Department of Defense Files: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Department of the Army
C–52391. Personal for JCS. Reference JCS 99935.1
A comprehensive estimate of relative capabilities in the Korea campaign appears to be dependent upon political-military policies yet to [Page 1631] be formulated vis-à-vis Chinese military operations being conducted against our forces. It is quite clear now that the entire military resource of the Chinese Nation, with logistic support from the Soviet, is committed to a maximum effort against the United Nations Command. In implementation of this commitment a major concentration of Chinese force in the Korean-Manchurian area will increasingly leave China vulnerable in areas whence troops to support Korean operations have been drawn. Meanwhile under existing restrictions our naval and air potential are being only partially utilized and the great potential of Chinese Nationalist force on Formosa and guerrilla action on the Mainland are being ignored. Indeed as to the former we are preventing its employment against a common enemy by our own Naval Force.
Should a policy determination be reached by our government or through it by the United Nations to recognize the State of War which has been forced upon us by the Chinese authorities and to take retaliatory measures within our capabilities we could: (1) Blockade the coast of China; (2) Destroy through naval gunfire and air bombardment China’s industrial capacity to wage war; (3) Secure reinforcements from the Nationalist garrison on Formosa to strengthen our position in Korea if we decided to continue the fight for that peninsula; and (4) Release existing restrictions upon the Formosan garrison for diversionary action (possibly leading to counter-invasion) against vulnerable areas of the Chinese Mainland. I believe that by the foregoing measures we could severely cripple and largely neutralize China’s capability to wage aggressive war and thus save Asia from the engulfment otherwise facing it. I believe furthermore that we could do so with but a relatively small part of our overall military potential committed to the purpose. There is no slightest doubt but that this action would at once release the pressure upon our forces in Korea, whereupon determination could be reached as to whether to maintain the fight in that area or to effect a strategic displacement of our forces with the view to strengthening our defense of the Littoral Island chain while continuing our naval and air pressure upon China’s military potential. I am fully conscious of the fact that this course of action has been rejected in past for fear of provoking China to a major war effort but we must now realistically recognize that China’s commitment thereto has already been fully unequivocally made and that nothing we can do would further aggravate the situation as far as China is concerned.
Whether defending ourselves by way of military retaliation would bring in Soviet military intervention or not is a matter of speculation. I have always felt that a Soviet decision to precipitate a general war would depend solely upon the Soviets own estimate of relative strengths and capabilities, with little regard for other factors. It was because of this and the growing tensions arising from the Soviets [Page 1632] increasing propaganda interest in Japan that for the past six months I have advocated the reinforcement of the Far East Command by a minimum of an army of four divisions. It has been my intention to commit this reinforcement to the defense of Japan and to provide a security cover for the gradual building up of Japan’s own defense potential. It has never been my thought that they should be committed to the Korean campaign. Indeed, it was my understanding, in which I may have been in error, that the four National Guard divisions called to active duty in September were for the ultimate employment here should the necessity arise. If we are forced to evacuate Korea without taking military measures against China proper as suggested in your message, it would have the most adverse effect upon the peoples of Asia, not excepting the Japanese, and a material reinforcement of the forces now in this theater would be mandatory if we are to hold the Littoral Defense Chain including Japan against determined assault. Moreover it must be borne in mind that evacuation of our forces from Korea under any circumstances would at once release the bulk of the Chinese Forces now absorbed by that campaign for action elsewhere—quite probably in areas of far greater importance than Korea itself. On the other hand, the relatively small command we now have in Korea is capable of so draining the enemy’s resources as to protect the areas to the south which would in itself be possibly a greater contribution to the general situation than could be made by such a force disposed in other areas for purely defense purposes, but not possessing the power to pin down and localize so massive a part of the enemy’s potential as now committed in Korea. I have little doubt but that the entire ROK potential in case of our evacuation would disintegrate or become of negligible value. The loss of Korea would render the defense of Japan more vulnerable.
I understand thoroughly the demand for European security and fully concur in doing everything possible in that sector, but not to the point of accepting defeat anywhere else—an acceptance which I am sure could not fail to insure later defeat in Europe itself. The preparations for the defense of Europe, however, by the most optimistic estimate are aimed at a condition of readiness two years hence. The use of forces in the present emergency in the Far East would not in any way prejudice this basic concept. To the contrary it would insure thoroughly seasoned forces for later commitment in Europe synchronously with Europe’s own development of military resource.
So far as your tactical estimate of the situation in Korea is concerned, under the conditions presently implied viz no reinforcements, continued restrictions upon Chinese Nationalist action, no military measures against China’s continental military potential, and the concentration of China’s military force solely upon the Korean sector it [Page 1633] would seem to be sound. The tactical plan of a successively contracting defense line south to the Pusan beachhead is believed the only possible way in which an evacuation could be accomplished. In the execution of this plan it would not be necessary for you to make an anticipatory decision for evacuation until such time as we may be forced to that beachhead line.