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The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman
Message From Mr. Attlee to the President
I have been giving much thought to the problems which are likely to face us as the situation in Korea develops. These problems are of course primarily military but they are likely to have increasingly wide political implications.
2. The implications will concern not only the way in which we should like to see the situation in Korea develop but also the reactions of the Russians as it develops. Russian reactions may be expected not only in the Far East; we have been giving some thought to other parts of the world where the Soviet Government may cause trouble for us.
3. A particular aspect of the situation in Korea which is causing us concern is that the Russians have involved the Western Powers in a heavy commitment without themselves playing an overt part, and there are other areas in the Far East where the same tactics are open to them. You have already made known your concern with Indo-China and Formosa. There is some reason to think that Communist-inspired activities in Malaya have already been stepped up in tune with the Korean affair. And we can not ignore the possibility of a Chinese attack on Hongkong.
4. But further, we can not be sure that these activities on the part of Russia will be confined to East Asia. I understand your Military Advisers have already expressed the view that Persia may again become a danger spot. We should consider whether the opportunity may not be taken of relighting the fire in Greece. And there may be other areas of potential trouble.
[Page 315]5. No-one can attempt to provide precisely in advance for every eventuality. But I hope you will agree with me that we should look ahead as far as we can and reach some agreement as to our common policy in these areas in the event of further outbreaks.
6. I would like to propose to you therefore that representatives of our two Governments should meet to consider what courses of action are most likely to be adopted by the Soviet Government and should have an exploratory discussion of the plans we should adopt to meet them. Plans have already been concerted between us over a wide field but I think that the time may have come for extending the area to which our detailed plans should apply. Other Governments, in particular the French, may be concerned but it will suffice if they are informed as and when the situation demands.
7. I would therefore like to suggest to you that you should authorise the appropriate United States authorities to discuss these problems with Lord Tedder in Washington. If you approve this suggestion, I should propose to send a representative of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff to advise Lord Tedder on our thinking here.
8. It seems to me that such talks cannot ignore the political implications. I should therefore be glad to hear whether you would propose that the Department of State should be associated with these talks. If so, I should of course arrange for Lord Tedder also to be supplied with appropriate political advice.
9. My colleagues and I attach very great importance to reaching the closest possible understanding with the United States Government so that we can both plan in full confidence that we understand each other’s approach to these weighty problems. I therefore deeply hope that you will be able to give me an early and favourable reply to this suggestion.
10. I am sure you will agree that there should be no publicity about the proposed talks either before or while they take place.