Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

357.AD/12–2950: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

New York, December 29, 1950—9:07 p. m.
[Received December 29—10:29 p. m.]

Delga 467. Re Korea. Following is report Ross’ conversations today:

Jebb telephoned this morning to ask our views on action in UN. He said he had asked London for instructions but had received nothing from them as yet. He said he assumed we were not pressing for meeting before January 3. He assumed cease-fire group would make factual report and that committee would thereafter (probably beginning January 4) have to take some action re report if only to take note of it. He said he thought 6-power resolution was out of date and would have to be modified, question being how it should be modified. Said he guessed his people in London would be worried about a finding of aggression against ChiComs at this time for fear of precipitating war with China with resultant threat to Hong Kong and he observed he thought French would be even more worried. He said he understood Israelis were peddling resolution (with Canadians, Swedes, et cetera) which, as he had heard of it, seemed unrealistic in that it seemed to assume that elections could be held, et cetera, with armies still in field. He said he was seeing Rau this afternoon and would let us know if he found out anything of interest.

Lacoste came in at his request to explain text of resolution which Chauvel and he had drafted (sent Department as Delga 466, December 29).¹ Lacoste said Dayal had come to see him yesterday and had argued against 6-power resolution on grounds that it was out of date, that it had been presented originally in situation which had been overtaken by events, and that if it were passed now it would in effect give MacArthur free hand to bomb Manchuria. Lacoste indicated he (and, by implication, Chauvel) shared Indian view of 6-power resolution, at least to extent of believing it was quite out of date. Lacoste said that in view of development of events since 6-power resolution had originally been tabled, Chauvel had drafted last night resolution based on 6-power resolution but which was in some respects stronger and in some respects weaker. He stressed that this initiative by Chauvel was entirely personal and that it was not based on instructions or even on any indication of French Government views.

Ross, emphasizing that he was thinking out loud and speaking entirely personally, expressed view that Chauvel’s effort was interesting and that we would seek advice of Department and let him know soon as possible our official reaction which Lacoste had requested.

Referring to second paragraph of draft and to phrase, noting the report of the committee of 3, Ross queried whether they were not a very weak presentation of the facts in the case. He emphasized our continuing desire to find peaceful solution of Korean question but on other hand necessity of maintaining in the process the unity and integrity of UN which was more essentially a means of protection to smaller states than in fact to US.

Admitting in effect that draft resolution was perhaps not very well balanced between these considerations, Lacoste felt that stronger references to ChiCom aggression and their defiance of UN, in particular cease-fire group, might very well slam door on any possibility of achieving peaceful settlement with ChiComs.

At lunch with Dayal he in effect confirmed what Lacoste had reported re Indian attitude toward 6-power resolution. More specifically he said that paragraph in resolution calling attention to grave danger which continued intervention by Chinese forces in Korea would entail taken in conjunction with preceding paragraph would certainly be interpreted by ChiComs and Russians either as threat to bomb Manchuria or as empty threat which we were not able to back up. Referring to a meeting Thursday night² Dayal said press accounts were distorted. He said Rau had been delegated by group to get in touch with US and find out our attitude towards giving precedence to and passing 12 Asian power resolution. He implied very strongly that group did not want to go ahead with 12-power resolution on basis indicated without at least our acquiescence.

Emphasizing our desire to maintain unity of free world within UN, Ross drew attention to repeated indications we had given Rau and others of our willingness to seek peaceful settlement. Open defiance of cease-fire group and continued aggressive posture of ChiComs raised serious question whether UN could refuse any longer to face these simple facts. If UN refused to face these facts to what extent, if any, could UN be maintained as effective, collective security instrument, having in mind in particular security of smaller or weaker nations. From point of view of American public it must be apparent that there was strong body of opinion in this country which felt that if UN were to follow line of appeasement then US should look after its own security and allow others look out for theirs. Since the facts were so clear, would it not seem essential as minimum for UN to recognize facts.

Dayal did not disagree that facts were clear. He also recognized that survival of free nations, at least weaker ones, depended upon maintenance of UN. At same time he felt that to name ChiComs as aggressors would risk precipitating not only war with China but perhaps general war. He felt we must not give up our efforts to achieve peaceful settlement and that to name ChiComs as aggressors would in fact sacrifice what remaining chance there might be of peaceful solution.

Ross asked whether it would not be better to proceed with 6-power resolution as next step in committee. For reasons already indicated Dayal said he thought this would be very unwise.

It was clearly understood that foregoing conversation was personal and exploratory on both sides.

