Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

undated

1. Political Factors Involved in a Voluntary Withdrawal from Korea:

a. The issue of aggression. We should be confronted at once with the crucial question as to what we do about Korean and Chinese aggression. To turn away from the issue of aggression would almost certainly start a chain reaction of defeatism and disillusionment both nationally and internationally which would be difficult to halt. To withdraw from Korea, on the other hand, and take other military action against China might bring about immediate and violent reaction from the USSR which we are trying to postpone. The best way to gain time would seem to be to continue the military operation in Korea until it is clear that military necessity requires us to leave. Of course, gaining time is of little value unless the time gained is in fact used to the best advantage.

b. The commitment to the Koreans. A decision to abandon our Korean allies would have far-reaching consequences. We would voluntarily turn over some 20,000,000 anti-communists to communism. It is an important source of anti-communist military manpower from a non-American source. If we abandon the Koreans, many other present and potential allies will get a lasting impression of our reliability. This would be particularly true in Japan and the rest of Asia. It would be interpreted widely as a signal that those who are exposed had best now come to terms with communism on the best obtainable basis.

c. United States military prestige. It would be a serious thing for us to act like a defeated nation on the basis of events which have thus far transpired in Korea. In the broadest sense, our armed forces in Korea represent about 10% of our present military manpower; this 10% has not suffered heavy casualties since the beginning of the UN offensive in late November. Our comparatively small force in the field has not been seriously defeated; it has been out-maneuvered and has been set back. In any event, this force is not the measure of American power. We should not act as if we had suffered a national calamity; by doing so, it will become a national calamity.

d. Chinese military and political prestige. A voluntary withdrawal in the near future would leave Chinese military and political prestige at its peak; this would give great impetus to Chinese aggression elsewhere and to the consolidation of communism in China itself. If militarily possible, we should give the Chinese a chance to expose their weaknesses and to run up against the heavy costs of any large scale effort into south Korea. They should be forced to take a large dose of American air, sea and fire-power—even if our ultimate withdrawal from Korea becomes necessary. Hardship in Korea will produce strains on troop morale, on communist leadership and on relations between Peiping and Moscow.

2. Political Factors Involved in the Reinforcement of Japan:

a. World deployment of U.S. forces for World War III. Before deploying additional forces to Japan from the United States to meet the contingency of what would be, in fact, World War III, it should be decided that this is the deployment we would want for World War III. If the Soviets attack Japan, World War III is upon us. Where do we want our available forces to be in that contingency?

b. Vital importance of holding Japan. It can be accepted that the holding of Japan (as well as Germany, Western Europe, the United Kingdom) is of vital importance to the U.S. If there is a clear choice as between Japan and Korea, priority must go to Japan.

c. Effect in Europe of major reinforcement in Japan-Korea area. The dispatch to Japan of the divisions now in training in the U.S. would have a disastrous effect upon the program for the defense of Europe.

d. Inter-relation between our position in Korea and the defense of Japan. We should not overlook the close connection between our posture in Korea and our ability to defend Japan, because of the highly important political and psychological factors involved. A determined attitude in Korea is probably essential to a capability to defend Japan with Japanese assistance.

e. There is no question but that it would be desirable to strengthen our military position in Japan; the question is how.

3. An approach to the problem, as seen from the political side:

a. Political and military action to stabilize a position in Korea

(1) cease-fire along the 38th parallel

(2) political deal calling for phased withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea

(3) assistance to increase effectiveness of ROK forces

(4) Korea to be left in hands of a UN Commission

b. Strengthening of military position in Japan

(1) staging of 3rd Division to Japan rather than Pusan

(2) rapid increase of Japanese constabulary capability

(3) stand-by plans for immediate evacuation from Korea to Japan.

4. Questions which require examination:

a. Are there new elements in the situation now which have not been present since the Chinese Communists intervened in Korea in October?

b. Do we lack military equipment for an increased Japanese constabulary? If so, would it not be better to give a portion of the equipment now in the hands of the 4 National Guard Divisions in order to utilize Japanese manpower? We can assume that the Japanese would fight at least as well as Americans for the defense of Japan; are we not better off to keep our Americans in this country with their heavier equipment, even if we give the light equipment to the Japanese?

c. What degree of mobility can we count upon in moving our forces from Korea to Japan in the event of World War III?

d. To what extent can we improve our ability to defend Japan by increasing our air and naval power in the vicinity?

e. How far should we go in making concessions on a Korean settlement in order to remove our forces to Japan with UN blessing?

f. Assuming the increased threat of general war, what do we estimate we need for the defense of Japan, quite apart from the Korean issue?

g. How do we relate the defense of Japan to the defense of Alaska as priority demands upon our capabilities?

h. Can we find a way in the near future to reinforce our garrison in the Philippines?

i. In the event of World War III, would the atom bomb be available to play any role in the Japan-Korea theater of operations?

j. Does the problem of the defense of Japan suggest any modification of our priorities as to mobilization, e.g., should we put any special emphasis on aircraft carriers or any other particular types of weapons?

k. Is there any way in which we can make more effective use of Korean manpower within our own units, thereby making up in combat strength for any gap caused by deployment of certain units from Korea to Japan? Can we reinforce our units in Japan by attached Japanese?

l. Should we ask Canada, Australia or others to provide additional forces for the protection of UN air bases in Japan, in the event they could furnish partially-trained units for limited service in Japan?