Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/7–950: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

top secret
priority
niact

Washington, July 9, 1950—7 p. m.

123. Eyes only for the Ambassador.¹ I have fol comments on Kelly’s instructions which in general seem satisfactory providing fol points are safeguarded.

1. While we certainly wish to explore every possibility of restoring peace, it is most important not to convey to Gromyko any impression of slackening in our determination to carry out UN decisions on Korea. Such impression would be contrary to fact and would be particularly dangerous while mil position remains in present difficult phase.

2. Soviets should not be permitted to lead discussions into framework of dealing with a dispute in which both parties are blameworthy. Kelly should leave no doubt of UK conviction that SC findings and decisions, supported by 46 members of UN, describe the situation as it exists in fact.

3. It also seems important to me that each ref to cessation hostilities by North Koreans should be coupled with ref to requirement of withdrawal behind 38th parallel.

4. Discussion restoration of status quo or former situation should not carry any implication obligation of UN forces thereupon to be withdrawn from SK nor any diminution in responsibilities UNCOK.

Foregoing appear to be among traps to be avoided which I believe should be further emphasized or amplified to Kelly.

Acheson

1. At 5 p. m. on July 9, the Department of State had transmitted telegram 122 to London requesting the Ambassador to see to it that Kelly withhold his approach to Gromyko until the Department’s comments on Kelly’s instructions could be conveyed (795.00/7–950).