Grafstrom came in at his request. He said first that Israelis had been to see him with new draft resolution explaining that they want to discuss it with US but wanted get reactions from other delegations first. He said Israeli resolution had following components: (1) ceasefire; (2) declaration support objective of unified Korea involving elections, et cetera; (3) new commission in place of UNCURK on which USSR and ChiComs would be represented; (4) withdrawal by both sides; (5) reconstruction Korea under auspices UN; (6) hands-off Korea policy; (7) after foregoing accomplished, discussion outstanding issues including: (A) Formosa; (B) Chinese–Korean frontier; and (C) Chinese representation. Grafstrom said he had given Israelis no encouragement since he thought resolution quite unrealistic.

Grafstrom said he thought 6-power resolution might be all right as a quickie but that it was clearly out of date. He said in contemplating pending resolutions we were trying to ride two horses. He said he thought we should forget about cease-fire and forget about idea of negotiations and try new approach. He thought new approach might be based on reality of what UN could do and could not do in present situation. He thought it might be good idea for UN to withdraw its forces and save them for building up strength of free world. He would leave moral force of UN behind in Korea in form of UN commission stronger and bigger than UNCURK, supported by a UN guard. He said he thought there might perhaps be another body composed of US, UK, USSR and ChiComs. He said he would envisage withdrawal of ChiCom forces and the exacting of guarantees from NK’s that they would collaborate with new commission and cooperate in restoration and maintenance law and order.

In substance Grafstrom said he felt we should give up Korea (leaving moral force only of UN behind) and let ChiComs find out hard way that they were not going to get Formosa or China seat in UN.

Grafstrom asked for reactions to his suggestions telegraphed Department; December 27 (Delga 464).

Padilla Nervo³ telephoned and said he had been talking with several delegates, all of whom were worried about next steps in UN. He expressed view most important consideration was to determine action in UN on basis necessity safeguarding UN forces and what he termed prospective operations for future. Referring to various pending resolutions and modifications thereof, he said he thought we should not contemplate taking one step without knowing pretty exactly what next steps would be. In this connection he said number of delegations had commented to him on Lie statement to effect that putting responsibility on other side for general war did not meet point of necessity maintaining UN principles without endangering future of UN. He said he had talked with Urdaneta⁴ who had urged taking up 6-power resolution and voting on it following report of 3. Padilla thought this was rushing matters too fast. He thought we might hear report of cease-fire group on Wednesday and then allow little time for full consultations and opportunity for delegates to get instructions in view of gravity situation before rushing headlong along some particular course.

Fawzi telephoned and gave fuller version Asian group meeting Thursday night. Said he and Rau had been delegated to ascertain views other delegates re giving priority to 12-power resolution. Fawzi indicated, however, which Dayal had not, that group contemplated amendment of 12-power resolution, making everything conditional on cease-fire. Fawzi felt giving priority to 12-power resolution amended as indicated would be wholly consistent with US statements in committee and Attlee–Truman communiqué. He argued that another chance should be given to ChiComs. If this chance refused our (UN) position would be improved not worsened. We would be strengthened, he said, in whatever next steps we would have to take. Next steps might include 6-power resolution with appropriate modifications in light of new developments. Asked what modifications of 6-power resolution he had in mind, Fawzi said he had not thought this through. He then commented in same sense as Dayal concerning present form 6-power resolution to effect that if, in light of developments, 6-power resolution were now passed, it would be giving or interpreted as giving blank check to cross frontier and hit at bases from which trouble is coming. In light Fawzi’s comments it seemed quite clear Asian group has not faced up to or thought through problem of what comes next if, following passage 12-power resolution, ChiComs and Russians maintain present attitude.

Fawzi emphasized strongly Asian group desire get together with US. He hoped for our positive support giving precedence 12-power resolution, amended as he had indicated. If US could not take positive stand in favor we could abstain as long as it was understood we were not strongly opposed. On basis talks past few days with Fawzi, Jamali and Dayal, it seems clear Arabs are endeavoring to some extent at least to protect our position vis-à-vis Rau, and are thus far at least seeking maintain some flexibility in hoping reach compromise and solidarity with US.

Austin

1. Telegram Delga 466 not printed. The draft resolution in its second paragraph noted “that with the knowledge and consent of the PRC armed forces organized in large units and composed of Chinese subjects have crossed the Chinese border and are undertaking military operations against the forces of the U.N. in Korea.” In its concluding paragraph, the draft resolution invited “the PRC to cease all assistance and encouragement of the authorities of North Korea, to prevent its subjects and all members and units of its armed forces from aiding the North Korean forces, and to recall immediately all its subjects and all members or units of its forces which may at the present moment be in Korea.” (320.2–AB/12–2950)
2. December 28.
3. Dr. Luis Padilla Nervo, Mexican Permanent Representative at the United Nations.
4. Roberto Urdaneta Arbelaez of Colombia, Chairman of the First Committee.