357.AD/12–1550: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received December 15—7:25 p. m.]
974. From Gross. Re meeting of Entezam Committee. Following is report of meeting this afternoon of Gross (representing Austin) and General Crittenberger,1 as military adviser, with group of three established under GA Resolution re Korea.
At outset, Gross made preliminary statement reflecting point of view of US Government that UN forces were in Korea pursuant to UN mission, whereas Chinese Communists were there as outlaws and aggressors against UN; that we assumed UN would adhere to principle that Chinese Communists must withdraw forces from Korea even though this point was not covered in formulation of indispensable conditions of a cease-fire which group of three was about to receive; and that we understood this meeting to be for purpose of outlining UC point of view re the essential elements of cease-fire within military context.
Gross then set forth points contained in Department’s No. 590, December 15, as revised at meeting this a. m. of Rusk, Hickerson, Crittenberger [Page 1555] and Gross with Austin.2 Text was not left with committee, all three members of which took full notes. General reaction of three members of group was that elements outlined were fair. Gross and Crittenberger stressed that these were indispensable elements and not a point of departure for bargaining purposes. This was understood by all three members, none of whom expressed disagreement.
After some discussion of best tactics of approach of group to Chinese Communists, it was agreed that the group, upon establishing contact with Chinese Communists, would go over with them the problem raised in each of the points and ascertain reactions and viewpoints of Chinese Communists without presenting UC views as a target against which Chinese Communists might shoot.
Re Cease-fire Commission, Gross made it clear we would welcome views of group as to composition of commission or use of one-man commissioner. Pearson tentatively suggested possibility of using POC in some manner, or some designee of POC. Gross suggested possibility of using UNCURK, or some designee of UNCURK, or establishing a one-man supervisory mechanism. Gross referred to experience in cease-fire problems heretofore handled by UN and pointed out that use of one-man truce supervisor seemed to be more practicable than use of commission which frequently injected political elements. It was understood by group that we were receptive to suggestions and that this point would be discussed further after the group had considered the matter and consulted among themselves.
No opposition was taken to any of the suggested points. Question was asked what we contemplated for “administration” of demilitarized zone, to which Gross and Crittenberger replied that we had no prejudgments on this matter except appropriate provision must be made in the cease-fire arrangements with regard to civil government and police power in the demilitarized zone. We referred to experience of US government in dealing with civil affairs problems in World War II.
At request of Gross, Crittenberger made statement concerning composition of teams of observers to be designated by the Ceasefire Commission. The general feeling was that these might be composed of representatives of opposing armed forces but group of three wished to consider this matter further.
With regard to neutralizing waters off land areas occupied opposing armed forces, question arose concerning possible introduction into those waters of Soviet naval vessels. Crittenberger pointed out that this problem was not covered in draft points, which referred merely [Page 1556] to “opposing naval forces”, but that we would object to use of these waters by Soviet naval forces. Group took note of this point.
Gross advised group that we would be available at any time from now on. No political questions were raised by any member of group and in particular no reference was made to what our position would be with regard to negotiations on political issues. Formosa was not mentioned.
Group had apparently not yet decided how it would proceed to attempt to establish contact with Chinese Communists. Pearson asked whether we had suggestions or information re command situation in North Korea, that is, whether forces there were under Chinese commander, what relationship was between Chinese Commander and North Korean command, and what we knew of the status of North Korean authorities. Crittenberger advised group on confidential basis without attribution to him, that the Chinese forces in North Korea were known to be under a Chinese commander, an associate of Mao Tse-tung.
Re publicity, it was agreed that in view of delicacy of negotiations and desirability of avoiding public discussion of points raised by either side, group would limit itself to brief statement merely stating discussions had been held with representatives of UC. On our part we agreed to limit ourselves to mere statement of no comment, explaining that we consider it inappropriate to make any public comments for fear of impeding the work of the group. Entezam and his colleagues made special point requesting that all efforts be made to avoid leaks in Washington and Gross agreed to pass this comment along to Department, Crittenberger to transmit same request to Defense Department to Joint Chiefs. Members of USUN all have been instructed to refrain from any comments. [Gross.]