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795.00/7–350

Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council Affairs, United States Mission at the United Nations 1

secret

Subject: Korea

Conversations separately:

Participants: Mr. Joseph Nisot, Belgian Delegation
Mr. Bredo Stabell, Norwegian Delegation
Dr. Jose A. Correa, Ecuadorian Delegation
Mr. David Wainhouse, UNP, Dept. of State
Mr. C. P. Noyes, United States Mission

Nisot asked whether the rumor that there would be a Special Session of the General Assembly on Korea, in the near future, had any basis in fact so far as we knew. I told Nisot that I heard the suggestion at various times during the last several days but that so far as we knew, no one was taking it seriously at the present time. If the situation changes for the worse, of course, that would be a different matter. Nisot indicated he felt there was nothing to be gained at the present time in calling a Special Session. He simply wanted to check on our feeling.

Stabell wanted to get our advice as to when the next meeting of the Security Council could be held. He said that they were in a very difficult position to judge since while they knew there were some conversations going on, they did not know the substance of these conversations. He asked what we thought about holding a meeting on Wednesday2 and that if that were to be done the decision should be made this afternoon.

I told Stabell I was in a difficult position. We had as yet received no instructions but hoped to receive them tonight or tomorrow. Ambassador Austin plans to see the British and French on Wednesday morning. I indicated that we were not in a position to initiate action. If a proposal were put forward, it would come from some other Delegation. While we would have our instructions by Wednesday, we did not know whether any other Delegations would have their instructions by that time and whether any resolution should be tabled on Wednesday.

Stabell indicated that under these circumstances his advice to Sunde3 would be that they should not call a meeting this afternoon for Wednesday afternoon and should contemplate that the meeting should [Page 293]probably not be held until Thursday morning or afternoon. This would give more time for private consultations and would perhaps enable the Security Council in a single meeting to have a resolution introduced and passed. I said that personally I thought that was a good approach. I did not think we felt any urgency about a Wednesday meeting. In case of real necessity, a meeting could of course be called on short notice.

Stabell made a plea that we should keep the President in close touch with the situation. I told him I would do my very best to let them know just as soon as we received our instructions. This might, however, have to await Ambassador Austin’s return on Wednesday morning.

Mr. Wainhouse. After speaking with Ambassador Gross, Mr. Ross and Ambassador Austin, I telephoned the Mission’s comments to Mr. Wainhouse in the Department, as follows: [Re Resolution shown Dept’s 8, July 3.]4

The Mission thinks that the latest draft resolution is excellent and fully supports it. We hope the Department will give us the broadest possible discretion to negotiate on the basis of this resolution with other Delegations. We understand that we shall attempt to get some other Delegation to introduce a resolution along these lines. We should like to make the following comments:

Paragraph 5. It might be advisable, if possible, to find some language which does not pin the responsibility on the United States to make Reports. Wainhouse commented on this point to the effect that it was essential to have a single channel for Reports so as to avoid confusion. I indicated this was not a matter of any importance with the Mission.

Paragraph 6. The Mission agreed that the Committee should be composed of Five Representatives. However, we felt we needed considerable latitude here to change this if necessary in the light of the comments of other Delegations.

The main thing that concerned us with the resolution was that the Terms of Reference of the Committee seemed too limited. We doubted that we could sell such a limited Committee and we saw no reason why the United States should not support somewhat broader Terms of Reference. We were wholeheartedly in agreement with the Department, and were quite sure other Delegations would be, also, that we must stick to the principle that the Committee should have no jurisdiction whatever to deal with problems of the strategic direction or command of the joint forces.

As to a, we felt that the Department should consider giving the Committee power to coordinate the offers of assistance so that it would not be doing simply a secretarial function.

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As to c, we suggest that the Committee should have the power to give advice to the Security Council concerning matters relating to the implementation of the Council’s resolution. The Committee should of course not have any authority to give advice directly to Members on such questions. In this connection, we thought it might be possible for the Committee to make useful recommendations to the Security Council on economic problems; that in any case it should have this authority.

The Mission also felt that it might be advisable to invite the participation of Members of the United Nations who were contributing forces or other assistance when questions involving their interests were being considered, and, in particular, that some reference should be made to the effect that the Republic of Korea might be invited to sit.

The Mission also believes it would be desirable that in some way authority should be given to the combined forces to fly the United Nations Flag. Wainhouse indicated that the Department had now cleared its policy along these lines.

I emphasized that these were minor comments and that our basic position was that we should be delighted to get instructions as soon as possible authorizing us to negotiate on the basis of this resolution with as wide authority as possible.

Dr. Correa called and wanted to know where we stood. I told him we hoped to have instructions by Wednesday morning; that I would call him. I thought that on either Wednesday or Thursday it might be possible for the Council to take some affirmative action.

  1. The source text is a copy of a document in the IO Files, Department of State, bearing the designation US/S/1273 and the date July 3, 1950.
  2. July 5.
  3. Arne Sunde of Norway was the President of the U.N. Security Council during the month of July.
  4. Brackets appear in the source text.