Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/7–1050: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

top secret
niact

Moscow, July 10, 1950—3 a. m.
[Received July 9—9:37 p. m.]

83. Eyes only for Secretary. Indian Counselor Kapur called on me this afternoon to deliver following “secret and personal” letter from his ambassador dated July 9:

“I have been thinking a great deal about Korean situation. I know that anything we do should not appear as matter of appeasement. What do you think of settlement on these lines: (1) that America support the admission of People’s Republic of China into SC and UN; (2) and that SC with China and USSR on it support immediate cease fire in Korea and withdrawal of North Korean troops to 38th parallel and mediation by UN for creation of united, independent Korea. Postscript: if we are able bring main disputants into SC to consider outstanding questions it may well be beginning of new chapter”.

Kapur said he would appreciate my conveying contents letter to Washington and making reply thereto in due course. I told him that his Ambassador’s request would receive every consideration and that I would inform my Government, at same time pointing out present attitude US Government re China and Formosa along lines Department circular telegram July 1, 3 a. m.¹

Shortly after delivering letter to me Kapur made personal call on Thurston,² who had in meantime been informed of contents and asked by me to sound out whether his Ambassador’s letter represented personal gesture or was written pursuant to GOI instructions. When Thurston queried Kapur along this line, latter expounded as follows:

1. Radhakrishnan’s letter was delivered to me pursuant GOI instructions.

2. GOI has not been empowered by UN act as mediator in present Far Eastern crisis but is seeking resolve impasse by “informal mediation”; hence the “personal” tone of the message.

3. Moscow chosen as venue for this informal mediation effort because of danger of premature leaks if discussions took place New Delhi or Washington; furthermore Radhakrishnan is in touch with Soviets, who have been given same formula; and, lastly, because nature of GOI mediation effort shaped in large measure on recommendations of Indian Embassy Moscow. Kapur added: “I am sure our Washington Embassy is not acquainted with our mediation effort, and I don’t believe any approach has been made to your Embassy New Delhi”.

4. Kapur explained that R’s first point is meant to be implemented by US only if point two accepted by Soviets.

5. Radhakrishnan has presented same formula to Soviets, who “have made it clear that they will not agree to second point, hence US has nothing to lose by accepting both points”.

6. Indian Ambassador Peking has presented same formula to Chinese Communists “who have agreed to both points”.

7. GOI views divergence between Soviet and Chinese Communists on proposed settlement as most significant and believes that US acceptance would bring about split between Kremlin and Peking “which is one important objective of GOI in its present effort”.

8. Other important objective GOI is to eliminate present UN impasse over Chinese representation question and put spotlight on Soviet unwillingness to cooperate with UN in peaceful settlement Korean issue, that is, to put onus on Soviets if they refuse abide by SC majority. “If UN in present form is to break up, it is much better for all of us that this occur over Soviet veto of UN action directed against clearcut aggression in Korea rather than on debatable Chinese representation question.”

9. When pressed as to whether positive US support Chinese Communist membership considered essential, Kapur said that “abstention coupled with friendly word to Ecuador and Cuba would probably do just as well”.

10. Asked whether Indian formula might not create doubts as to legitimacy previous UNGA action re Korea, not to mention SC resolutions June 25 and 27 re Korea, Kapur said, “Not at all; new resolutions could incorporate appropriate references to previous action and thus not give rise such doubts”. Present UN effort in Korea would continue.

11. Asked what GOI thinking was reference timing, especially in view impact GOI plan at time when North Korean forces have not yet suffered serious military set-back, Kapur said he did not consider this important consideration “since Soviets were sure to turn down point two”. He added: “We have in mind publishing replies of governments concerned (he clearly means US and Soviets but also may have had Peking regime in mind) as soon as possible but before publication we’ll check with you in order that wording Ambassador’s letter may be amended to remedy omission about conditional relationship between points one and two.”

12. Toward close conversation Kapur mentioned that it was the Formosa question which had started his Government thinking along lines proposed formula. He indicated that linking of Korean and Formosa questions were creating difficulties for GOI in its sincere desire back UN effort Korea whole-heartedly.

13. Kapur said that Radhakrishnan was personally very upset at news of “young American boys dying in Korea” and of “lack of vigorous resistance by South Koreans”.

14. No indications from what Kapur said that Indian Embassy aware Gromyko approach to British Embassy.

15. Kapur made point of asking that nothing be said to British about Indian mediation effort.

Kirk

1. For text, see vol. vi, p. 367. The telegram indicated that the action taken regarding Formosa in President Truman’s statement of June 27 was intended as an immediate security measure without prejudice to political questions affecting the Government of the Republic of China (794A.00/7–150).
2. Ray L. Thurston, Counselor of the American Embassy in Moscow.