Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/7–650

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Washington, July 6, 1950

secret

Extract From Telegram From the Foreign Office to the British Embassy, Washington, Dated July 6th, 1950

I think that you should at once communicate the text of Kelly’s report¹ to Mr. Acheson personally and speak to him from me in the following sense.

2. He will remember that we decided to make a parallel approach to the Soviet Government after the United States had approached them. This Soviet response clearly needs the most careful consideration, and we shall not make any further move in Moscow without discussion with the United States Government. Meanwhile it would be very helpful to us to know what Mr. Acheson’s reaction is.

3. Have in mind that the public here in the main believe that the Russians themselves recognise that they have overstepped the mark in Korea. They will therefore expect the most serious consideration to be given to any move which might lead to peace, and the Government for their part are bound to be careful not to act in any way which might lose them the unanimous support of the country which was demonstrated in yesterday’s debate in Parliament.

4. Please impress on Mr. Acheson that it is of the utmost importance that details of Kelly’s conversation with Gromyko should not be allowed to leak to the press. We are refusing to enlarge on what Kelly has already given out to the press in Moscow.

5. In my immediately following telegram I am transmitting a message from the Prime Minister to the President² regarding the military and political implications of the Korea situation. I am anxious that Mr. Acheson should see this message at the same time as he sees Kelly’s report. The Prime Minister’s message will indicate to the United States that we think that nothing should be left to chance. But I do not think that the proposals in the Prime Minister’s message should detract from the importance of weighing carefully what reply we should give to Gromyko’s approach.

1. The text of Ambassador Kelly’s telegram to the Foreign Office, July 6, on his meeting with Gromyko, which was transmitted to the Department of State along with this note from the British Embassy, is not printed; the substance of Ambassador Kelly’s message is contained in telegram 54, from Moscow, supra, and is also summarized in Prime Minister Attlee’s statement before the House of Commons on July 20, 1950, printed in British Cmd. 8078, Korea No. 1 (1950): Summary of Events Relating to Korea, 1950, p. 27.
2. Infra.