795.00/12–2150
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
| Participants: | Secretary of Defense Marshall |
| Deputy Secretary of Defense Lovett | |
| Assistant Secretary of Defense Leva | |
| Secretary of the Navy Matthews | |
| Secretary of the Air Force Finletter | |
| Assistant Secretary of the Army Johnson | |
| General Omar Bradley | |
| General Hoyt Vandenberg | |
| Admiral Forrest P. Sherman | |
| General Wade H. Haislip | |
| Assistant Secretary of State Rusk |
Secretary Marshall invited me to come to a meeting of the above Policy group to discuss in a preliminary way the security of Japan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have received a telegram1 from General MacArthur asking for substantial reinforcements for the security of Japan proper.
Secretary Marshall opened the discussion by stating that he has been concerned for a week or ten days about the extreme vulnerability of Japan in the event of a sudden Russian onslaught. He said that the American people were familiar with the general problem which would be created in Europe by a Russian attack and would expect the kind of [Page 1571] difficulty we would have in the overrunning of West Berlin, in the advance of Russian columns into Western Europe and in air attacks against the British Isles. He said that an attack on Japan, however, would disclose a degree of vulnerability which would surprise the American people and the resulting shock would produce a very serious situation. Just as he and Mr. Lovett were discussing this matter between themselves, he was brought a telegram to the Joint Chiefs of Staff from General MacArthur asking for a major reinforcement of our forces in Japan. The question which he wished to raise for discussion was whether there was any way in which we could “withdraw from Korea with honor”. He stated that he had spoken to me briefly yesterday afternoon on the matter and had invited me to come over to repeat my statement of some of the political problems which are involved.
I then spoke along the lines of the attached memorandum, covered the principal points mentioned, but telescoped a few of the questions in order to illustrate the nature of the investigation which would be required by this problem. In my conclusion I strongly emphasized the need for maximum improvisation in this situation in order to make full use of Korean and Japanese manpower. I stated that the questions which were being raised were of the greatest importance and that I could only express certain preliminary views pending the Secretary’s return from Brussels;2 Secretary Marshall indicated that the present discussion was entirely preliminary and exploratory.
Secretary Finletter then said that he thought we should keep in mind the great principle on which we had entered Korea and that we should continue to support that principle. The American people acted best in support of a great principle and we should not lose sight of that factor.
Secretary Matthews said that the considerations which he had put forward were very important and would have to be taken fully into account but that he was convinced that the American people would support a withdrawal from Korea if that proved to be necessary. He spoke of his recent trips around the country which had led him to that conclusion, despite the attitude of metropolitan newspapers which he doubted were representative on this point. He said he thought that the reaction of the American people would be much worse in the event of a forced withdrawal (a Dunkirk) than in the event of a voluntary withdrawal.
Assistant Secretary Johnson said that the basic benefit of the great decision which had been made in June, a decision which he thought [Page 1572] was the right one, was that it had awakened the American people to the nature of the threat which confronts us and had unified the country behind the measures which will have to be taken to put ourselves in a position of strength. He said that we have now identified our principal enemy and are prepared to do what is necessary to meet that danger. We have stopped the downward toboggan of our military strength. Between now and the time when we can take care of ourselves, he believes we should make the necessary decisions on a purely military basis and that if these decisions are presented to the country by military leadership they would be supported by the public. He said political judgments on such questions as prestige and the effect upon the attitudes of others can vary in much the same way in which psychological reaction to stock market trends go up and down. He said such considerations are unreliable as a basis for action and that we should do what is militarily sound. He said that he did not believe that what we do will make very much difference to the other side and that our action in Korea will have very little effect upon other moves which international communism can be expected to make.
Admiral Sherman said that from a military point of view it would be desirable to withdraw from Korea. He did not favor further ground reinforcement from the United States. He said that we should play this problem “down the middle”, decide what is right to do and that we would be supported by [sic]. He stated that he was convinced that Western Europe would be delighted to see us withdraw from Korea. He stated that there might be some loss of prestige and some adverse effect in Asia but that we might have to accept that and balance it off against our increased capacity to deal with the overall situation.
General Vandenberg expressed the view that, from a military point of view, it would be desirable to withdraw our ground forces from Korea and to continue operations by air and sea against China. He Specifically mentioned the destruction of industrial plants and the disruption of communications. He was particularly concerned about the debacle which could ensue if the 8th Army were again outflanked and driven into a Seoul-Inchon beachhead and there subjected to persistent air and submarine attack. He said the problem of evacuating the 8th Army through Inchon would become well nigh impossible. He stated that we should give serious attention to the question of gaining time. If we now believe that the Soviet Union plans to initiate an early war, he thought the point of greatest danger would be August 1951, which he related to the completion of the European harvest. He said if that is correct, between now and August 1951 would not work in our favor since we would not improve our ground potential siginficantly but would in that period have given the Soviets a chance to [Page 1573] produce additional atomic bombs. He did not say so specifically, but the implication was that it would be better for us to precipitate hostilities at an early date in order to prevent further USSR atomic buildup.
General Haislip said that he was not in favor of sending General MacArthur the large reinforcements he requested, but that if it became necessary to send him an additional division an equivalent division should be sent to the European theater. He pointed out that the divisions now in training will not have completed their basic training before March 1, and that these divisions now have in them personnel who have not yet learned how to be a basic soldier.
General Bradley said that the decision in June was a governmental decision as well as a United Nations decision, that it was taken basically for political purposes (he did not mean domestic political purposes) and that any decision to withdraw from Korea should be made as a governmental matter and perhaps as a United Nations matter. He referred to my query about instructions to United Nations forces to remain south of the 38th parallel and seemed to think there might be considerable merit in the issuance of such instructions. He did not believe we should withdraw further until we had serious indication that the enemy would in fact advance in strength south of the 38th parallel. He though it unlikely that the 8th Army would be pinned up against the Port of Inchon and thought that it would be feasible to withdraw on Pusan. He pointed out that General MacArthur had available to him some 18 divisions, of which 10 were Korean. He stated that in all directives to General MacArthur it had been pointed out that the security of Japan was paramount and that General MacArthur has made his decision to reinforce Korea with that in view. He said he thought General MacArthur might well be able to spare one or two divisions from Korea for Japan without having that make the difference between success or failure in Korea. General Bradley felt that if the Chinese were really intent upon driving us out of Korea, they had the military capability to do so even if the reinforcements which General MacArthur had requested were used in Korea itself.
During the above exchange, I pointed out that we had not asked General MacArthur to defend the 38th parallel as such, or even the Seoul area, and that if further withdrawal became necessary from a military point of view we would not interpose any political objection. General Bradley thought that we should await clear enemy intentions to drive in force south of the 38th parallel and pointed to considerable criticism that our forces had withdrawn such a great distance without having been seriously engaged except at the time of the initial Chinese counter-offensive.