The attached message gives the line of an oral reply which Sir David Kelly
will make to Mr. Gromyko. This is intended as a first step, which, if the
Soviet Union are now genuinely anxious to find a way out of the Korean
conflict, may encourage them to show their hand a little further.
[Annex]
Message From Mr. Bevin to Sir David Kelly,
Moscow, 9th July, 1950
secret
Following is the line I wish you to take with Mr. Gromyko:—
I am much interested in the attitude taken up by Mr. Gromyko at your last
conversation and I am glad to note his statement that the Soviet
Government wish for a peaceful settlement. That is also the earnest
desire of His Majesty’s Government.
As regards his question whether we have any specific proposals to make, I
am well aware of the precise and concrete sense attached by the Soviet
Government to the word proposals. (The Russians read into the word
proposals far more than we do and are apt to regard them as something by
which the proposer is irrevocably bound, just as they regard a “basis of
discussion” as something which is firmly agreed. Hence my use of the
phrase “preliminary suggestion” in this telegram.) It would be difficult
for His Majesty’s Government as a member of the United Nations, to come
forward with proposals in this sense. We could not properly do so unless
we had assured ourselves that what we proposed carried with it the
assent of the other members of the United Nations chiefly concerned. In
view of our collective responsibility as a member of the United Nations,
we could not, as an individual government, run so far ahead as this. We
therefore think it best to make a preliminary suggestion. The Soviet
Government may well make the comment that they see nothing new in the
preliminary step which we propose. But any step is tremendously
important if it leads to a cessation of hostilities and the clearing up
of difficulties among members of the United Nations. It therefore seems
to us that the influences making for peace ought to join together in
order to bring about a cessation of hostilities, without concerning
themselves for the moment with other causes of difference which have
[Page 339]
arisen in the more distant or
more recent past in connexion with the Korean question.
I want you therefore to emphasise to Mr. Gromyko that, irrespective of
any other consideration, the plain fact is that the hostilities in Korea
have arisen from the movement over the 38th parallel by the forces of
North Korea. It follows that the best suggestion which His Majesty’s
Government, as a member of the United Nations, are in a position to put
forward is to urge the Soviet Government—who His Majesty’s Government
are glad to note have expressed their desire for a peaceful
settlement—to add their efforts to those of other members of the United
Nations by using their influence as a member of the United Nations with
the North Korean authorities to bring them to cease hostilities and to
withdraw their forces to the 38th parallel.
If, as is possible, Mr. Gromyko tries to get you to say how you would see
matters developing if the Soviet Government were willing to use their
influence with North Korea and produce the desired result, you will have
to say that the working out of these matters would fall to be dealt with
by the Security Council. What you are now concerned to do is to suggest
a step whereby, in the view of his Majesty’s government, the way might
be paved for an ultimate solution. If Mr. Gromyko, for his part, has any
suggestions to make, you should of course say that you would be very
glad to convey them to me.
Mr. Gromyko may also raise other questions such as Chinese representation
on the United Nations or Formosa. I suspect that he may also be angling
for an opening to suggest a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers
of the Four Powers. This would have the advantage for him, since it
would arise out of a Far Eastern issue, of opening the way for the
Soviet Government to bring the question of the Japanese Peace Treaty
into this forum, which they have (unjustifiably in our view) always
wanted to do. You will have to avoid such traps. Your best line would, I
think, be to say that, without prejudice to other questions which remain
to be settled, the cause of peace is of such over-riding importance that
we feel entitled to call upon the Soviet government to lend their
assistance. What do they think? Have they any suggestion to make? They
and we have an equal interest in bringing hostilities to a close. You
are not speaking for any other Government or organisation but for His
Majesty’s Government who feel deeply about the dangers of the present
situation and make an earnest appeal to the Soviet Government to join
their efforts to those of other members of the United Nations and to use
their influence in the interest of peace. I want you to drive home the
thought that it is essential to stop the fighting in Korea, to get back
to methods of peaceful settlement and to promote the restoration of
peace.
Washington
, 9 July,
1950.
