Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/12–2950: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)¹

top secret
operational immediate

[Washington,] December 29, 1950.

[JCS 99935.] From JCS personal for MacArthur. This Message has been handled here with the ultimate of security and it is suggested that the contents thereof be confined, for the present, to you and your Chief of Staff and to General Ridgway² and his Chief of Staff. Message follows:

It appears from all estimates available that the Chinese Communists possess the capability of forcing United Nations forces out of Korea if they choose to exercise it. The execution of this capability might be prevented by making the effort so costly to the enemy that they would abandon it, or by committing substantial additional United States forces to that theater thus seriously jeopardizing other commitments including the safety of Japan. It is not practicable to obtain significant additional forces for Korea from other members of the United Nations. We believe that Korea is not the place to fight a major war. Further, we believe that we should not commit our remaining available ground forces to action against Chinese Communist forces in Korea in face of the increased threat of general war. However, a successful resistance to Chinese-North Korean aggression at some position in Korea and a deflation of the military and political prestige of the Chinese Communists would be of great importance to our national interests, if this could be accomplished without incurring serious losses.

Your basic directive to furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in that area requires modification in the light of the present situation.

You are now directed to defend in successive positions, as generally outlined in your CX 50635,³ inflicting such damage to hostile forces in Korea as is possible, subject to the primary consideration of the safety of your troops. Every effort should be continued to mobilize the maximum Korean contribution to sustained resistance, including both conventional and unconventional means.

Since developments may force our withdrawal from Korea, it is important, particularly in view of the continued threat to Japan, to determine, in advance, our last reasonable opportunity for an orderly evacuation. It seems to us that if you are forced back to positions in the vicinity of the Kum River and a line generally eastward therefrom, and if thereafter the Chinese Communists mass large forces against your positions with an evident capability of forcing us out of Korea, it then would be necessary, under these conditions, to direct you to commence a withdrawal to Japan.

Your views are requested as to the above-outlined conditions which should determine a decision to initiate evacuation, particularly in light of your continuing primary mission of defense of Japan for which only troops of the Eighth Army are available.

Following the receipt of your views you will be given a definite directive as to the conditions under which you should initiate evacuation.

1. The source text is a copy of this message sent on January 2, 1951 to Mr. Rusk fry Col. L. K. Ladue, Deputy Secretary of the JCS.
2. Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway had arrived in Korea on December 26 to assume command of the Eighth Army following the death of Gen. Walton H. Walker in an accident.

3. Not printed. The substance of this message was rendered as follows in Record of the Actions Taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 74:

   “On 7 December 1950, CINCFE issued instructions for a withdrawal in successive positions, if necessary, to the Pusan area, the Eighth Army holding the Seoul area as long as possible without risking envelopment; and the X Corps withdrawing from the Hung Nam area and eventually rejoining the Eighth Army. This plan was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 December 1950.”