357.AD/12–1650: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received December 16—1:22 p. m.]
Delga 443. From Gross. Re Chinese Communist Delegation talks. Lie told me at midnight last night that Wu had come to see him during the evening. Wu said that the Chinese Communist Delegation had been here for about three weeks and felt that there was not much [Page 1557] use for them to stay around any longer. Wu said that the GA “had recessed” and that the matter which the Chinese had come to discuss had been postponed many times in the committee. Therefore, Wu was planning to leave with his group on Tuesday1 by BOAC flight and Wu asked Lie to help make arrangements for their trip.
Wu also asked Lie to set up a press conference for Wu at Lake Success at 3:00 p. m. today. Wu’s apparent intention is to announce publicly pretty much what he said to Lie last night. Lie told me that he urged Wu not to take this step and that he pointed out to Wu that from the point of view of Chinese Communists themselves this would be a harmful step for them to take at the very moment the cease-fire group was attempting to establish contact with them for the purpose of discussing the basis of a satisfactory cease-fire. However, Wu repeated that he was under instructions from his government to return to Peiping and added that they wanted him back there for the Chinese New Year and that in any event Wu could return to Lake Success quickly if that seemed desirable. When Lie pressed him further to be available for a meeting with the cease-fire group, Wu replied that he had already told Rau yesterday morning at a meeting between Wu and Eau that Wu would not meet with the cease-fire group and that he considered the GA resolution illegal.
Following his meeting with Wu, Lie called together the group of three and told them of his conversation with Wu. It was decided by the group of three that Rau, on their behalf, would seek a meeting with Wu this a. m. and make an informal approach for the purpose of making arrangements for a formal meeting between the group of three and the Chinese Communist Delegation.
In order to take an independent reading of the situation, I called Pearson this a. m. The latter confirmed the substance of Lie’s conversation with the group of three. However, with regard to the Rau-Wit meeting yesterday a. m., Pearson said that after the group had left Lie, Pearson taxed Rau for full information concerning his meeting with Wu. (Rau had made no mention whatever to me of the fact that he had met with Wu yesterday a. m., despite the fact that at the lengthy meeting of Crittenberger and myself with the group of three we had discussed at considerable length the procedures by which the group might go about the problem of establishing contact with the Chinese as well as the matter of approach in any such meeting.)
Pearson said that Rau did not give to him quite the same flavor of his conversation with Wu as appeared from Lie’s report of the Wu-Eau [Page 1558] conversation. Rau told Pearson that he had not lost hope as a result of anything Wu had said to him and that he did not get the impression from Wu that the latter was on the point of immediate departure from New York. However, Rau frankly admitted to Pearson that he was somewhat influenced to optimism by reason of the reports he was receiving from GOI concerning Panikkar’s discussions in Peiping. It appeared from these reports, said Rau, that the Chinese in Peiping were not taking as intransigent or hard a line as Wu was taking in New York.
Pearson told me confidentially that he was preparing a message which he expected to clear with his colleagues on the group. This message would constitute a formal approach by the group to Wu and, among other things, apparently would state that the group was willing to see the Chinese Communists or North Koreans anywhere. I asked Pearson whether this meant the group was contemplating a flight to the Far East, to which Pearson replied “not necessarily”, that they might request someone on the spot to see the appropriate authorities on behalf of the group.
In the meantime, Rau, if he succeeds in seeing Wu this a. m., will tell him that the reason the group had not wished to make a formal approach was out of consideration for Wu, since it seemed to the group better to make the first approach on an informal basis in an attempt to establish contact.
Pearson agreed with me that it was highly desirable for the group to send a formal communication to the Chinese Communists prior to the 3 o’clock press conference. I urged that they send such a note as soon as possible after (and if) Rau sees Wu and that I hoped that Pearson would not let himself be talked out of sending such a formal communication by any fuzzy analysis by Rau. A copy of the note, I thought, should be telegraphed to Peiping.
Pearson told me that Younger was coming to see him this a. m. and tell him about a talk which Younger had with Wu yesterday. I shall endeavor to see or talk with Younger myself later this a. m. in order to get a direct report and will communicate to Department as soon as possible.
At 11:45 a. m. today Pearson called to advise that Rau had not been able to establish contact with Wu and might see Wu tonight following the Wu press conference. Pearson agreed with me that it would be desirable for group to send formal communication to Wu prior to press conference, and Pearson will communicate at once with Entezam to make this recommendation. [Gross.]
- December 19.↩