357.AD/12–2850: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received December 28—7:48 p. m.]
Delga 465. Re Korea—Indochina. Following is report of Ross’ conversations with Lacoste (France) and Fawzi (Egypt) today. In both cases conversations on our side were essentially personal and exploratory in order to draw out thinking of others rather than selling any line of our own.
Lacoste came in at his request for exchange of views in light of his recent visit to Paris. After discussing French views concerning Brussels conference which are undoubtedly familiar to Department, he said [Page 1621] that French he saw in Paris did not have very many thoughts about current Korean situation. They professed to be completely in dark concerning military situation; they supposed there were four alternatives: (a) withdrawal altogether; (b) hold on at 38th parallel; (c) withdrawal to two beachheads (Inchon and Pusan); or (d) one beachhead (Pusan). They did not know which of these alternatives should be adopted either from military or political viewpoint. Generally they hoped very much we would not get involved even in limited war with China.
Lacoste then proceeded at his suggestion to give very gloomy analysis of situation in FE as he saw it. In this analysis he talked great deal about situation in Indochina in relation to Korea, emphasizing former much more heavily (he in fact several times turned conversation back to IC away from current situation in UN re Korea). He said so far as Korea concerned it was obvious that best available US forces were immobilized there. Best that could be hoped for would be to punish Chinese to some extent but that this would not appear to be very much relative to vast manpower resources of China. With regard to IC he had somewhat similar view. It did not appear to him that IC could be held very long against ChiCom manpower and material resources if ChiCom’s decided give full-scale support to IC Communists. If IC fell he was quite certain that rest SE Asia (Nepal, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia) would fall very quickly to Communists and in turn India would not be far behind. This would mean fundamentally important loss sources of rubber, tin, sugar, petroleum, and other raw materials. US for six months past had been bearing major and highly disproportionate share of burden in Korea; France, however, had borne major share of burden in IC for last five years. Half of France’s military budget was devoted to IC defense. They had been losing annually in IC flower of their officer corps at as fast rate as they could turn out officers at St. Cyr. Economic institutions such as the Banque de L’Indo-Chine had been smart enough to withdraw most their assets; there was not particular economic stake left for France in IC. Neither was there a political stake, France having signed that away in treaty with Associated States. They were therefore staying in IC only to hold line against advance of Communism throughout SE Asia and in order not to run out on Indochinese who had thrown in their lot with French and free world.
Lacoste observed that Moscow must be very pleased with situation we now find ourselves in IC and Korea. He also observed that in retrospect he felt we had probably made great mistake to go into Korea at end of June. He said when he was in Japan following 1945 he had [Page 1622] talked with great many our military and diplomatic people and it had been his understanding that Korea was not strategic necessity to protect Japan. In light of circumstances as they have developed since end of June he wondered whether it would not have been wiser for us to have denounced NK aggression, to have taken that aggression as basis for mobilization of free world against Communist aggression but to have refrained from going back into Korea.
In view of intense gloom of Lacoste’s presentation Ross asked whether Lacoste drew conclusion from his remarks that we should get out of Korea and IC as soon as we could. Lacoste hedged somewhat in response. He said we should examine very carefully whether there were any reasonable chance of holding line in IC. If so then we should probably try to hold on as long as we could. France, he said, could not possibly do this alone without very substantial help from US. It might perhaps be not altogether unfair to draw inference from all of Lacoste’s remarks that we should in effect beat a strategic retreat from Korea in order to support more fully Indochinese resistance to Communist aggression as well as husbanding our resources for defense in other areas.
On other hand Lacoste recognized importance of UN and of preserving its unity and integrity to maximum possible degree as an instrument which could be a very effective one for free world in resisting Communist aggression.
With regard to current parliamentary situation in UN Lacoste’s principal concern seemed to be that we should avoid participating [precipitating] a crisis before we are ready to meet it. He seemed to assume that we would consider it essential at early date to name ChiCom’s as aggressors and he personally indicated that he was fully prepared to accept this as well as further steps such as economic sanctions. In giving this indication it is probable, however, that he was not reflecting views of his government nor of Chauvel; in fact he gave some indication that Chauvel’s mind was running in direction of some middle course which on one hand would be perhaps somewhat stronger than six-power resolution, but on other hand perhaps not so strong as to name ChiCom’s explicitly as aggressors. In context of this part of conversation Lacoste observed that he thought we would have great deal difficulty with British in getting them go along with naming of ChiCom’s as aggressors.
