357.AD/12–1850: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received December 18—7:30 p. m.]
Delga 448. Re Korea: Cease-fire subcommittee, Entezam, Rau and Pearson, invited Gross to meet with them Sunday evening, December 17. Present also at meeting which lasted over two and a half hours was Jebb.
[Page 1568]Meeting was opened by Rau. He said that although the committee had not any official contacts with Wu, he had had informal discussions with him. Wu privately reiterated the PRC feeling that the 13-power Asian resolution re cease-fire is a trap in the sense that Communists are called upon to cease hostilities without any concrete assurances that there will subsequently be broad negotiations with them on Far East problems. He added that Wu had asked Rau to keep trying, that the Communists want peace and that while he must return to Peiping on December 19, a mission could always return. Gross commented that Wu’s public utterances followed entirely the Malik approach and that if the Communists wanted to settle these problems they could do so. Gross wanted the record clear that the Communists have from the beginning singled out the US for vituperation and that this tactic should be seen for what it is.
Rau continued that in the light of his contacts with Wu and after Conferring with the other members of the subcommittee, they had decided that the best way to meet what might be a suspicious, but nevertheless real fear of entrapment would be by passing immediately the second Asian resolution calling for the representatives of governments not named in the resolution to make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of existing issues. During the ensuing discussion, which ended with a rejection of this idea and the strong opposition to it by Gross, the following points were covered:
- (a)
- Calling upon the representatives of governments to meet as soon as possible would mean as soon as possible after a cease-fire were in effect and therefore the resolution might never become operative. Rau would have been willing to accept an amendment to clarify the point.
- (b)
- The peaceful settlement of existing issues which is language from the Truman-Attlee communiqué should be taken to mean existing Far East issues and that could be explained in speeches.
- (c)
- Gross emphasized that another difficulty with the resolution would be that its passage would indicate a quid fro quo for a cease-fire. On this, Pearson argued quite strongly that there would be no added connection between the two resolutions by calling up the second one at once.
- (d)
- The bulk of the discussion revolved around the idea of leaving blank the names of the representatives who should be called upon to make recommendations. Rau had suggested the US, UK, Soviet Union, and Chinese Communists and three others—perhaps India, Egypt and France. All sorts of formulas were suggested, all of which involved the US, UK, USSR and Chinese Communists, and none of which provided for the interests of the ROK or Nationalist Government of China. Entezam advanced several ideas for leaving blank the governments involved for a definite or indefinite period. Rau indicated that he would not accept an amendment which would avoid the blank and provide simply that representatives of interested or directly interested [Page 1569] governments should meet after the cease-fire became effective. At that point, the idea of adopting the resolution was discarded.
During the discussion, Gross emphasized very strongly the US interest in proceeding with the six-power resolution and the fact that we had slowed our pace simply to recognize the views of those who wished to try for a cease-fire. He gave to the group the substance of Deptel 584 of December 13, stressing that while the US is willing to negotiate with the Peiping regime, the question of the forum as raised by the blank in the Asian resolution is basic and we would not accept any demand that the UN should oust the Nationalists from such negotiations. He also pointed out the additional items which the US might wish to suggest during such negotiations.
He recalled that it is the Chinese Communists who are actually pressing an offensive and that we see the six-power resolution as the absolute minimum and the authority and future of the UN at stake. He suggested in the light of this that if some useful idea was in the second Asian resolution, perhaps it could be added as an amendment to the six-power resolution. Gross referred to strong domestic feeling in the US toward isolationism if we and our friends become separated on this question and he added that when the Communists and Russians single out the US for attack, it is only fair to expect our friends to point to the fallacy.
Pearson, asserting his concern to preserve collective security machinery, felt his government would have recognized PRC but for US view. He saw divided view in UN on true motives of that regime and felt that opinion must be respected, otherwise war in Far East without solid support could result. In same vein Jebb referred to Chiang Kai-shek as “dead duck”. He felt that present situation could result in some UN members being at war with China without others and he did not construe Truman-Attlee communiqué as providing that Chinese Nationalist Government should take part in negotiations over Far Eastern problems of sort envisaged in Asian draft resolution. In summing up, Gross spoke from substance of Deptel 263.1
When idea of giving priority to draft resolution and passing it was abandoned, Pearson suggested that subcommittee make an interim report reciting their informal discussions with Wu, pointing out that Asian resolution previously adopted contains in its preamble indication that further steps should be taken for peaceful settlement. Report or statement would then point out that this means negotiations not to exclude Peiping regime.2 He then expressed hope that US would state [Page 1570] in committee that Truman-Attlee communiqué indicates that these governments would not exclude Peiping regime from discussions of the type mentioned in preamble of 13-power Asian resolution. However, this was a tentative view which the members of the subcommittee themselves wished to consider further.
Gross commented that he would ask instructions and that while it is a fair interpretation of the communiqué to say that the Peiping regime should not be excluded, it would have to be read in the light of other parts of the communiqué, such as the reference to excluding any thought of appeasement and the need for strong support for resistance against aggression. He also stressed the strong views of the US for proceeding with the six-power resolution and evolving policy from there.