320/12–3050: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 30—6:55 p. m.]
Delga 470. Re Korea. Ambassador Muniz (Brazil) called on me this morning at his request and said that he was anxious to know where we stood. I indicated that the first item of our agenda was the 6 power resolution and we thought that the best course of action open to us was to proceed in normal course with that resolution perhaps with some modifications. I said I understood that the Asians were still interested in their 12 power proposal. Speaking for the United States mission, I said I felt that the passage of this resolution would lower the prestige of the UN and that I thought that it was clear that the efforts of the UN to obtain a cease fire had been rejected and had been rejected in insulting terms. The UN had received two slaps in the face from the Chinese. Was it appropriate now to repeat the same process and receive a third slap in the face? I said that I did not believe that anything useful could come of such an effort and indicated that it was not clear to us that the Asian states had made up their minds to press this step. There were indications that they might not do so unless they received a favorable response from the other delegations. I said that I rather hoped that they would not put this proposal forward at all.
I indicated that we were extremely conscious of the importance of maintaining the unity of the free world in the present situation. It was of great importance to us to have all the free world, including the Asian states and the Arabs stand together. We hoped that in the present circumstances it would be possible to take a first and relatively mild step forward basing our action upon the fundamentals of the 6 power resolution. This had received very wide support heretofore. It was not provocative. It did not close any doors, nor do we intend to close any doors to negotiation. On the other hand, it would be a first action which would begin to uphold the prestige of the UN. We were quite prepared to consider amendments to this resolution which would [Page 1634] increase its support among the members. I mentioned that some delegations were concerned that the resolution would authorize the Unified Command and MacArthur to bomb China. This was a misconception. If necessary, we were quite prepared to modify the two paragraphs which gave concern in this respect. We were also prepared to drop other paragraphs which were out of date and to try to work out with the Arabs and the Asians some additional paragraphs which might indicate that the door for negotiation was not being slammed.
I said that this was only the first step in a program. If the Communists did not withdraw or change their policy, it would, of course, be necessary to go on to firmer and stronger action. We are not yet prepared to discuss with our friends details of such a second stage. We felt, however, that it was of urgent importance that we work very closely together on this step as we had done in preparing the essentials of peace resolution. Passing the 6 power resolution now would give us the necessary time to work out the second stage resolution through diplomatic preparation so that before it was introduced we would be assured of wide support.
Ambassador Muniz expressed his appreciation and his agreement with this policy. He particularly noted the desirability of attempting to find a basis of agreement with the Asian group. It was essential in his view to have a very large vote in favor of the 6 power resolution. He agreed with my analysis of the 12 power resolution and thought that it would damage the prestige of the UN. Ambassador Muniz emphasized that in his view it was most important that we should work out an agreed program before the Wednesday meeting so that everybody would understand what was going to happen. Then there would be no public disputes. He said he would like to talk to his Latin American friends about the matter and I indicated that I would be glad to have him do so along the above lines.