With regard to six-power resolution Lacoste dismissed possibility of withdrawing it. He thought it was probably not adequate in its present form and he assumed we should probably proceed on basis of some modification of six-power resolution. Mentioning pending Soviet resolution and twelve-power Asian resolution (negotiations) in passing, [Page 1623] Lacoste said there was fourth possibility in present parliamentary situation, namely, possibility of four-power talks. On latter point Ross indicated (reference topsec Deptel 612, December 27)1 that there was of course no certainty at all that ministerial meeting would be held or that if it were held FE questions would be discussed, and that for these reasons it did not seem very fruitful to consider any possible ministerial meeting as factor in parliamentary situation which confronts us now and with which we will have to deal no later than next Wednesday.2
At lunch Fawzi took line he wanted to talk about broad principles rather than routine of pending resolutions. He talked about necessity of maintaining unity of UN and said he was opposed to hardening of any Asian bloc along lines of LA bloc. On other hand he felt Asians perhaps had psychology and a feel for situation which would be helpful in preservation unity of UN. He then raised rhetorical question whether we (UN) were ready to name ChiCom’s as aggressors and accept consequences. Answering the question he said UN was not psychologically or physically prepared for this step. Psychologically he said that Asian countries, even including India, realized in their hearts they had to side with us as part of free world and in interest of their own self-preservation. On other hand they were confronted with psychological fact that westerners and particularly Americans were shooting Asians. From physical point of view Asian countries recognized their own weaknesses; beyond this they recognized physical weakness of west at this time. It was essential in view of such factors and having in mind fundamental importance of preserving unity of UN, in present situation we must play for time, even if best we could gain by playing for time would be only six weeks or six months. Naming ChiCom’s as aggressors would cast the die and lose us the chance of gaining even a little time.
Turning to NE in order to illustrate what he hoped could be accomplished or at least begun in direction of psychological and physical preparedness, he referred first to Anglo-Egyptian treaty and of developing true spirit with Egypt and other Arab states of comradeship in arms. He said neither his government nor any other Arab government could relegate its people to role of trenchdiggers, camp-followers or lackeys. If a true comradeship in arms could be developed then free world would in reality have strong defense in depth in NE which would more than adequately protect our interests in that area; he mentioned bases, transportation, communication, oil.
[Page 1624]Second, he mentioned necessity of convincing under-developed peoples of NE that western world stood for “social justice”. This must be done by further steps for technical aid and economic development. Third, on question of peace with Israel he said that while it was impossible at present for Arab states to enter directly into definitive and final peace arrangements with Israel they were nevertheless fully prepared to envisage treaty system based upon tripartite declaration that would give every possible assurance of protection for Israel.
Drawing conversation back to UN, Ross emphasized the stake which smaller and weaker countries have in UN collective security system. He emphasized feeling great many Americans had that if members of UN were not willing to support it in its efforts to combat aggression, then there was not much reason for US to support it. At same time if UN ignored defiance by ChiCom’s of its efforts through cease-fire group and otherwise to achieve peaceful settlement, this would greatly weaken fabric of UN.
Fawzi said he was strongly opposed to appeasement or rewarding aggression.
He said he was trying to find and steer a middle course between appeasement and slamming door on whatever possibility might remain of achieving peaceful settlement; in light of Chou En-Lai response to cease-fire group and fact that there has not yet after month been any reply to Asian appeal to ChiCom’s not to cross 38th parallel, he agreed there did not seem to be much desire on part of ChiCom’s for peaceful settlement. He volunteered that if ChiCom’s crossed 38th parallel it would probably undoubtedly be necessary name them as aggressors. He said in order maintain integrity of UN principles and its objectives in Korea he thought there should be no voluntary withdrawal from Korea. He said he would prefer to have us “thrown out”. He thought best thing would be to try to establish very strong beachhead in Pusan area as a symbol of UN determination.
Turning to pending resolutions in Committee 1, Fawzi thought six-power resolution was out-of-date. He also thought preamble of this resolution would be so obnoxious to ChiCom’s that it might have effect of slamming door. He did not urge twelve-power resolution in present form but on contrary queried whether proper approach in committee would not be to proceed on basis of a modified version of twelve-power resolution. He said he was opposed to pending Soviet resolution which was simply condemnation without investigation.
Both Lacoste and Fawzi urgently requested that we let them know as soon as possible conclusions our own thinking.