal reply.
(c)
Note contains convincing exposition our position which must have certain effect on Nehru and much more so on other members his new Cabinet Committee on Korea—Patel, Rajagopalachari, Ayyangar.
(d)
Delivery should be soon in order prevent resentment Nehru and Bajpai from hardening and to influence them to curtail their critical comments of us to Indian leaders and press and foreign diplomats and from taking other steps which might be injurious.
3.
Following represent certain suggestions re Department’s draft:
(a)
First sentence fourth paragraph. It might be helpful instead merely of referring to reasons given Nehru orally last autumn for our failure to recognize Peiping, to list most cogent reasons as we did in recent message to Bevin (Deptel 40, July 104 section 2 first seven numbered points). Foreign Relations Committee Cabinet might thus be in better position understand our policy toward Peiping.
(b)
Change next last sentence paragraph 5 to read:

“We are hoping that in the present critical phase of the development of the UN as an effective mechanism to prevent aggression [Page 456] those nations sharing the common objective of stopping aggression in Korea will not permit differences of opinion over such questions as Chinese representation to divert their attention and energies from the attainment of this objective.”

(c)
Second sentence penultimate paragraph. Substitute words “continue to endeavor” for “make every effort”.
4.
Any leak Washington this message after previous leaks would be most unfortunate. It is difficult us believe leaks have been US sources. We are wondering whether member some foreign diplomatic mission in Washington might not have been indiscreet.

Henderson
  1. See telegram 148, from New Delhi, received on July 19 at 9:27 a. m., p. 425. Reference is to the third and fourth sentences of Mr. Nehru’s message.↩
  2. Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhai Patel.↩
  3. See enclosure 1 to the note from Madame Pandit to Mr. Acheson, July 17, p. 408.↩
  4. See telegram 132, July 10, 5 p. m. to London, p. 347, repeated to New Delhi as 40↩