795.00/7–650: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

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55. For the Secretary. Re my immediately preceding telegram Korea.1 Without overlooking possibility that Russian move is solely designed as trap in effort to slacken pressure on Korea by endeavoring drive wedge in unanimity free world, our first reaction is that approach is genuine to the extent that it reflects Soviet view that, in [Page 316] light of developments, outcome in Korea cannot be envisaged as favorable to the Soviets, that as of now at least they are not disposed to enlarge the conflict into a general Asian or world conflagration, that they wish to localize the affair, and that they are seeking means to salvage as much prestige as possible. Should their representations develop into a peaceful solution, they probably feel they could capitalize on their initiative as demonstrative of their peaceful pretensions. Even if nothing comes of it they may foresee advantageous exploitation of their step in terms of publicity in connection with their peace campaign. British Ambassador is of same view.

In any event it seems to us that Gromyko’s request for “specific proposals” is one which cannot be let drop. We do not at this point have any specific ideas as to the most desirable UN action towards the unification of Korea following the re-establishment of the 38 parallel line. Presumably the obvious reply to Gromyko is to make fully clear that a prerequisite to a peaceful solution is complete compliance by the North Koreans with the SC order that they withdraw beyond the 38 parallel and cease fire. It seems to us that there might be added to such a statement a request for assurances that the Soviet Union would cooperate and participate in a subsequent UN supervised all-Korean election, should the other members of the UN determine such an election to be desirable, and, having left no doubt in the Soviet mind that such agreement on their part and on the part of the North Koreans are essential pre-conditions, inquiry might then be made whether the Soviet Government has anything specific in mind itself.

It will be noted Gromyko’s remarks were confined to Korea.

Kirk
  1. See telegram 54, from Moscow, received at 2:58 p. m. on July 6, p. 312.